



CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

A quarterly review of cultural developments in
the six Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.



Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with
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CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of cultural developments in the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The subjects treated include history, geography, demography, the arts, education, irrigation and communications.

In addition, the *REVIEW* analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang.

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CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

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Fuzuli as propagandist facing page 239

Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiyaya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Az. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Azerbaydzhan SSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
I	Izvestiya
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
K	Kommunist
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
NT	New Times
P	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

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EDITORIAL

The Russian administration of Central Asia during the Tsarist regime is a subject on which it has hitherto been difficult to obtain full and objective information. During the last century a number of books appeared in Britain dealing with the Russian conquest of Central Asia and some of these touched briefly on the Russian administrative arrangements. But the two most valuable of these books, Schuyler's *TURKESTAN* and Curzon's *RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA*, were written before 1890 and could therefore only describe the earlier stages of Russian administration, which was of a strictly military character. Many of the other works published in English were largely concerned with the alleged Russian threat to India and can hardly be described as objective. The latter criticism also applies to many works published in Russia, although not to the works of the great oriental historian Bartol'd, few of which, however, have been translated into English.

Soviet writing on the Tsarist period is voluminous and is important in the sense that Soviet historians have access to much archive material which is not available to the West. It too, however, can hardly be regarded as objective, since one of its main purposes is to show the great contrast between Central Asia under the Tsars and under the Soviet regime. Moreover, between 1937 and 1951 Soviet historiographical policy underwent a considerable change, with the result that many books written before 1951 by acknowledged experts are now officially condemned as inaccurate and unreliable. Since 1951 there have been further changes: emphasis is now sometimes placed on the inefficiency and corruption of Tsarist officials and sometimes on the general soundness of Tsarist policy and always on the benefits which accrued to the peoples of Central Asia from their association with the Russian people. There have no doubt been cogent political reasons for these changes of policy and shifts of emphasis, but the general impression conveyed by Soviet history of Central Asia in the Tsarist period is in no way clear or convincing.

For the student of Central Asia the appearance of Richard Pierce's *RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA 1876-1917* (Univ. of California Press, 1960) is a notable event. It seems to be the first book on the subject which has made impartial use of Tsarist Russian, Western European, and Soviet source material. The general picture which it conveys is convincing and reasonable. It makes no attempt to compare Tsarist with Soviet achievements; it does show, however, that the foundation of many of the projects and reforms successfully carried out during the Soviet period were laid by Tsarist administrators. Although Soviet critics can hardly accuse Mr. Pierce of minimizing Soviet achievements, it is unlikely that his book will give them complete satisfaction. Mr. Pierce describes his book as "a study in colonial rule" and he makes no bones about the facts of the Russian conquest. The present Soviet tendency is not to admit that Tsarist Russia owned any colonies and to substitute the word "incorporation" for conquest.

. . .

In the last issue of *CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW* mention was made of the decision by the Peoples' Council of the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region to use for the Kazakh and Uygur languages a latin alphabet of 26 letters plus 8 special letters designed to meet phonetic requirements. *DRUZHBA*, the journal of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Society, has now published (No.21, 20 May 1960) a short article on this subject. The article merely says that this decision has resulted from research carried out by experts between 1956 and 1958 and that it is expected that the old script will be replaced by the new one in from 3-5 years. No mention whatever is made of the linguistic conference held in Urumchi in August 1956, to which considerable publicity was given in the Chinese press at the time (see *CAR*, 1956, No.4, pp.444-5). At this conference it was formally decided that of the Turkic languages used in the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region, Uygur, Kazakh and Kirgiz were to be written in the cyrillic character and Uzbek and Tatar would be written in the same cyrillic script as that used by the Uzbek and Tatar peoples of the Soviet Union. During 1958 full details of the new alphabets were published in the Chinese press (see *CAR*, 1958, No.1, pp. 81-82) and from this it appeared that in fact Kazakh and Kirgiz would use exactly the same alphabets as used in the Soviet Union, while the Uygur alphabet would consist only of the 25 cyrillic letters necessary to fulfil the requirements of Uygur phonetics. It is interesting to speculate on the reasons for this change of policy. One practical consideration may have been that since the latin alphabet is in use for other purposes in other parts of China, it would be unnecessarily confusing to introduce a second non-Chinese system of writing.

. . .

The transliteration of Central Asian and Azerbaydzhani personal and geographical names is a constant source of difficulty to the Editors of the Review. In No.2 of Vol.II (1954) they explained some of their difficulties and the reason why they deviated in some respects from the system advocated by the British Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for Official Use and by the American Board on Geographical Names. In 1955, however, it was decided to adopt the latter system for all geographical names and for the transliteration of book and article titles.

It has recently been possible to examine some Soviet books of instructions on the rendering of geographical names in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Azerbaydzhan. The Soviet authorities have decided against a system on the lines of the PCGN/BGN system, which transliterates languages not written in the latin character on a symbol-for-symbol basis, but makes no attempt at the phonetic transcription of languages using the latin script although with different phonetic values and additional diacritical marks. Thus maps of Persia printed in Britain and the USA have the names transliterated according to a fixed system while those of Poland and Turkey use exactly the same spellings as are used in those countries. In maps printed in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, no attempt is made to transliterate names in languages not using the cyrillic alphabet but instead a very broad and not always consistent system of phonetic transcription is followed.

The choice of phonetic transcription rather than transliteration as a means of rendering names written in a character other than one's own is perhaps a matter of taste: it facilitates pronunciation and memorization of names although it is less accurate and may permit ambiguity. What is less easy to understand is the procedure followed in writing non-Russian names in languages which use a modified form of the cyrillic alphabet. Why if the Turkmens pronounce and write the name of their capital Ashgabat (Ашгабат) does it have to be written on Soviet maps as Ashkhabad (Ашхабад)? In some instances the Soviet version of Central Asian place-names is so different from the native way of writing them as to be barely recognizable, for instance, the Turkmen Esenguly (Эсенгулы) becomes Gasankuli (Гасанкули). The Soviet literature on the subject describes the Soviet method of spelling as "traditional". This does not, however, explain the present spelling of Ashkhabad rather than Askhabad used before the Revolution. Again, the Tadzhiks spell their capital Stalinobod, since 'o' is used to represent the long Persian ā sound. But on Soviet maps this has always been written Stalinabad; yet on these maps the same sound is written as 'o' in other names, for instance, Obi Garm which is simply the Persian Āb-ē-garm - hot water.

The principles governing the Soviet system of transcription obviously deserve closer study than the Editors have yet been able to apply to the matter, and this will be attended to in a later issue. There is of course no question of changing the system of transliterating geographical names at present followed in the Review. The Editors are, however, anxious to arrive at a satisfactory differentiation between the spelling of personal names in the pre-and post-Russian periods, with reference not only to Turkestan and the Stepnoy Kray, but also to the khanates.

Atomic reactor in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is one of the four Soviet republics which possesses an atomic reactor. (The other three are the RFSSR, the Ukraine and Georgia.)

The staff of the Uzbek reactor includes Uzbek women amongst whom there is an engineer and a senior operator.

SU. No.124, 1960

Higher education in Uzbekistan

In Uzbekistan today 81 persons out of every 10,000 have a higher education. There are now more college and university students in Uzbekistan per thousand of the population than in the United States or Britain, and more than twice as many as in France, Italy or the German Federal Republic.

SU. No.124, 1960

Russian-Kirgiz dictionary

A pre-Revolution Russian-Kirgiz dictionary has been discovered in the Lenin library of Moscow. It is the work of T. Bokin an active organizer of Soviet power. T. Bokin worked on his dictionary from 1911 to 1914 while working as a Government immigration officer. The dictionary contains 2,000 words and is one of the most successful pre-Revolution dictionaries.

KP. 22.6.60

THE LITERATURE OF AZERBAIDZHAN

The present article is divided into two parts, dealing with Azerbaydzhani literature before and after the October Revolution. Each part consists of an analysis of the main Soviet writing on the subject, with brief editorial comments at the beginning and end. Except where otherwise stated, all the views expressed in the analyses are those of Soviet writers.

The Russianized spelling has been used for writers flourishing during the Russian period, i.e. after 1828. Otherwise the more conventional western spelling has been followed.

. . .

PART ONE

AZERBAIDZHANI LITERATURE BEFORE THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Introductory comment - Origins and the language problem - Early Islamic poets - The 13th-16th centuries - Fuzuli - The 16th-18th centuries - Russian Azerbaydzhani - Editorial comment.

Introductory comment

The main Soviet sources which have been consulted on the subject of the pre-Revolutionary Azerbaydzhani literature are: (a) IZ ISTORII LITERATUR SOVETSKOGO VOSTOKA by L. Klimovich, Moscow, 1959; (b) THE GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd edition, Vol.I, 1949; and (c) ISTORIYA AZERBAIDZHANA, Vol.I, ed. I.A. Guseynov, A.S. Sumbat-zade, and others, Baku, 1958.

The Soviet approach to the pre-Revolutionary history of the literatures of all the Soviet nationalities is based on Lenin's theory of "two cultures within every national culture in the

conditions of antagonistic (sic) society". Lenin's theory helps to "estimate correctly the role of literature in the class struggle. . . This teaching of V.I. Lenin is of primary importance for Soviet literary studies in their assessment of the literary heritage, and in the campaign against 'the theory of the single stream' and the manifestations of bourgeois nationalism and cosmopolitanism."(1)

Klimovich believes that the Western "capitalists" ignored the literatures of the peoples of the Soviet East as long as they could, but that they finally had to admit their existence. He finds an indication of this change of attitude in the fact that the new ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, started in 1955, contains articles on Akhundov and Adhari (Azeri) literature which were absent from the earlier edition. He adds that the Western press "which serves the interests of the bourgeoisie and colonizers" cannot be sympathetic towards the Soviet study of these literatures, and some of the articles it publishes "have nothing in common with science".(2) He applies the same criticism to some Tsarist scholars "who attempted to transplant to our country whatever served the interests of the 'Europo-Centrists' and colonizers". He gives as an example THE GENERAL ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF LITERATURE, by I. Sherr, whose ten editions published before 1905 stated that the Azerbaydzhanis had no literature.(3)

An important consideration in the study of pre-Soviet Azerbaydzhani literature is the fact that from the 11th century up to 1913 (with a brief interval from 1723-35), the whole of the territory populated by Azerbaydzhanis was either under Persian suzerainty or actually part of the Persian Empire. This naturally resulted in profound Persian influence on the language and literature of Azerbaydzhan, a fact which is admitted in the first edition of THE GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA (Vol.1, 1926) but which is nowadays largely ignored by Soviet writers.

Origins and the language problem

THE GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA seeks the origin of Azerbaydzhani literature in distant antiquity and ascribes it to the 7th-6th centuries B.C. when the Median legends recorded by Herodotus appeared. "These heroic and patriotic tales. . . were directed against Persian raids." It is also stated that "among the ancient monuments of Azerbaydzhani culture the AVESTA of Zoroaster. . . is included. It reflects the religious, philosophical and social views of the ancient Azerbaydzhanis."(4)

At the beginning of the 5th century A.D. the Albanian alphabet of 52 letters was already in existence and before the Arab invasion the

Azerbaijanis had created poetry of their own while in the 7th century Moisey of Kalankaytuk started compiling a history of the country.

In the 5th-7th and 9th-12th centuries Azerbaijan was repeatedly invaded by the nomadic Turks and their settlement there was accompanied by the growing importance of their language which gradually came to be accepted even by the native population. Before that a large number of languages or dialects was used, the most important of which were the Azeri and Arani. An Arab author, Ibn-Khaukal (sic), wrote that "originally I used to deny this [diversity of languages] until I saw for myself their numerous towns and that in each town there was a language of its own apart from Azerbaijan and Persian." (5)

Early Islamic poets

After the Arab conquest a number of poets appeared. Even those who lived in the 10th century in Baghdad and wrote in Arabic - Babakuhî Bakui, Pir Huseyni Shirvani and others - are claimed as Azerbaijanis. The same is said about the poet and scholar Khatib Tabrizi (1030-1108). Beside Arabic, the Turkic language of the nomads began to create its own literature and about the 11th century the epos DEDE-KORKUD, describing the life of the nomadic Oguz people, came into being. The epos was recited by generations of ashugs (bards) and finally was written down in the 15th century.

The court poets of the "feudal" lords specialized in composing panegyrics, odes, love and lyrical poems. The most famous of them was Khagani Shirvani (1120-1199), who served the Shirvan Shah Akhistan I, but in spite of this occupation his works "reflect particularly strongly the rebellious spirit of the poet and his indignation at the tyranny of the rulers, the hypocrisy of the clergy and social injustice." (6) Another celebrated court poet was Abul-Ula Ganjaevi, a "major representative of the feudal panegyrical poetry". (7)

Nizami

The most prominent among the early poets was Nizami of Ganja (now Kirovabad) (1141-1203). He refused to become a court poet and spent all his life in Ganja where he composed some 20,000 couplets of lyrics and the famous KHAMSE ("five") consisting of "The Treasure-House of Mysteries", "Khosran and Shirin", "Leyli and Majnun", "Seven Beauties" and "Iskander-name". The last is particularly interesting to the Western student as one of the versions of the Alexander romance celebrated in medieval Europe. It contains an exposition of Nizami's social and political views - "a social Utopia, ideal society

where men do not exploit one another. They are neither rich nor poor; they all work collectively and the commodities of life are evenly distributed among them. In this blessed land the people live happily without state machinery and its instruments of coercion - the army, prisons etc."(8)

The story of Leyli and Majnun was a popular tale of two lovers parted by Leyli's marriage to another man. The fact that it drew Nizami's attention ("Leyli - a girl who bravely protests against the Shariat violating her human dignity"(9)), as well as the other subjects he dealt with, have caused the Soviet historians of literature to endorse him as "progressive" and a "great humanist" who struggled against religious superstitions and even "hoped with his truthful and inspired words, to induce them ["feudal" lords] to stop oppressing the people."(10)

The 13th-16th centuries

The Mongol invasion in the 1220s for a time disrupted the cultural life of the country and poetry of this period is permeated with pessimism. Sufi poetry was predominant in Azerbaydzhani literature of the 13th century and had strong pantheistic tendencies. This genre was represented by Shams Tabrizi, Maragaly Akhvedi and Mahmud Shabistari, the author of the celebrated FLOWER GARDEN OF SECRETS.

In the second half of the 14th century the Hurufi sect appeared. It "was directed, to a certain extent, against feudal and clerical oppression and the bloody invasion of Tamerlane."(11) Its views were disseminated by the poet Nesimi (died 1417) whose significance for the history of Azerbaydzhani literature is due to the fact that he was the first major lyrical poet to write a divan (collection of verse) in Azerbaydzhani. The vernacular became a literary language in the 13th century with the TALE OF YUSIF (1233) which subsequently became widely known in the East.

Nesimi's work was carried on by Qasim Anvar (died 1434) who participated in the Hurufi movement and wrote in Persian and Azerbaydzhani.

The creation of the Safavid state at the beginning of the 16th century was followed by a period of peace and prosperity in Azerbaydzhani which fostered intellectual life. At the beginning of the century the poet Habibi flourished at the court of Ismail I who was himself a poet of distinction. Both wrote in Azerbaydzhani.


FUZULI AS PROPAGANDIST



Thou dost fondly dream that by amassing
wealth thou shalt become free



Alas, money will only circumscribe
thy freedom still further



It is with silver not gold that the Monarch of the Golden Hand corrupts



He trains his armies to seize the lands of others

The above pictures reproduced from *Bakinskiy Rabochiy* of 10. 12. 58 are an attempt of a Soviet cartoonist, Oganov, to enlist Fuzuli in the service of anti-American propaganda.

Fuzuli

Muhammad Fuzuli (died 1556 or 1562) spent his life in Baghdad where his father had migrated from Azerbaydzhan. He was versed in various branches of science, knew Azerbaydzhani, Persian and Arabic and was familiar with the works of Nizami, Nesimi and other Azerbaydzhan poets.

Fuzuli is the author of three divans and thirteen major works, of which eleven are original and two translations. The most popular of these are LEYLI AND MAJNUN (a tale of Arabic origin, popular with various Eastern poets including Nizami and Navoi), BOOK OF SORROW and HASHISH AND VINE. The autobiographical BOOK OF SORROW is the earliest surviving specimen of Azerbaydzhani literary prose, in which the author described the corruption at the court of the Sultan Suleyman, the "Turkish invader". "Criticizing the despotism of the shahs and sultans, the poet, however, satisfied himself with merely calling upon the rulers to consider the feelings of the people."(12)

Fuzuli's most famous work is LEYLI AND MAJNUN. His version of the story proved superior to those of his predecessors and was widely read throughout the Near and Middle East and the composer Gadzhibekov embodied it, in 1908, in the first Azerbaydzhani opera of that name.

The pre-eminent position of Fuzuli in Azerbaydzhani literature is due to the fact that he considerably widened the range of subjects it discussed and proved that the vernacular was a proper vehicle for great literature. Soviet historians ascribe his greatness to the fact that he "convincingly ridiculed invaders", "expressed the most progressive ideas of the period" and that his works "reflected the thoughts and hopes of the broad toiling masses".(13)

The 16th-18th centuries

In the 16th century there appeared a number of authors of biographical collections and commentaries. The most prominent of them were Sam Mirza, Ibrahim Mirza, Ahdi Baghdadi and Sadiq-bek Afshar. Oral folk poetry fostered and developed by the ashugs also flourished. In the 16th and 17th centuries a number of popular heroic and romantic poems were created: ASHUG-GABIR, SHAH ISMAIL, and others. The most famous of them is KÖR-ÖGLÜ describing the activities of a hero of that name against the invading Turks. In the 17th century classical and folk motives came to blend together in the works of poets like Mesihi, Ghausi Tabrizi, Nishat Shirvani and others, but on the whole the period of Turco-Persian wars was not conducive to literary activity.

The most famous poets of the 18th century were Vidadi (died 1809) and Vaqif (1717-97). Vidadi's lyrics reflect his pessimism inspired by the war-stricken plight of his country, while Vaqif's poetry is full of the joy of life and praise of the beauty of his country and that of Azerbaydzhani and Armenian women. Vaqif was the chief vezir of the Karabakh khanate and favoured its Russian orientation.

Russian Azerbaydzhani

Soviet historians regard anti-Tsarist sentiment and all attempts at westernization and progress as being ipso facto revolutionary in the Soviet sense. "In the struggle against the colonial policy of Tsarism and the serf-owning landowners, the Azerbaydzhani people sought ideological support from the leading section of the Russian society - the revolutionary democrats. . . [The native intellectuals] came to appreciate Russian literature and the great Russian language and they understood that liberation and happiness of the Azerbaydzhani people could not be won independently of the revolutionary and democratic Russia."(14)

The earliest representatives of the new "realistic and enlightening" literature were Abbas-Quli-Agha Bakikhanov (1794-1847), Mirza Shafi Vazih (died 1852) and Ismail-bek Kutkashinli (1806-61). The most famous Azerbaydzhani author of the 19th century was Mirza Fatali (Fath Ali) Akhundov (1812-78).

Akhundov was educated at the Russo-Azerbaydzhani school at Nukha and in 1834 entered the service of Baron Rozen, the governor of the Caucasus. He worked as an interpreter and he developed a strong interest in the Russian language and literature (he particularly admired Pushkin) and came to believe that the Russian Muslims "should stop shunning the Russians under whose rule the safety of their life, property and honour are guaranteed, while their brethren in Persia and Turkey are in a deplorable situation and great poverty. But here the Muslims will amalgamate with the Russian people and the spirit of fanaticism and Muridism will die out."(15)

In the backward Muslim clergy Akhundov saw a serious obstacle to his country's progress: "You, preachers. . . deprive the people of all the earthly blessings, you keep them in an uninterrupted stagnation, you close their road to progress and all that is good in life and you invariably proclaim from the mosque pulpits, 'do not play musical instruments - it is sinful. . . do not go there - sinful; do not dance - sinful; do not watch dancing - sinful; do not listen to singing - sinful; do not play chess - sinful; do not play at backgammon - sinful; do not draw portraits - sinful; do not keep images at home -sinful.'"(16)

In his critical works Akhundov advocated the westernization of Azerbaydzhani literature. In 1862 he wrote: "Our prose writers and poets will begin, when literary criticism develops, to search for topics closer to life. Plots should be taken from real life and should be so rich that the reader can derive a lasting satisfaction from literature and the listener feel entranced." (17)

Politically, Akhundov showed himself to be a sworn enemy of despotism, "feudal" backwardness and religious superstition, which ideas he put forward in his propaganda work widely read in the East, **THREE LETTERS FROM AN INDIAN PRINCE, KEMAL-UD-DOWLEH, TO A PERSIAN PRINCE, DZHALAL-UD-DOWLEH, AND THE LATTER'S ANSWER.**

Akhundov lived at Tbilisi (Tiflis) where Rozen's offices were. In 1845 a Russian theatre was founded there, an event of great importance for his subsequent literary career. Under its influence Akhundov became the founder of Azerbaydzhani drama. Between 1850-6 he wrote six comedies which give very interesting information on Azerbaydzhani social life in the middle of the 19th century. (**MOLLA IBRAHIM HALIL - THE ALCHEMIST, MONSIEUR JOURDAN AND DERVISH MASTALI-SHAH, THE VEZIR OF LENKORAN, THE BEAR THAT KNOCKED DOWN THE ROBBER, HAJJI GARA and PLEADERS OF THE COURT OF TABRIZ.**)

In these plays Akhundov introduces a number of characters typical of Azerbaydzhani life. The alchemist Molla Ibrahim Khalil preys upon the ignorance of his customers - there is some evidence that he was a real person resident at Nukha where he included a number of local merchants and burghers and even Tsarist officials among his victims. He has much in common with dervish Mastali-shah who extorts money from ignorant women. They want to keep at home Shahbaz, who wants to go to Paris with Monsieur Jourdan, a botanist, and the women fear that there he will be lost to his betrothed, since girls in Paris go about with their faces unveiled. Mastali-shah promises them to use his magical powers to destroy Paris and a coincidence helps him: just then the revolution of 1848 breaks out and Louis Philippe flees the country, allowing Mastali-shah to triumph.

Another black character is Hajji Gara, a merchant whose name has become proverbial in Azerbaydzhan for rapacity combined with cowardice. This play which "contrasts the hard work of the Armenian and Azerbaydzhani peasants with the predatory activities of the beks and merchants" (18), is the most popular of all and is still played in Azerbaydzhani theatres.

Akhundov translated his plays into Russian and published them simultaneously with the originals. They were first produced in Russian in 1853 but on the Azerbaydzhani stage they did not appear until 1873,

the year of the foundation of the first Azerbaydzhani theatre at Baku. From 1880 translations began to appear in other languages, including Persian and Urdu.

The plays were a great innovation in oriental literature. They gave an accurate picture of the every-day life of the people and the author provided them with comments explaining how the characters should act - intonation, gesture etc. - details which are obvious to European actors but which were completely new in the East where the only species of dramatic representation were the passion plays depicting the death of the Imams.

Of a more ideological description was Akhundov's tale *THE CHEATED STARS* (1857), based on events which took place in the seventh year of the reign of Shah Abbas (1587-1628). The court astrologer announces that during the forthcoming approach of Mars to the constellation of Scorpio the stars will cause the ruler of Persia to die. To avert the danger to the Shah, artisan Yusif of Qazvin is placed on the throne, rules much better than the real Shah, but very soon dies. The author comments: "The foolishness of the stars astonishes me; they did not guess the Persians were cheating them. . . . They made a poor man suffer, the innocent Yusif, and left the real ruler of Persia, Shah Abbas, alone. Then for forty years they watched with indifference his despotism, cruelty and fanaticism. . ."(19)

Between 1918-57 Akhundov's works were published in the Soviet Union in eight languages, totalling 372,000 copies. Considering that Akhundov has been officially approved for general consumption this seems unexpectedly low by comparison with the works of some other writers belonging to the Soviet national minorities. For example, during the same period Nizami and Navoi's works have appeared in seventeen languages each (838,000 and 570,000 copies respectively), while Shevchenko was published in forty languages to a total of 10,234,000 copies.(20)

Akhundov's literary traditions were carried on by Nadzhaf-bek Vezirov (1854-1926); educated at Baku and Moscow. During his student days at Baku in 1873 he helped his teacher, Zardabi, to produce one of Akhundov's plays, thus contributing to the foundation of the Azerbaydzhani theatre. In the same year he wrote a comedy, *THE FLESH IS FOR YOU AND THE BONES FOR ME*, and followed it in 1875 with *A PICTURE OF HOME EDUCATION*. In these plays he sharply criticized the old-fashioned, patriarchal education.

During his stay at Moscow Vezirov became acquainted with Russian literature and drama and developed a great admiration for the plays of A.N. Ostrovskiy which exercised such influence on his works that he

was sometimes called "a Muslim Ostrovskiy". Altogether Vezirov wrote fifteen plays describing the life of Azerbaydzhani landowners and businessmen. Among the most famous of these are *THERE IS BUT ONE NAME* (1891), *OUT OF THE FRYING-PAN INTO THE FIRE* (1895) and the *TRAGEDY OF FAKHREDDIN* (1896). After the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaydzhani he wrote, in 1922, a play significantly entitled *THE BEGINNING OF A NEW AGE*. Vezirov was also a distinguished publicist and wrote for the first Azerbaydzhani newspaper, *EKINCHI*, and subsequently for other papers. He condemned the idea of "art for art's sake" and demanded modernization of Azerbaydzhani education.

Azerbaydzhani drama was further developed by Mamed Quli Zadeh (1869-1932), Akhverdov (1870-1933) and Suleyman Sani Akhundov (1875-1939). Poetry of the period was represented by Abbas Sihhat (1874-1918). It had a strong romantic trend common to the early years of the twentieth century, and some of the poems were "reactionary". This, however, was redeemed by the author's very fine translations of Krylov, Pushkin, Lermontov, Gorkiy and other Russian authors.

An important role in Azerbaydzhani life and literature was played by the paper *MOLLA NASREDDIN*, founded in 1906. Its editor, Mamed Quli Zadeh, was a distinguished playwright and the talented satirist Sabir (1862-1911) published his poems in it (see "the Journal *MOLLA NASREDDIN* . . .", *CAR*, No.1, 1960).

During the Bolshevik Revolution the "revolutionary propaganda literature" in Azerbaydzhani was opposed by a literature which "expressed the ideology of the nationalist bourgeoisie". It used "reactionary romanticism" as a means of expression and was represented by Guseyn Dzhavid (Husain Javid), Akhmed Dzhavad (Ahmed Javad) and others.

Editorial comment

Two points stand out in the Soviet treatment of pre-Revolutionary Azerbaydzhani writers. The first is the appropriation as Azerbaydzhani of writers generally regarded as belonging to other countries. The outstanding example of this is the poet Nizami. He was born in Ganja (now Kirovabad) while it was inside the Persian Empire; the vast majority of his work was written in Persian; and he is regarded by the whole world outside the Soviet Union as a Persian poet. In 1947, the 800th anniversary of his birth as that of an Azerbaydzhani poet was celebrated with acclamation in the Azerbaydzhani SSR. It was similarly celebrated in Persia, where the Soviet claim to Nizami is much resented. The case of Fuzuli is somewhat different. Although he was born in Azerbaydzhani while it was part of the Persian Empire and spent his whole life in Baghdad, he wrote mainly in Turkish and is considered as a Turkish poet

by the Turks. He also has been claimed as an Azerbaydzhani poet and his 400th anniversary was celebrated in the Azerbaydzhan SSR in 1958. The appropriation of Fuzuli does not, however, seem to have created as much irritation in Turkey as that of Nizami in Persia. A less important group of appropriated writers is that of Shams Tabrizi, Marageli Akhvedi, and Mahmud Shabistari, all of whom, as their names clearly indicate, originated from what is still Persian Azerbaydzhan.

The second point of interest is the emphasis laid on the political role alleged to have been played by Mirza Fathali Akhund (Akhundov) and the consequent depreciation of his significance as an imaginative writer of unusually entertaining plays. Soviet writers try to read all sorts of ideological meanings into these plays, but the fact is that they have been produced in Persia and to some extent in India for several generations without any such meaning being read into them.

PART TWO

THE SOVIET PERIOD

Ideological regimentation - Prose - Poetry - Drama -
The ashugs - Editorial comment.

The main sources used are the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, LITERATURNYY AZERBAYDZHAN, No.3 of 1960, and various articles in the Azerbaydzhani Press. It has, however, proved difficult to construct a comprehensive or even comprehensible picture of Soviet Azerbaydzhani literature since these sources habitually mention authors without their books and books without their authors. Their chronological arrangement, moreover, leaves much to be desired and it is difficult to discover what subjects predominated at various times.

Ideological regimentation

"The victory of the Soviets in Azerbaydzhani opened unprecedented possibilities for the development of national culture. Soviet Azerbaydzhani literature, managed by the Bolshevik Party, flourished and grew stronger amidst the struggle against bourgeois nationalism, pan-Turkism and the reactionary theory of 'pure art' [art for art's sake]. It united the writers who in the Socialist Revolution saw the realization of the cherished dream of the Azerbaydzhani national masses and of the whole of progressive mankind."(21)

Lenin believed that "it is absolutely necessary to leave wide scope to individual initiative and inclination, to thought and imagination as regards both form and substance."(22) This was apparently taken to mean that "socialist realists" should describe "typical heroes of the Revolution and the Civil War, the leading builders of socialism. . . enthusiasm of the toiling masses, the class struggle of the proletariat and peasantry against the fiercely resisting enemies of the Revolution and the struggle of the old with the new in all aspects of life."(23)

The reaction of the writers to the new requirements was far from uniform. Some "right from the beginning sang about the Soviet Government and thereby created many valuable works" - to this category belonged M.S. Ordubady, A. Akhverdiyev, J. Mamed Quli Zadeh, Dzhafar Dzhabarly, Tagi Shakhbazi (Simurg), S.S. Akhundov and others. There were also some who "did not immediately understand and accept the Socialist Revolution and in the early years of Soviet rule they pain-

fully and hesitatingly sought their place in literature" - such were the poets Akhmed Dzhavad, Guseyn Dzhavid (who had supported Azerbaydzhani nationalists during the Civil War) and G.K. Sanyli. In the middle 1920s they finally "understood" the literary policy of the Party. Finally, there were poets and prose writers who "could not and did not wish to reconcile themselves to the Soviet Government," such were Ali Mansur, Almas Yildyrym, Dzhabar Efendizade and other "anti-national" authors.(24)

To ensure supervision by the Party, the writers had to be organized into a literary union which "would direct the authors' work and inspire them to create works needed by the people". There was no such organization before the Revolution and the "poets' unions" which until the end of the 19th century existed at Baku, Shemakha and Shusha, could not now serve as a model since "they were not official organizations and their activities were limited to reading poems".(25)

On 10 August 1922 a number of authors with the playwright Guseyn Dzhavid at their head proposed in the newspaper KOMMUNIST that a union of the writers of Azerbaydzhan should be founded and "almost all" writers and journalists responded to this appeal. This enabled KOMMUNIST to call a conference of the authors, at which the union was founded and S.S. Akhundov elected its chairman. The union, however, proved a failure and all it did during its two years of existence was to collect material for the literary page of KOMMUNIST, which was published once a week under the heading "Life creates national literature". This page very well reflects the still unsettled ideological state of Azerbaydzhani literature since it contains ideologically sound poems as well as "pessimistic poems of bourgeois poets and articles of a pan-Turkic character, written by bourgeois authors".(26) For example, the No.186 literary page (supplement to KOMMUNIST) of 1923 carried an article by Mukhiddin which stated that since Azerbaydzhan had no original classical literature young people should study Turkish literature. As such things were published with the knowledge of the writers' union, the union itself could not be tolerated by the authorities.

In 1925 in Baku a new organization was set up - the Literary Society with B.A. Talybly as its president. Ideologically it was far from uniform: amongst its members there were social and political activists like Rukhulla Akhundov, Gabib Dzhabiyev and Mustafa Kuliyeu, Communist writers like Ordubady, Tapi Shakhbazi and Talybly, "democratic" writers like J. Mamed Quli Zadeh, S.S. Akhundov and A. Shaig and, finally, poets and prose writers who wrote "anti-patriotic" works - Ali Mansur, Ismail Hikmet and others.

At the same time a literary circle attached to KOMMUNIST was set up. Its members prepared literary pages ('Red Pen', 'Young Pen') for newspapers and journals, and organized literary talks for workers and students.

In June 1925 the resolution "On the policy of the Party concerning belles-lettres" was published and became the programme for all Soviet, including Azerbaydzhani, literature, in the second half of the 1920s and early 1930s. It condemned bourgeois notions that literature should be "non-political, neutral" and pointed out that literature of a class society must be one of the struggling proletariat and peasantry. At the same time literary critics were called upon to supervise its orthodoxy by inexorably opposing counter-revolutionary tendencies in literature; but they were also told to "handle very tactfully the writers who might still be able to join hands with the proletariat." (27) After the resolution, "the ideological struggle on the literary front grew even more intense in Azerbaydzhani." (28) It resulted in the final victory of the "proletarian" writers and in 1926 the Union of Red Pens was set up with the poet Suleyman Rustam as its secretary. Unlike the Literary Society, it was very active not only in Baku but also in the provinces and branches were founded in Kirovabad, Nakhichevan, Nukha and other towns.

This organization, however, must have proved unsatisfactory for in 1928 at a writers' congress the AzAPP (Association of Azerbaydzhani Proletarian Writers) was set up. Its task was to enforce the Central Committee's resolution of 1925 and the "ideological struggle on the literary front" reached its final stage. Suleyman Rustam addressed the "bourgeois aesthetes" thus: "Stop singing - your voice sounds like a requiem!" Vurgun wrote a poem in 1928 against the poets "detached from life and foreign to the people" in which he put forward a rhetorical question: "Hey, you, poets wandering in the clouds, what do you see in serving the boundless sky?" (29) Thus in the early 1930s the ways of the Soviet and "bourgeois" poets finally parted.

But the AzAPP committed blunders in its work and it refused membership to Mamed Qulı Zadeh, A. Akhverdiyev, S.S. Akhundov and others who now founded a rival organization - the Association of Soviet Writers.

The split ended when on 23 April 1932 the All-Union Central Committee issued a decree "On the reconstruction of literary and art organizations", whose purpose was to unite all writers supporting the Government and thus obviate the danger of the smaller organizations becoming detached from current political problems. Socialist realism was put forward as the basis of Soviet art and literature. The result of

this was the foundation of the Union of Soviet Authors of Azerbaydzhan which has henceforward enjoyed the monopoly of literature in the republic. From now onwards the ideological soundness of literature was assured, although it was "negatively influenced by I.V. Stalin's personality cult".(30)

The Union, however, did not escape criticism. On 8 June 1937 PRAVDA published an article significantly entitled "Hostile Designs"; it denounced a number of Azerbaydzhani writers and attacked the leadership of the Union. The Union now held a three-day conference at which the writers hastened to admit that PRAVDA was right and to put all the blame on the leaders of the Union, whose secretary was the poet Vurgun. He and the chairman, Shamilov, tried to defend themselves but their speeches "failed to satisfy" the audience since they "did not have courage to disclose the disgraceful things which were taking place in the Writers' Union." (31) Together with Dzhavid and Dzhavad, whose counter-revolutionary past had not been forgotten, they were denounced for a complete lack of vigilance as a result of which "agents of Japanese and German Fascism, Trotskiyists, national deviationists, Musavatists, pan-Turkists and all sorts of counter-revolutionary elements have crept into the ranks of Azerbaydzhani writers." (32) A purge in the Union followed but Vurgun managed somehow to escape the fate of his colleagues. In 1956 he died a natural death.

The events of 1937 were not the end of Vurgun's troubles. In 1948 he was again denounced as the president of the Writers' Union. In August the Azerbaydzhani Central Committee issued a statement "On the state of Azerbaydzhani Soviet literature and measures to improve it", which severely criticized manifold failures on the part of the Union: its leadership had failed to draw the necessary conclusions from the statement of the All-Union Central Committee on ideological problems; it did not try to suppress vices flourishing in the Union, such as lack of criticism and self-criticism, "amicable relations" (i.e. personal cliques) and petty intrigues. The training of young writers was neglected, as well as the supervision of the Union's magazines, particularly EDEBIYYAT GAZETI, and Party and political education. Owing to these shortcomings Azerbaydzhani literature was in a sorry state: it lagged behind life and did not satisfy the demands of the people, the thoughts and heroic efforts of the "toilers" had not been adequately described in literary works which were "dim ideologically, lifeless artistically and notable for their fanciful subjects". There were two main reasons for this state of affairs: (a) the majority of the writers had lost touch with the people, almost never visited factories, kolkhozes etc. and their idea of the political and cultural standards of the people were sadly out of date; (b) the writers were

"politically and culturally backward" and had but a vague idea of socialist-realist methods. All this made their works "ideologically weak", which was particularly obvious in Abdul'gasan's novel THE WAR, in which he showed his ignorance of the fact that the high moral standards and fiery patriotism of the people had been instilled in them by the Party even before the Great Patriotic War. Also the critics were blamed for their lack of vigilance and inability to apply the Marxist-Leninist theory of art to literature and, what is worse, they "camouflage reactionary and historically narrow-minded ideas" of the writers.(33)

By 1958 the ideological situation had considerably improved and BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY of 5.12.58 expressed satisfaction that the Azerbaydzhani writers were doing their best to contribute to Soviet literature - "the most advanced in the world" - but their efforts were somewhat marred by the fact that "a tendency is observable in the work of some authors to depart from the important problems of the present day, which is contrary to the splendid traditions of Soviet literature."

Prose

In the Soviet period poetry has yielded its previous predominance in Azerbaydzhani literature to prose. The Azerbaydzhani novel and short story are mainly of Soviet origin - very little fiction having been produced in the Tsarist period. The first Soviet novel was A. Abdul'gasan's YOKHUSHLAR (The Heights) published in 1930. Azerbaydzhani literature of the 1930s could be divided, according to its subject matter, into two groups: (a) Novels and stories about the Civil War which are still regarded as valuable ideologically and artistically. The first of these was Ragimov's SHAMO, first published in 1931 and still worked upon by the author so that by now it has developed into a three-volume saga. It describes the struggle of the Azerbaydzhani "toilers" headed by the Baku Bolsheviks against the Musavatists and Turks. (b) Novels and stories by Mekhti Guseyn, Abdul'gasan, Mir Dzhahal, S. Ragimov, Enver Mamedkanly and S. Rakhman, describing the new socialist village and the Soviet man struggling for the new way of life.

The range of subjects widened during the Second World War. The spiritual and political unity of the Soviet people, their patriotism and self-sacrifice for the sake of their country were exalted in a number of works (Ragimov's MEDALLION, Dzhahal's MY CONTEMPORARIES, Abdul'gasan's WAR, Guseyn's CALL and others) describing the struggle against the fascists. In this connection it is interesting to notice that Abdul'gasan's WAR, denounced in 1948 for ideological errors, was praised in the following year by the SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA because it

"truthfully shows events during the Great Patriotic War. . . the firm Stalinist friendship of the Soviet peoples".(34)

The Persian Azerbaydzhanis have not been forgotten. Mirza Ibragimov has produced some novels and stories (THE DAY WILL COME and others) on the struggle of the Persians and southern Azerbaydzhanis against the "Persian reactionaries and their British and American masters".(35)

The "problems of the present day" continue to predominate in Azerbaydzhani fiction. Among the most highly praised books are APSHERON and THE BLACK ROCKS by Mekhti Guseyn and Ibragimov's CONFLUENCE OF WATERS. Guseyn's books describe the Azerbaydzhani oil-workers; the first of them clearly shows that their "struggle for oil is not a struggle for existence and for the satisfaction of personal needs or interests, as is typical of the working-class in capitalist countries, but a struggle for Communism". A strong point in its official favour is the fact that Guseyn "more than our other prose writers has profitably learnt from the best traditions of Russian realism. . ."(36) The hero of CONFLUENCE OF WATERS is Rustamov, chairman of a kolkhoz on the banks of the Kura, who made a neglected kolkhoz flourish, then came under the influence of evil men and finally found his way back to righteousness. The highlight of the novel is "the profound optimism and the infinite faith in the creative powers of the people, with which the author deals even with the most difficult moments in kolkhoz life."(37)

Although it is emphasized that Azerbaydzhani prose has made remarkable progress, there is still much room for improvement. "It is impossible to ignore the fact that some of our prose works, particularly those dealing with the village, often strongly resemble each other. Primitivism and schematism are still going strong in the construction of artistic works and in the representation of conflicts, which constitute their subject matter. The personalities of many heroes are stereotyped (sozdayutsya po printsipu lobovogo resheniya). Prolivity, superfluous details and long-drawn out descriptions are a real scourge of our works. Many authors forget the immortal principle of the classics - that conciseness is the sister of talent."(38)

Poetry

Soviet Azerbaydzhani poetry markedly differs from the pre-Soviet for "intimate lyricism, previously so important in the works of many poets, has. . . yielded to political lyricism [sic] inseparably connected with the great achievements of the people, Party and Government. . . Our poetry, however, is not confined to describing

socialist developments, but it also sings about the heroic past of the Azerbaydzhani people and their struggle during the Civil War. Many poems are devoted to international subjects: they unmask the anti-national policy of the imperialists in the East and encourage the people to resist foreign invaders." (39)

Struggle against imperialism and fascism occupies a very important place in the poetry of the 1930s and reached its apogee during the Second World War. At the same time the range of subjects and political outlook is widened to include the problem of the oppressed Azerbaydzhani in Persia. Some poems, by virtue of their subjects, had to be done with particular pietism - thus Rasul Rza worked many years on his hagiographic piece about Lenin while Ragim devoted thirteen years to writing one about Kirov (THE IMMORTAL HERO).

Before the Second World War poetry quickly improved - so it is claimed - in quality as well as quantity. After a period of stagnation in the 1920s, probably caused by difficulties of ideological adjustment, the 1930s witnessed a steady expansion of poetic output. Thus whereas in the 1920s only one collection of poems was published (ALAMDAN NASHAAYA by Rustam), in the 1930s Vurgun, Mushfik, Rza, Ragim, Saryvelli, Khalil, Natig, Rafibeyli and others published volumes of collected poems.

After the war more peaceful subjects returned to poetry - the Five-Year Plans and various aspects of the life of the hard-working Soviet man, the builder of Communism. One of the most profusely praised poems is Vurgun's KOMSOMOL POEM posthumously published by Saryvelli, but regarded as new owing to its recent publication. Among the other celebrated post-war poets there are, beside the older generation (Rustam, Rza, Saryvelli and Dzhamil), Balash Azer ogly, Vagabzade, Ali Tude and Nabi Babayev. BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY of 4.12.58 summed up the state of Azerbaydzhani poetry thus: "We cannot complain of the small amount of poems, but it must be emphasized that in the field of poetry we still act but feebly to suppress imitation, narrow-mindedness (ogranichennost) and repetition. . . In many cases the poet lowers himself to the level of the reader with a debased taste."

Drama

Drama is a relatively recent branch of Soviet Azerbaydzhani literature since M.F. Akhundov is regarded as its father. The founder of Azerbaydzhani Soviet drama was Dzhabar Dzhabarly (died 1934) who in 1918-20 sided with the "bourgeois nationalists" and after the consolidation of Soviet power in Azerbaydzhani promptly repented of this deviation. He wrote a number of propaganda plays: in AYDYN (1922) and

OKTAY EL'OGLY (1923) he attacked the parasitism and false morals of the capitalist world, in SEVIL' (1928) he demanded full emancipation of the Azerbaydzhani woman, while ALMAS (1930) and YASHAR (1932) were devoted respectively to the problem of setting up kolkhozes and their subsequent success.

Vurgun was a playwright as well as a poet. In VAGIF (1938), on the life of an 18th-century poet of that name, he described the struggle of the Azerbaydzhanis against Persia; KHANLAR (1938-9) glorified the revolutionary activities of Stalin in Baku in 1907.

G. Dzhavid found it difficult to conform to the requirements of Soviet dramaturgy. In 1922 he wrote THE PROPHET in which he represented Muhammad as a positive character; this was followed by TAMERLANE, which in 1926 was disapproved by the authorities since the famous despot was described there as a hero. Subsequently he admitted his "mistakes" and produced a number of propaganda plays: TELLI SAZ emphasizing the great changes which had taken place in Azerbaydzhan during the first ten years of Soviet rule; THE PRINCE celebrating the consolidation of Soviet power in Georgia, and others.

Dzhabarly's best traditions are being continued by Mirza Ibragimov. His KHAYAT, on the action of the political department of the MTS (machine and tractor station) has reaped much triumph in the Azerbaydzhani Dramatic Theatre. Another of his plays, MAKHABBAT, illustrates the self-sacrifices of the Azerbaydzhanis during the last war. Now he is working on MADRID, a play describing the struggle of the Spanish people against fascism. In 1953 he wrote the libretto of an opera, THE FREE GIRL, whose subject is the struggle of the southern Azerbaydzhanis against Persia and her "western masters".

The poet Suleyman Rustam is the author of some propaganda plays. The first was CHINAZ-KHANUM ASLEEP, played at the Satirical Agitation Theatre in the early period of Soviet rule in the republic. Rustam commemorated the tenth anniversary of Soviet government in Azerbaydzhan with a drama called BLOOD FOR BLOOD, on the struggle for Soviet power in Azerbaydzhan. Subsequently in collaboration with G. Nazarli he wrote a comedy, FIRE, which in the 1930s enjoyed much success in the Baku Workers' Theatre.

Comedy is regarded as one of the most efficient propaganda methods and the early Soviet period saw the hey-day of Party-inspired comedy in Azerbaydzhan. At that time S.S. Akhundov, A. Akhverdiyev, J. Mamed Quli Zadeh and M.S. Ordubady mass-produced comedies on burning problems of national life. But subsequently Azerbaydzhani playwrights turned their attention to more serious plays and comedy has lost much of its former importance.

In 1958 the state of Azerbaydzhani drama was found to be not entirely satisfactory: ". . . The basic weakness of the latest plays is the feeble and unconvincing representation of the positive hero who only too often is turned into a mouthpiece expressing the author's ideas. . . . The playwrights too often impoverish the rich and complex spiritual make-up of the Soviet people. . . . In the last years very few interesting heroes and conflicts have appeared in the plays of Azerbaydzhani authors. . . . [The form of the plays] is only too often very primitive." (40)

The ashugs (bards)

Ashug poetry is said to have developed remarkably in the Soviet period. The ashugs can be broadly divided into two groups: those who compose the text and music of their songs and those who only perform them.

A number of ashugs started their work before the Revolution and continued it in the Soviet period - Chaban Afgan, Guseyn Bozalganly, Mirza Asad, Veli and Sheyda Aziz. Their poetry is very interesting since it reflects the ideas of the people on both the old way of life and the impact of the Soviet order on it. They cooperated with the Government and their poems describe in glowing terms the happy life of the Soviet people: "From the very first days of Soviet rule the ashugs, expressing the thoughts and feelings of the Azerbaydzhani people, in their new songs and dastan (a popular form of ashug poetry used mainly to describe important political and social events), sing of their love and gratitude for the Communist Party and the great Lenin." (41) Other popular subjects are denunciations of fascism and colonialism, praise of the peace-loving policy of the Party and exhortations to the people and the frontier guards to be vigilant; this rather sharply contrasts with the old ashug traditions when love was the basic theme.

The authorities believe that ashug poetry would be more satisfactory if it were centrally controlled. In the 1930s the Azerbaydzhani Writers' Union had a special ashug section and it is believed that it should be restored. (42) In 1928 and 1938 ashug conferences were held. Just before his death Vurgun drew up a plan of organizing the ashugs but it did not materialize. The question still remains open.

Editorial comment

During the Soviet period Azerbaydzhani literature has developed considerably in respect of output and the adoption of new literary forms such as that of the novel. The range of subjects has been greatly extended to include topics arising from the modernization and

sovietization of Azerbaydzhani life. The written language too has been to some extent purified and made more intelligible to the people; it has at the same time offered robust resistance to attempts to russianize it. Finally, consequent on the growth of literacy, improved printing facilities and low costs, literature has now penetrated to all social groups.

In spite of this development the general quality of literature remains mediocre. While the central control militates against the display of any originality, the authorities never cease to complain of the use of stereotyped characters in fiction, of the drab similarity of many works and of the tendency of some authors to neglect current problems. It is apparently not considered that it is the very fact of regimentation which induces and perpetuates most of these shortcomings.

Notes

- (1) IZ ISTORII LITERATUR SOVETSKOGO VOSTOKA. L. Klimovich. Moscow, 1959, p. 21
- (2) Ibid., pp.32-33
- (3) Ibid., pp. 7-8
- (4) GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd ed., Vol.I, 1949, p.467
- (5) ISTORIYA AZERBAYDZHANA, Vol.I. Ed. I.A. Guseynov, A.S. Sumbat-zade and others. Baku, 1958, p.170
- (6) Ibid., p.165
- (7) SOV. ENC., Vol.I, p.467
- (8) IST. AZERB., pp.168-9
- (9) Klimovich, p.48
- (10) IST. AZERB., p.168
- (11) SOV. ENC., Vol.I, p.468
- (12) IST. AZERB., p.254
- (13) SOV. ENC., Vol.I, p.468
- (14) Ibid., p.469
- (15) Ibid., Vol.III, p.571
- (16) Klimovich, pp.134-5
- (17) Ibid., p.131

- (18) Ibid., p.135
- (19) Ibid., pp.138-9
- (20) Ibid., p.299, note
- (21) SOV. ENC., 2nd ed., Vol.I, p.470
- (22) Lenin, SOCHINENIYA, 4th ed., Vol.X, p.28
- (23) SOV. ENC., Vol.XL, p.182
- (24) LIT. AZERB., No.3, 1960, pp.99-100
- (25) Ibid., p.100
- (26) Ibid.
- (27) SOV. ENC., Vol.XXX, p.280
- (28) LIT. AZERB., No.3, 1960, p.101
- (29) Ibid.
- (30) SOV. ENC., Vol.XL, p.182
- (31) BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 14.6.37
- (32) Ibid.
- (33) Ibid., 22. 8.48
- (34) SOV. ENC., Vol.I, p.471
- (35) Ibid., Vol.XVII, p.260
- (36) BR., 21. 4.59
- (37) Ibid., 30.11.58
- (38) Ibid., 8.12.58
- (39) LIT. AZERB., No.3, 1960, p.102
- (40) BR., 8.12.58
- (41) Ibid., No.11, 1959, p.100
- (42) Ibid., p.103

THE KAZAKHS AND PUGACHEV'S REVOLT

During the past 25 years the official Soviet views on the attitude of the Kazakhs towards their original incorporation in the Russian Empire have undergone a considerable change. During this period three histories of Kazakhstan have been published: OCHERKI PO ISTORII KAZAKHSKOY SSR (Outline of the History of the Kazakh SSR) by M. Vyatkin (Moscow 1941); ISTORIYA KAZAKHSKOY SSR (Alma-Ata 1943); and ISTORIYA KAZAKHSKOY SSR, VOL.I (Alma-Ata 1957). In addition there have been long articles on Kazakh history in the two editions of the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA (Vol.30 of 1936, and Vol.23 of 1953), as well as articles on different episodes of Kazakh history in learned journals.

A clear statement of the official line in 1936 can be found in the first edition of the SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA where the notion that the Kazakhs voluntarily submitted to incorporation in the Russian Empire is described as "an obvious lie" (yavnaya lozh'). The historical editor of the First Edition of the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA up to 1932 was M. Pokrovskiy, whose theory of the "absolute evil" of Tsarism was not finally discredited until 1937. In his History published in 1941, Vyatkin takes a somewhat indeterminate line: while discounting much of Pokrovskiy's theories, he continued to speak of "Tsarist colonialism" and spoke favourably of Kazakh resistance to it. Vyatkin's theories naturally communicated themselves to the 1943 History of the Kazakh SSR, in which he was a collaborator. In 1951, the theory of "the lesser evil" which had replaced Pokrovskiy's theory of the "absolute evil" was in its turn replaced by the theory developed by Professor Nechkina, who maintained that the Tsarist conquests and the incorporation of Central Asia in the Russian Empire were in fact a "positive good". One of the results of this change was that the 1943 History of the Kazakh SSR came under a heavy fire of criticism. A new History of the Kazakh SSR was ordered and when this eventually appeared in 1957 it was seen to differ from the 1943 history in a number of respects (see CAR, 1957, No.4, p. 353). In particular, the theory of the voluntary submission of the Kazakhs to Russian rule described as "an obvious lie" in 1936 and attributed to "Great Power chauvinists and Kazakh bourgeois nationalists" was now found to be historically correct and any suggestion of conquest, coercion or colonization was and still is strongly repudiated.

The so-called "Peasants' War" of Yemel'yan Pugachev (1773-5) has always been regarded by the Soviet regime as "progressive" in the sense

that it demonstrated the peasants' hostility to the Tsarist regime and to feudalism. That the Kazakhs were involved in the revolt has been universally recognized, but views on the extent of their involvement and the significance attached to it have varied with the passage of time. In the 1936 Encyclopaedia article, the participation of the Lesser Horde in Pugachev's Revolt is given as providing a refutation of the "voluntary submission" theory. In both the 1943 and the 1957 Histories, the Kazakhs' participation in the Revolt are given as the earliest manifestation of the understanding of the fact that their fate was inseparably joined with that of the Russian people. As will be seen later, the 1957 History tries to prove its point by showing that during the Revolt the Kazakhs confined their attacks to Russian posts and military personnel and left the peaceful peasants alone. Whatever the truth may be, it is plain that whereas in 1936 the official line, as given in the First Edition of the Encyclopaedia, was that the Kazakhs' participation in the Revolt proved their opposition to union with Russia, the later, and apparently the current, line is that it proved exactly the contrary.

Vyatkin, formerly accepted as the outstanding authority on Kazakh history, was evidently regarded as mainly responsible for the errors in the 1943 History since he was singled out for strong criticism (see CAR, 1955, No.4, pp.269-76), and did not collaborate in the 1957 History. One of the principal sources used by him in the chapter on the Pugachev Revolt in his OCHERKI PO ISTORII KAZAKHSKOY SSR (1941) is an article by A. Chuloshnikov entitled "The Kazakh-Kirgiz Nomadic Hordes and Pugachev's Rebellion 1773-1774" which appeared in NOVYY VOSTOK, No.25, 1929. This is a scholarly article well-documented from contemporary sources; it discusses the subject dispassionately and refrains from propaganda and the use of Marxist phraseology. It was not mentioned in the 1943 and 1957 Histories, but it seems likely that it is nearer to the facts than anything which has been written since. It is therefore of some interest to examine it in the light of the accounts given in the two Histories. Although the latter to some extent support their versions of the events with quotations from the original sources, comparison with those provided by Chuloshnikov reveals that they have been carefully chosen with a view to justifying the conclusion, identical in both Histories, that as early as 1773 the oppressed Kazakh masses associated their dreams of freedom and social justice with the struggle waged by the Russian workers against Tsarism and feudalism.

I. The Background - II. Chuloshnikov's Account - III. Current Line

I. The Background

In the 18th century, on the eve of the Pugachev Revolt, the Lesser Horde found itself fully exposed to Russian pressure. It occupied the steppes east of the Yaik (Ural) River; that is, the eastern part of the present West-Kazakhstan and Gur'yev oblasts as well as the Aktyubinsk oblasts. Its immediate neighbours were the Yaik Cossacks on the right bank of the river, who first settled there in the middle of the 16th century. Subsequently their numbers were swollen by escaped serfs, so that by 1762 there were 3,300 people in their central settlement, the Yaik cantonment.

The process of strengthening the Russian frontier in these regions coincided with a period when a crisis in the primitive cattle-breeding economy was just beginning to be felt. The development of the Ural and Siberian Fortified Lines limited the area where the nomads could roam with their flocks and herds. The Russian Government forbade them to wander beyond the Yaik, which was the more serious since grazing lands in the Aral steppes were poor and the nomadic habits of the Lesser Horde included wintering on the right bank of the Yaik. Leave to cross it was seldom granted and sometimes the Kazakhs wintered on the opposite bank without permission - thus in 1759 Prince Putyatin reported that "the Kirgiz-Kazakhs without warrant and defiantly. . . [have moved] not only with their cattle but even with their kibitkas from the steppe to the inner side of the River Yaik, and their animals have caused damage to the Cossack hay." (IST. KAZ., SSR, 1957, p.267.)

The Tsarist authorities regarded crossing the river without permission as an act of lawlessness and it was often followed by fights between the nomads and the Cossacks. In the 1770s such incidents became frequent and the complaints of the Kazakhs against the Cossacks were ignored by the authorities. The Kazakhs watched with misgiving the growth of Cossack and Russian settlements along the frontier since these threatened to deprive them ultimately of the use even of their own steppe land.

Since 1748 the Lesser Horde had been ruled by Nuraly, the first Khan whose title was officially confirmed by the Russian Government. Sultan Batyr, however, did not acknowledge his overlordship and was elected Khan by the Shekty clan. Thus the Lesser Horde was weakened by an internal split: its south-eastern territories on the lower Syr-Dar'ya constituted Batyr's Khanate while Nuraly ruled over the north-western part, which was most directly threatened by the territorial expansion of Russia.

II. Chuloshnikov's Account

The following is Chuloshnikov's account of the part played by the Kazakhs in Pugachev's rebellion:

Pugachev's rebellion started in the Yaik region. On 16 September 1773 at the Tolkachevo farmstead, 100 km. south of Yaik fort, he formed a small armed band of Cossacks and peasants, to whom he declared himself as Tsar Peter III, who had in fact been murdered. Until March 1774 the movement continued to spread in the Yaik area adjoining the lands of the Lesser Horde.

As soon as the report of the alleged re-emergence of the legitimate sovereign, Peter Fedorovich, reached the Kazakhs, Nuraly hastened to establish contact with him. The Khan's clerk, Zabir, was sent to Pugachev's headquarters on the river Usikha; his task was to present the "Tsar" in his master's name with a sabre, a chakan (a small axe set in silver), a Bukhara silk khalat and a bay horse, and to find out how reliable the rumour of his royal rank was. But on 15 September, just before Zabir's arrival, Pugachev had left the place and not until the 18th did Zabir meet him on the way to the Chagan outpost and deliver the gifts. Although Zabir's mission was only to obtain the desired information, Pugachev saw in it an opportunity to rally the Kazakhs to his cause and despatched an ukase which declared: "I, Peter Fedorovich, am your most gracious sovereign as well as of all my other subjects. This is my message to the Kirgiz-Kazakh Khan Nuraly, in order to dispel doubts as to my status. Send to me immediately, as a pledge of loyalty, one of your sons, the sultan, with a hundred men and with the men who have delivered this letter (s poslannymi s sim) from my Majesty to Your Honour (stepenstvo)". (P.203.) Subsequently he demanded 200 armed men.

Nuraly, however, having received Zabir's report, preferred to adopt a "wait and see" policy. Although he did not send the armed men asked for, he did not wish to alienate Pugachev. At the same time he did not want to displease the Russian Government and on 24 September he wrote a letter to Reynsdorp, the Governor of Orenburg, which reflected his attitude to the usurper: "We steppe-folk did not know whether this man now riding abroad was a scoundrel or the Tsar himself; but since he styled himself tsar, I thought up a pretext to send a messenger to him. On his return he told me that he did not know what sort of man that one was and all that could be noticed was that his beard was yellow." (P.203.)

Nuraly's behaviour during these months was somewhat puzzling. On the one hand, he continued to maintain relations with Pugachev and

style him Tsar Peter Fedorovich, while on the other he pretended that he wished to cooperate with the Government. At his meeting in September with the commander of the Yaik fort, Colonel Simonov, and the commander of the loyal Cossacks, Borodin, he declared: "Seize the brigands if you and your men are able to do so, but if you are not strong enough, let me and my people make a raid and capture them. But I may not cross the Yaik without the Orenburg Governor's permission." (P.204.) This statement satisfied the Yaik authorities, who had feared that Nuraly's alliance with Pugachev would be followed by the devastation of the Astrakhan' guberniya by the Kazakhs; but as the rebellion had not yet become dangerous, the authorities had no intention of accepting the Khan's services.

Nuraly, however, must have had a scheme of his own which required that he should cross the river legally, for he followed up his failure with Simonov by sending a letter to Reynsdorp which was received at Orenburg on 24 September. In it he put forward the offer made to Simonov and the messenger added that the Khan was ready with 5,000 men to pursue the usurper - clearly, Nuraly did not wish to commit himself in writing. But Reynsdorp turned down the offer merely requiring that, should Pugachev appear in the territories of the Lesser Horde, the Khan should try to capture him and his men and surrender them to the authorities.

Nuraly showed his resentment of this second refusal by moving with his people to the far part of the steppe, while those Kazakhs who stayed on the Yaik began to harass the Russian frontier. During this period Pugachev reached the limit of his success and laid siege to Orenburg, the capital of the province. On 20 November he issued an ukase to the Kazakhs promising them all sorts of favours after the final victory including that "they would be clad from head to foot", granted land, water, pastures, arms, foodstuffs and copper. (P.208.)

Pugachev's success emboldened Nuraly. He now crossed the frozen Yaik and on 26 November appeared outside Kulagino fort, announcing that he was going to winter there. This, however, did not mean that the mass of the Kazakhs cooperated with the rebels, though they were eager to profit from the existing disorder. Chuloshnikov says (pp.208-9) that the participation of the nomads in the movement "expressed itself only in the general increase of their usual raids on the Russian frontier line, in taking captives and stealing cattle, but was was nowhere manifested by open action side-by-side with Pugachev's troops. Even the most tempting promises liberally made by Pugachev's supporters, that the nomads would be given Cossack wives and children and that their Khan would become the chief authority and commander of all the fortresses between Orenburg and Astrakhan', could not induce them to take organized action against the Government forces. Thus even Sultan

Dusali, whose son with a small number of the Kazakh-Kirgiz subject to him was at Pugachev's camp, and who himself maintained continuous close relations with Pugachev, did not openly side with the rebels. . ."

At the end of November Dusali received Pugachev's ukase mentioned above and, although he informed his superior, Nuraly, of it, he tried to evade the "Tsar's" demand that 200 armed dzhigits (horsemen) should be immediately despatched to his camp. This attitude agreed with the Khan's desire to remain neutral in spite of the recent cooling of his relations with Orenburg. Thus he congratulated Pugachev upon his recent successes and expressed his readiness to help the rebels but at the same time he asked that Seid-Ali, Dusali's son, should return from Pugachev's camp to the Horde, for his absence made it impossible for the Kazakhs to reach a final decision. (P.209.) On his part, Dusali protested his joy that his son served his Tsar and begged Pugachev to let him postpone the ultimate decision until various doubts concerning the rebels' cause should be clarified. This policy allowed him to be counted amongst Pugachev's supporters and at the same time to avoid helping him should this become inadvisable.

The same policy was adopted by all the Kazakh sympathizers of Pugachev, whose followers harried the Russian border settlements throughout the winter, spring and summer of 1773-4. It is noteworthy that "this was done irrespective of the social status of the harassed Russian population. The gentry, merchants, clergy, Cossacks of all ranks as well as common soldiers, serfs and peasants working at the industrial establishments were indiscriminately dragged into captivity or slaughtered." (P.210.) Such raids, naturally, weakened the rebels also. The damage done by the Kazakhs, who in the winter of 1773-4 felt themselves the undisputed masters of the lands between the Yaik and the Volga, must have been considerable if Krechetnikov, the Governor of Astrakhan, could report that in three months 200 inhabitants of the Russian farmsteads in his area alone were captured, while in peacetime along the very long borderline between Gur'yev and the Zverinogolovskoye post the average number of captives varied between 34-175 a year. (P.211.) The Governor of Orenburg reported that between May and August 1774, 348 Russian men and 86 women, peaceful inhabitants as well as soldiers, were killed or captured along the Orenburg Line by the nomads. (Ibid.) The same, though on a smaller scale, was being done by the Middle Horde along the Siberian Line. Thus the practical value of the Kazakhs' sympathy for Pugachev was questionable since it provided them with a pretext to plunder and oppress the settlers.

The authorities, who in September 1773 had alienated Nuraly by refusing him permission to cross the Yaik, now saw the results of their policy and hastened to win him over to the side of the legitimate Empress. In October 1773 when their situation was steadily

deteriorating, Reynsdorp sent to the Khan and his brother Aychuvak a gift of 100 rubles each. In the following June, when the raids were at their worst and had penetrated as far as the Buzuluk fortress, the Governor at last decided to fulfil Nuraly's request of the previous September - that his subjects, captured by the Russians while stealing the settlers' cattle and taking captives, should be released and return to the Horde. The nomads, however, did not appreciate this friendly gesture and from the beginning of August their raids grew so daring that they even attacked Russian forts and captured the smaller detachments of armed soldiers and their officers. This action was probably inspired by Pugachev's Kazakh sympathizers and Nuraly, who stuck to his policy of neutrality, was rapidly losing control over the Horde and complained that "the Kirgiz [Kazakhs] do not obey me now and the reason is that rogue who calls himself Peter III". (P.213.)

On 24 August 1774 the rebel army was annihilated in a battle near the Sal'nikov factory, 100 km. south of Tsaritsyn (Stalingrad) and Pugachev flying in the direction of Yaik was captured. On 5 January 1775 he was executed at Moscow.

III. The Current Line

It is evident from Chuloshnikov's account above that, having carefully examined the sources, he came to the conclusion that in the light of the known facts the extent to which the Kazakhs can be said to have supported Pugachev is open to considerable doubt. The 1957 HISTORY OF THE KAZAKH SSR, however, constructs an entirely different picture of the events, and it is noteworthy that although it cites a number of facts and figures to support its version there are no references to the original sources, which makes the whole account look unconvincing, the more so because its very obvious object is to show that the phenomenon of Russo-Kazakh friendship has a long history behind it. Such a theory, in order to be acceptable, must be adequately documented if the reader is not to regard it with suspicion. Thus allegedly when in the early months of the rebellion Pugachev called upon Nuraly to join forces with him against the Government, the latter answered that he could not change his loyalty to Catherine, whereupon Pugachev directly addressed the Kazakh people in the ukase of November 1773 mentioned above. This brought the desired result: "The toilers of the Lesser and Middle Hordes gave help to the insurgent army. In the regions where they came into contact with Pugachev's troops exchange of goods was going on, for example salt was bartered for cattle. In a number of cases the Kazakhs without pay supplied the insurgent army with cattle." (P.274.) The nomads helped the rebels by attacking "almost exclusively" Tsarist troops and forts. In the summer of 1774 Nuraly

begged help from the Government "to suppress by force of arms the action of the Kazakh workers" (p.276); this phraseology creates the classic atmosphere of class struggle between the "toilers" and the reactionary feudal lords and their ally, the Tsarist Government. The only point on which it is possible to agree with the official interpretation of these events is that the Kazakh raids helped Pugachev in the sense that they diverted part of the Government troops from the rebel army, although the purpose of the raids was not quite the same as stated by the 1957 History. The attacks of the Kazakhs on the peaceful settlers amply prove that the nomads did not regard themselves as friends and allies of the Russian workers against the oppressive Tsarist Government. The official interpretation of the significance of the rebellion for the Kazakhs, however, ignores this inconvenient evidence which Chuloshnikov gathered from his sources and declares: "The participation of the Kazakhs in Pugachev's peasant war was the first common action of the Kazakh and Russian peoples against the despotic and serf-owning regime. Amidst this common struggle which was frequently spontaneous, the Russian and Kazakh peoples started their historic campaign against their common enemy - Russian Tsarism. In the course of this long and difficult struggle national hostility gradually vanished and a sense of the common historical destiny of the two nations germinated." (IST. KAZ., 1943, p.177.)

There is no dispute about the facts of the suppression of the rising. Nuraly asked the Russian Government to send punitive expeditions to the winter camps of the Lesser Horde and the offenders were severely punished. To remove all traces of the rebellion the name of the river Yaik was changed to Ural and that of the fort, Yaitskiy Gorodok, to Ural'sk. Nevertheless the Kazakhs did not believe that Pugachev was dead and the legend of Tsar Peter III's survival continued to linger on for many years.

Death of Turkmen Communist Party official

Dzhuma Durdy Karayev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Turkmen Communist Party since 1958, died on 4 May 1960. Born in 1910 of a poor peasant family, Karayev became a member of the Komsomol in 1926 and in 1939 of the Communist Party. He was also an agricultural specialist and in 1947 was appointed Minister of Agriculture.

P. 5.5.60

THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN TURKMENISTAN AND KHORASAN IN THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES

The following is a shortened version of an article entitled "The Ethnic Map of Southern Turkmenistan in the 17th and 18th Centuries" by Yu.E. Bregel¹ in KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA No.XXXI (1959) of the Institute of Ethnography in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

The article, which is of great interest, is accompanied by two maps showing the ethnographic distribution in Southern Turkmenistan and Khorasan in the 17th and 18th centuries. These maps are schematic and their re-drawing in transliterated form presents certain technical difficulties. That relating to the 17th century has, however, been reproduced by photography with a transliterated key. In addition, an outline map showing the place-names mentioned in the abridged translation has also been included.

The main sources used by Bregel¹ are given at the end of this article.

. . .

Introduction - Iranian population - Turkic population - The Arabs.

Introduction

The 16th-18th centuries were a period of far-reaching changes in the ethnic composition of the population of northern Khorasan (i.e. southern Turkmenistan). The result of these changes was that, whereas in the 17th century its settled population did not noticeably differ racially from the southerners, by the end of the 18th century the picture was completely reversed: the nomadic and semi-nomadic Turkmens now occupied not only the steppes but also the oases of northern Khorasan while the settled Iranian population rapidly

vanished from these areas. At the same time in southern Khorasan the Iranian race, represented by the Kurds and Jamshids, became dominant.

In the 17th century the population of the north already differed markedly from that of the south owing to the predominance of nomads in it. This difference speedily grew more pronounced since in the course of the 16th-18th centuries the decrease in the settled population in northern Khorasan which had begun earlier, was speeded up by the wars waged on these territories by Persia and the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. The result was that by the middle of the 18th century northern Khorasan had changed into modern southern Turkmenistan - the land of the Turkmen.

Iranian population

In the 17th century, as before, the settled population of Khorasan considerably differed from the nomads in race, its bulk being constituted by the Shii Persians. At the turn of the 16th-17th centuries the Iranian group in Khorasan was strengthened when Shah Abbas, in order to weaken the position of the large nomadic tribes and defend the country against Uzbek incursions, transplanted part of the Kurdish population of Mazanderan and western Persia to Khorasan. He created for them a number of Kurdish dependencies (vladeniya) along the southern slopes of the Kopet-Dag on the border between north and south Khorasan. Their centres were Kuchan (Khabushan), Bojnurd, Darreh Gaz with its chief town of Mohammadabad, and Kelat (Kabud Gonbad). Thus the Kurds populated all the Atek border (Atek was the name given to the area round the Kopet-Dag) from Astrabad to Kelat. Apart from these, in the 17th century many Khorasan towns had Kurdish garrisons. In the 18th century another large area of Kurdish habitation is recorded - Semelgan (now Shahabad), Maneh and the Aladagh Mountains. The majority of the Kurds lived a settled life in the towns and villages of Khorasan.

Among the nomad population Iranians constituted only a small minority, represented in the 16th-17th centuries mainly by the Jamshids of eastern Khorasan. They had been introduced into Badgis by Timur where they lived beside the Aymak tribes. They were also found in the Meruchak oasis on the Murgab and in the Serakhs region on the Tedzhen.

In the 18th century the present racial character of northern Khorasan was finally emerging and the Iranian population there was shrinking rapidly. In the late 1730s Nadir Shah restored Merv and, although he settled 3,000 families of Persian peasants there, he also brought there the Turkic Qajars, to be followed in 1746 by numerous, mainly Turkic, groups from Azerbaydzhan. Iranians thus became a minority at Merv. In Atek their position was similar and about that time

the Persians came to regard it not as part of Khorasan but a separate province. So long, however, as northern Khorasan belonged to Persia, the Iranian population survived to some extent in Atek and on the Murgab, only to disappear in the second half of the 18th century when the Turkmens finally colonized this territory.

In the 18th century the Kurds continued as a large part of the population of the region of Kuchan, Bojnurd, Kelat and Darreh Gaz; they were also numerous at Nishapur and Abiverd while Kurdish nomads played an important part in the Aladagh-Semelgan area.


In Nadir Shah's reign a large number of Iranian nomadic tribes appeared in Khorasan. Thus in 1729-30 Nadir settled in various parts of the country 12,000 Afshar families and 44,000 families from Fars, Persia and Azerbaydzhan; in 1737 he transferred 10,000 Khaftlang and Chekharlang tribesmen to Khorasan, to be followed in 1744 by 3,000 families of Qashqai from Fars who were settled at Merv. Some Afghans were brought to Khorasan in the same way: in the 1730s some 9,000 Abdali families from the region of Herat were transferred to Merverrud, Nishapur, Sabzavar and Damghan but, they soon returned home, their place in Khorasan being filled by the Gilzai from Kandahar captured by Nadir in 1738. All this transplantation of tribes into Khorasan had no permanent results since after Nadir's death they returned to their native regions. Thus in the middle of the 18th century, apart from the Kurds, only the so-called Aymaks - mainly of Jamshid origin - represented Persian nomads in Khorasan. The Aymaks of Serakhs, who had refused to acknowledge Nadir's supremacy, were in the late 1720s transferred to Kelat and Abiverd.

Turkic population

Although Iranians constituted the bulk of the town-dwellers, new ethnic elements were penetrating into the towns, particularly in northern Khorasan. After the death in 1524 of Shah Ismail of Persia, the towns of Atek passed under Khorezmian overlordship and towards the close of the century belonged for some time to Abdullah, khan of Bukhara, and his son Abdalmumin. This brought new settlers to these towns: Uzbek "feudal" lords, their officials and troops. The influx of the Uzbeks had some racial effect on the local population and marked a stage in its turkicization, the more so since some Uzbeks remained there after the conquest of northern Khorasan by the Safavids. In 1729 they lived, together with the Turkmen Goklans, to the south of the upper Gorgan. Their subsequent history is unknown.

Another Turkic group among the settled population of Khorasan was the Kyzylbash. The Safavids, engaged in wars against the Uzbek

ETHNIC MAP OF KHORASAN AND SOUTHERN TURKMENISTAN IN THE MIDDLE OF THE 17th CENTURY



1. Karadashli 2. Nokhurli 3. Murchali 4. Ali-Ili 5. Goklans 6. Imreli 7. Yomuts
8. Teke 9. Saryks 10. Ersari 11. Salors 12. Bayats 13. Afshars 14. Qajars 15. Gireyli
16. Jelari 17. Uzbeks 18. Tatars 19. Persians 20. Kurds 21. Aymaks (including Jamshids)
22. Arabs 23. Georgians 24. Sparsely settled and nomad land 25. Districts with mixed populations

26. Tribes and peoples of adjoining territories 27. Kalmyk invasion of Khorasan 28. Abul Ghazi's expeditions against the Turkmens 29. Turkmen nomad routes 30. Names of regions 31. Main roads and caravan routes

(Reproduced from *Kratkiye Soobshcheniya Instituta Etnografii*, AN / SSSR, No. XXXI, 1959)

khanates of Central Asia, put Turkic garrisons first in the towns of southern and later, in the 17th century, of northern Khorasan. In addition, the administration was largely in the hands of Kyzylbash officials. Garrisons derived from various Kyzylbash tribes were found in many towns and a particularly large one, made up by the Qajars, held Merv. At the beginning of the 18th century, apart from Merv and environs, the Qajars were found at Chaacha, Mekhne, Turshiz, Sabzavar and the Astrabad province. As they were hostile to Persia, Nadir Shah had them removed from Merv (where they soon returned, in 1736) and after their uprising at Astrabad in 1744 they were deported to Nishapur whence they did not return until Nadir's death in 1747.

In the towns of southern, and to a smaller extent northern, Khorasan resided large military and civilian groups derived from other Kyzylbash tribes, the Bayats and Afshars. At the turn of the 16th-17th centuries the Bayats are recorded as the permanent inhabitants of Nishapur and district while the Afshars garrisoned Abiverd. The Bayat position at Nishapur was strengthened when Nadir transferred there, in 1732-3, 2,000 Bayat families from Kerkuk in Persia. They also lived round Mashhad. The Afshars in Nadir's reign lived in towns and strongholds; thus Bagvade, probably at the site of modern Ashkhabad, was inhabited by a clan or a branch of the Afshar Kunduzlu. The Afshars enjoyed much prestige in Nadir's reign since the Shah himself was descended from them and relied on their support. At the beginning of the 18th century the main area of their settlement was in Abiverd with the adjoining part of Darreh Gaz. Apart from this, they lived in large numbers in the Andkhui-Akhcha region of Afghanistan and also at Kelat, Nisa, Durun, Kurgan, and in the stronghold of Bagvade. Nadir took steps to settle all the Afshars in Khorasan, but after his death they lost no time in returning to their original homes, except those of Andkhui who seem to have remained in Khorasan.

Another Turkic-speaking group was the Mongol tribe of Jelair scattered all over Khorasan. At the turn of the 16th-17th centuries they lived near Merv and in Atek round Nisa, Durun and Bagabad. The Astrabad region was one of the main areas of their settlement where they were already found in the 15th century. At the beginning of the 18th century they lived in large numbers also in the districts of Shibirghan and Akhcha in Afghan Turkestan, and round Astrabad where they constituted a compact mass of the population. In Afghanistan they maintained close relations with the Afshars and probably from there both groups were moved to Kelat where they survived almost until the beginning of the 20th century.

A Tatar tribe lived in the district of Merv. It was probably descended from the Mongol tribe of Kara-Tatar which at the end of the 14th century had been transferred by Timur to Transoxania from south-

west (Perednaya) Asia. Subsequently they moved to the Merv oasis where they stayed until its ravage by Nadir. They did not reappear after Merv had been restored in 1736.

In west Khorasan, near Kalpush, Khadzhilar and possibly Isfarain lived the Turkic tribe of Gireyli (Kerali). In the 18th century they remained in those regions.

Apart from the Uzbeks and the Kyzylbash tribes, some Turkmens were found among the settled population of Khorasan: the tribes of Kara-dashli, Nokhurli and in part the Goklans. But the bulk of the Turkmens were nomads or semi-nomads. They constituted the majority of Khorasan's nomadic population and in the 16th century they began to move eastwards along the Kopet-Dag.

Although in southern Khorasan the nomads constituted a smaller proportion of the population than in the northern, their ethnic composition was much more varied and Turkmen tribes, except in the Gorgan area, were in the minority, while they constituted the majority in the north.


In the 17th century the Turkmens were distributed over Khorasan as follows:

In the region of Dzhurdzhan, on the lower reaches of the Gorgan and Atek, lived a group of tribes called Yaka (i.e. coastal or border), or Sainkhani Turkmens. It included the tribes of Okhlu, Goklan, Imreli (Eymyur) and partly the Khorasani Salors. In the second quarter of the 17th century these tribes, having been repeatedly defeated by the Persians, moved eastwards from Astrabad, while the Imreli went to Atek and settled in the district of Koch. In the middle of the century the Goklans, pressed by the Safavid army, followed them to the east. The Salors after 1628 moved into Khorezm while the Okhlu disappeared from the records for some time. The old lands of the Imreli and Goklans were in the middle of the century occupied by the Yomuts arriving from the north.

The Ali-Ili, the first Turkmen tribe to move eastwards along the Kopet-Dag, by the middle of the 17th century had penetrated farther than the others. At the beginning of the century they lived in the Sumbar valley and the Khodzha-Kala district from where they were subsequently dislodged by a Kalmyk invasion.

The Ersari, who in the 16th century lived in the Balkhan Mountains and Mangyshlak, in the 1630s were finally driven out by the Kalmyks and moved to Atek, particularly the district of Mekhin.

KHUKASAN AND SOUTHERN TURKMENISTAN IN THE 17th-18th CENTURIES



The Saryks in the middle of the 17th century lived in the Balkhans. Here the Teke also stayed for a time, but in the course of the century part of them penetrated into Atek and by the beginning of the 18th century they were already found round Nisa and Durun.

These Turkmen migrations were caused by the wars waged against them by Abul Ghazi, Khan of Khiva, and his son Anusha in the 1640s-50s. In that period the Turkmen fleeing from Khiva began a large-scale colonization of the banks of the Amu-Dar'ya and subsequently the lands on the Murgab including the oasis of Merv. In 1645 the Turkmen living in Khorezm round Khazarasp were defeated and a large part of them migrated towards the Tedzhen and hence, after another defeat, to the region of Bami-Beurma. As the Salors and part of the Ali-Ili and Ersari lived in Khorezm before Abul Ghazi's accession, it seems that it was against them that he waged his wars and pursued them to the Tedzhen. Thus in the middle of the 17th century the Salors and Ersari started their migration up the Amu-Dar'ya and by the middle of the 18th century they were found in the region of Chardzhuy (modern Chardzhou).

The movements of the Ali-Ili are less known and it seems that in the course of the 17th century they left Merv and moved up along the Murgab to settle round Meruchak.

The Turkmen who before Abul Ghazi's attack on Beurma had migrated to there from Balkh were probably the Afshars(1) who at the beginning of the 18th century lived in large numbers in the region of Andkhui. Another large part of the Afshars, belonging to the Karaklu clan, occupied the lands between Kubegan and Darreh Gaz where they had settled at the beginning of the 16th century.

In the first half of the 18th century the Turkmen of northern Khorasan were constantly in motion as a result of their struggle against Nadir. These wars resulted in a changed balance of power among the Turkmen tribes: while the Imreli and Ali-Ili were considerably weakened, the Teke and Yomuts grew stronger. In the 1720s the last two lived round Nisa and Durun and lands to the west of them. From there they slowly moved to the south-east and in 1731 appeared near Abiverd, only to be repulsed by Nadir. After the capture of Khiva by him, the Teke living there were transferred to Khorasan.

The Yomuts were the strongest tribe in the middle of the 18th century. The beginning of the century found them in the lands between

(1) There seem to have been two Afshar tribes: one Turkmen and the other Kyzylbash.

the lower course of the Gorgan and the Great Balkhans; together with the Teke they were penetrating into Durun. In Nadir's reign the Yomuts of Khorezm used to appear in Khorasan only to be driven back.

The Goklans continued to live on the upper Gorgan, between the Gorgan and the Atrek. Those of them who lived together with the Gireyli in the district of Karabag, were in 1729 driven by Nadir towards the Sumbar River and established themselves round Kara-Kala and Yuvan-Kala from where they dislodged the Ali-Ili and Karadashly.

In Atek only the settled Turkmen tribes survived - the Karadashli west of Durun and the Nokhurli.

The Imreli at the beginning of the 18th century were found all over Atek, between Durun and Abiverd; in the middle of the century they were mainly centred round Bami, Durun and Mekhin. To the east of them lived the Ali-Ili, between Durun and Bagabad. Another large Ali-Ili group was found far to the south-east, round Meruchak.

The Ersari at the beginning of the 18th century lived on the left bank of the Amu-Dar'ya, round Chardzhuy, from where they raided the oasis of Merv. When Nadir invaded Bukhara in 1740, they escaped to the north but soon returned and in the middle of the century stayed round Kerki from where they penetrated to Maimana in northern Afghanistan.

The Saryk used to live with the Ersari round Chardzhuy. In the 1720s together with the Teke and Yomuts they harassed Durun and Mekhin.

The Arabs

The third ethnic group of old Khorasan was that of the Arabs. They appear to have lived near Merv "since ancient times", but their presence there was not recorded until the first half of the 18th century. Possibly they were descended from the Arabs who in Timur's reign had come from Mesopotamia. In the 1720s Nadir transferred them to Abiverd and their subsequent fate is unknown.

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Week of Uzbek literature in Azerbaydzhan

A "week of Uzbek literature" opened in Baku on 5 May. Among the guests were several eminent Uzbek writers including Gamud Gulyam, Gafur Gulyam, Kyamil Yashen and M. Sheykhzade. BR. 5.5.60

Centenary of Kirgiz bard

The one-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Togolok Moldo, famous Kirgiz akyn (bard) and writer, was celebrated throughout the republic in June 1960. OGONEK, 23.6.60

Lenin prize for Tadzhik writer

Mirza Turzun-zade, celebrated Tadzhik writer, has been awarded the Lenin prize for literature. KT. 28.4.60

L A B O U R A N D L I V I N G C O N D I T I O N S

I N K A Z A K H S T A N

During the last four months of 1959 it became evident that the Kazakh SSR was confronted with serious difficulties. Although mainly economic by nature, they throw considerable light on some political and social problems which are still awaiting solution. In the last resort the authorities, from the Kazakh Central Committee and the Council of Ministers down to the oblast Party and executive committees, were blamed for all that had gone wrong.

Shortcomings in agriculture were widely discussed in the press after Khrushchev's denunciations at the December Plenum, but industrial difficulties - as expressed by the Temir-Tau disturbances - have passed almost unnoticed by the official papers, and the fact that something has happened there can only be deduced from indirect newspaper references to Temir-Tau and their frequency in the critical month of October 1959.

Temir-Tau

At the end of October 1959 and again in March-April 1960 the Western press reported that large-scale riots, caused by extremely bad living conditions, had taken place at Temir-Tau on 3-5 October 1959. The news was said to have been brought by Western Europeans lately repatriated from Kazakhstan.

Temir-Tau, near the oblast town of Karaganda, originated as a settlement called Samarkandskiy. In 1942 construction of a metallurgical plant started there. In 1945 Samarkandskiy became the town of Temir-Tau and its steady growth dates from then. In 1952 another metallurgical plant, the building of the so-called Kazakhstan Magnitka was begun and is still going on. In 1956 the town had, apart from a number of industrial establishments, fifteen secondary schools, a technical college, three tekhnikums, three factory schools (FZO), the Pioneers' home, three clubs and a palace of culture. In 1959 the population had reached 55,000.

Briefly, the story of the disturbances which has reached the West

is this: three thousand young workers employed at building the Magnitka and housed in a tented camp in Vostok, a suburb of Temir-Tau, were dissatisfied with their difficult living and working conditions and low pay. On Saturday night, 3 October, about fifty of them set their communal dining hall on fire and proceeded to plunder a shopping area situated about a mile from the camp. They were joined by other youths from the camp, some fifteen hundred altogether, and the local militia was overpowered. One report says that its chief was hanged and his deputy with his men driven out of town. Throughout the night looting went on, some of the local population joining in; also the plant offices were wrecked. Meanwhile it was announced that troops were on their way to Temir-Tau, whereupon the rioters set an ambush and disarmed three truckloads of soldiers.

On Sunday morning the youths occupied the main department store and turned it into their headquarters. During the night troop reinforcements arrived and the part of the town where the rioters were gathered was cordoned off.

On Monday morning some of the youths tried to get away in three lorries, which were driven into a group of soldiers barring their way and some of the soldiers were killed or injured. Ninety-one people are said to have been killed and hundreds injured by Monday afternoon. At that time the troops were replaced with "People's Guards" (civilians helping the militia to maintain public order); they failed, however, to induce the rioters to give themselves up. In the evening the troops took their place; the youths were quickly dispersed and some of them set the camp on fire. The troops stayed in town until 8 October. (GUARDIAN, 4.4.60.)

There has at no time been any admission in the Soviet press of the occurrence of any such incidents as those just described, but that the situation in this area was and still is unsatisfactory seems confirmed by the following:

From 10 October 1959 until early November KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA whether deliberately or by coincidence, paid much attention to Temir-Tau, Karaganda and Kazakhstan's Magnitka. These references do not mention any disturbances but either discuss the unsatisfactory state of affairs at the Magnitka - delays in its construction - or the fact that living conditions in the oblast should be improved, while one issue, that of 23 October, devotes a whole page to the more cheerful aspects of building the Magnitka.

KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 10 October brings a "letter from Karaganda" called "Living Conditions (byt) - It Is Not a Trifle". It emphasizes the fact that the Government has allotted over 4 milliard

rubles for house building in the oblast during the current Seven-Year Plan and over a milliard for the construction of buildings for cultural and utilitarian purposes. It is, however, admitted that the housing situation in the oblast towns including Temir-Tau is very bad. Also the availability of groceries, cooked meals and consumer goods leaves much to be desired.

On 23 October the same paper published a number of short articles, distinguished by their "human appeal", on the life, work and high sense of duty of the worthy young people who build the Magnitka. The best example of these is what is described as a genuine letter written to her mother by a Ukrainian komsomol girl who, together with her brother and sister, tremendously enjoys building the Magnitka. She says, "there are now here multi-storied houses, palaces of culture, schools, clubs and hospitals - not worse than in Kiev. . . From all parts of the country people have come to build the Magnitka. They are friendly and hard-working and do not fear difficulties. And difficulties there are many - it is not easy to build such a plant in a bare steppe. . . I, Valyusha and Anatoliy [sister and brother] have found our place in life. . . We do not float in the clouds: all our dreams are real and have come true - after all, we live in a country where all doors are open to the young. And Kazakhstan's Magnitka has become our own home." Editorial comment adds that "thousands of young patriots whose flaming hearts have brought them here to build the plant" live like the author of the letter.

At the same time the authorities were clearly concerned about the situation at the Magnitka. On 21 October at the 9th Plenum of the Karaganda obkom no less a person than N.I. Belyayev*, the first secretary of the Kazakh Central Committee, spoke about the progress of the plant (his actual words are not reported), and administrative changes were made: M.S. Solomentsev became the first secretary and member of the bureau of the obkom and A.A. Askarov was appointed secretary and member of the obkom bureau. B.F. Bratchenko, chairman of the Karaganda Economic Rayon Sovnarkhoz, became member of the obkom bureau.

* Belyayev was relieved of his duties as first secretary of the Kazakh CP in January (P.21.1.60), and elected first secretary of the Stavropol' Kraykom (P.29.1.60). Since then he has been progressively demoted:

Relieved of his duties as member of the Central Committee of the Party Praesidium. (P.5.5.60.)

Relieved of his duties as first secretary of the Stavropol' Kraykom. (P.26.6.60.)

On 23-24 October the 16th Plenum of the Kazakh Central Committee was held and Belyayev again spoke on "the situation at the Karaganda metallurgical plant" (i.e. the Magnitka - KP.23.10.59). The Plenum admitted that construction was too slow and that the Karaganda obkom and sovnarkhoz had failed to create satisfactory living conditions for the builders. (KP.28.10.59.)

At the same time the Temir-Tau gorkom of the Party seems to have remained indifferent to the bad situation in the town, and ignored criticism offered by the press. When the gorkom's secretary, Gordov, was criticized at the meeting of the Magnitka building partkom for his ignorance of the local press comments, he declared: "If one were to take notice of all the critical statements made in the papers, a second Party gorkom would have to be created at Temir-Tau - and even without this we have enough to do." This view was shared by the first secretary of the gorkom, Katkov. (KP.4.11.59.) Nevertheless, whether as a result of press criticism or not the food trade position in the town was improved by the opening there, early in November, of the largest grocery shop in the oblast. (KP.11.11.59.)

The fact that there had been trouble at Temir-Tau was officially, though vaguely, admitted only at the republican Party congress in March 1960. On 10 March Kunayev, the first secretary of the Kazakh Central Committee, said: "We must draw the inevitable conclusions from the interruptions (sryvy) which took place in the building of the Karaganda metallurgical plant last year. They were caused by the indifference of the building management to the living conditions of the workers and by the neglect of this important construction by the Karaganda sovnarkhoz, the oblast committee of the Party, the obispolkom, the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan." (KP.11.3.60.)

Agricultural difficulties

Kazakh agriculture has developed rapidly since Khrushchev put forward in 1954 his celebrated plan of reclaiming virgin lands. The scheme was said to have been so successful that the republic won the second place in the Union, after the RSFSR, in grain production and even this is far below Kazakhstan's potential yield.

The harvest of 1959 proved to be a set-back to Kazakhstan's agriculture. The republic underfulfilled by 94,000,000 puds* the grain quota to be supplied to the State. The worst offenders were the three

* 1 pud = 35.27 pounds

northernmost oblasts: on 1 November 644,000 ha. of grain crops were still not harvested in the Kustanay, 274,000 in the Kokchetav and 130,000 in the North-Kazakhstan oblasts. (KP.22.1.60.) These crops were lost under the snow. The same happened to 600,000 ha. in the western and southern oblasts. (KP.25.12.59.)

This was the situation when the Plenum of the Central Committee opened in Moscow on 22 December. In a speech on the agricultural situation in Kazakhstan Belyayev was unwilling to dwell upon the failure of the harvest, although he admitted that the grain quotas had not been fulfilled, and he laid the blame mainly upon the weather. He tried, however, to divert the audience's attention with general figures illustrating the beneficial effect of the reclamation of virgin lands, the cultivation of maize and the very good progress of Kazakh cattle-breeding. (P.23.12.59.) D.A. Kunayev, chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers, was more outspoken on the subject of the unfulfilled quotas but, like his predecessor, ascribed it principally to "unfavourable weather conditions" and, to a smaller extent, to the inefficient organization on the part of the local authorities. (P.25.12.59.) But Khrushchev, both as the first secretary and as the father of the virgin lands, was not satisfied and in his speech on 25 December he attacked the two dignitaries:

"Comrade N.I. Belyayev has given a lecture here and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh Republic, D.A. Kunayev, has taken part in the debates. But these comrades did not have enough courage to speak about the shortcomings as Party men should do. This is why, comrade leaders of Kazakhstan, I want now to discuss what you preferred to keep quiet about. . . By 1 November 1,618,000 ha. of grain crops had not been harvested. I know that the Kazakhs try to explain in their own peculiar manner and say, 'some of the grain had gone under the first snow and afterwards we went on harvesting.' But what sort of work it was! You know how geese, particularly goslings, nip grass: a gosling gets hold of a blade of grass, pulls and falls on its backside. A cow would not eat grass a goose has passed over. (Laughter in the hall.) Everybody knows this. And this is just how in Kazakhstan they gathered the crops covered with snow. . . If we here, at the Plenum, do not tell you the truth, Comrades Belyayev and Kunayev, in Kazakhstan they certainly will not tell you about this - indeed, they will applaud you. And you will emphasize that at the Plenum everything has gone all right, while in fact the situation is bad - very bad.

"The heads of the Kazakh SSR say that some crops were not gathered for they did not ripen. Dear Comrade Belyayev, why did they not? I will tell you why they did not ripen: 18,000 of your tractors stood idle during the spring sowing for they had not been repaired. What

does this mean, comrades? This means that the kolkhozes and sovkhoses delayed sowing and when the time came to prepare for harvest, sowing was just being finished in Kazakhstan. So why blame the Lord God and say that the crops did not ripen? . . . The same inefficiency had place in the preparation and conduct of harvesting. . ." (P.29.12.59.)

Khrushchev's attack caused the Kazakh authorities to search their conscience for the real reason for the unsatisfactory state of agriculture and it was revealed that it was more complicated than a mere neglect of machinery for it was ultimately due to the indifference of the authorities to the living and working conditions of the skilled agricultural workers. The machinery had not been repaired because, on the one hand, the training of tractor and combine drivers and other technical workers (mekhanizatorskiye kadry) had been disregarded by those responsible for it and, on the other, these specialists kept abandoning agriculture en masse owing to very hard living conditions in the kolkhozes and sovkhoses. Thus in 1958, 94,300 such workers left agriculture and 46,600 in 1959. (KP.22.1.60.) This has been going on for some years; the big virgin land sovkhos, Zheleznodorozhnyy, in the Kustanay oblast, may be quoted as an example: in 1956 it lost 52.7 per cent of those who had come there to work permanently, in 1957 - 73.2 per cent, in 1958 - 65 per cent. Between 1955-8, 76.3 per cent of the mekhanizatory who during those years had come to work in the kolkhozes and sovkhoses of the oblast, left their jobs. (VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, No.4, 1960, p.138.) It should be noted that the harvest was most disappointing in the Kustanay oblast.

Thus there were not enough agricultural machines because there was an acute shortage of people to drive and repair them. This affected not only the sowing but also harvesting: 32,000 combines, 21,000 pickers and 11,000 harvesters stood idle awaiting repair while the onset of the winter destroyed the crops. (P.29.12.59.) A minor reason for the failure of the harvest was ascribed to the shortage of good quality seeds for sowing, particularly in the three northern oblasts where the harvest was most disappointing.

It seems clear that although the weather and bad organization may have been contributory causes of the failure of the 1959 harvest, the main underlying cause of the highly unsatisfactory state of the agriculture as well as of the industry of Kazakhstan has been inattention to the living conditions of the workers. Judging from the areas involved, it may be assumed that the trouble has been among the non-Kazakh settler population. This may perhaps account for the appointment of a Kazakh, Kunayev, to replace Belyayev and the appointment of a Kazakh, A.A. Arstanbekov, for the first time to the important post of Chairman of the Committee of State Security.

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Reorganization of economic administration in Uzbekistan

The economic administrative rayons of Tashkent, Fergana, Samarkand, Bukhara and Kara-Kalpakia have been merged into one economic administrative rayon. The separate Councils of National Economy have been abolished and a single council formed for the whole of Uzbekistan. (See CAR, 1957, No.3, p.335, and No.4, pp.391-2.)

PV. 2.7.60

Electrification of rural Turkmenistan

The electrification of Turkmenistan's rural areas is to be completed this year. Every collective and state farm is to be provided with its own cinema and 244 projectors are to be installed during the next three years.

SU. No.123, 1960

T H R E E L E N I N G R A D O R I E N T A L I S T S

The fortieth anniversary of the Revolution in 1957 was celebrated by the Leningrad Department of the Soviet Academy Institute of Oriental Studies and the Oriental Faculty of Leningrad University with a joint "jubilee" conference. The anniversary provided the orientalists with an occasion to recapitulate the achievements of Soviet oriental studies, with special reference to Leningrad, in the last forty years. The lectures given at the conference have now been published in *UCHENYYE ZAPISKI INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA*, Vol. XXV, 1960.

The greatest Leningrad scholars concerned with Central Asia were Bartol'd, Yakubovskiy and P.P. Ivanov. All three had established their reputations as scholars before Marxist-Leninist methodology was applied to oriental studies so rigidly as it is today. They were therefore able to pursue their own particular interests which lay in the pre-Soviet period.

Bartol'd

It is doubtful whether Bartol'd (1869-1930) can properly be described as a Soviet scholar. He was educated and wrote the majority of his internationally known works before the Revolution; what is more important, "being a representative of bourgeois science in his outlook, even in the Soviet period Bartol'd was unable to understand the role and importance of social classes and class struggle. This is why he could not achieve a full understanding of the economic, political, philosophical and religious problems in the history of the eastern peoples. He proceeded from a false premise, that eminent personalities are the moving force of history since it is they, and not the people, who make history." (1) It is admitted that "his works written after the Great October Socialist Revolution show no trace of essential change of ideas when compared with those he wrote before the Revolution." (2)

The above two opinions were expressed in 1950 and 1954 respectively. At the "jubilee" conference, however, an attempt was made to rehabilitate Bartol'd, at least partially. It was revealed that Bartol'd had always been conscious of the principle of class struggle in history. Romodin declared that, although Bartol'd was not a Marxist and never had a clear conception of the role of productive forces and

relationships in history, it was wrong to believe that history was to him a mere chaotic patchwork of events. [This view is expressed in the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd edn., Vol.IV, p.274.] In his researches he paid attention to class (soslovnaya) struggle and even at the early stage of his career he believed that "in the East, as in the West, large-scale movements were caused by the interests of a large number of people; both in Asia and in Europe the same laws of historical evolution are at work." (The quotation comes from Bartol'd's article published in ZAPISKI VOSTOCHNOGO OTDELA RUSSKOGO ARKHEOLOGICHESKOGO OBSHCHESTVA, Vol.XI, 1899.) Thus Romodin seems to ascribe the misunderstanding of Bartol'd by his Marxist critics largely to a difference in nomenclature (soslovnaya versus klassovaya bor'ba). (3)

Romodina was seconded by another speaker at the conference, I.P. Petrushevskiy, who said that Bartol'd's last works showed clearly a Marxist trend. For example, in an article on the relationship between social and economic factors in the life of the Turks and Mongols, published in IZVESTIYA OBSHCHESTVA ARKHEOLOGII, ISTORII I ETNOGRAFII PRI KAZANSKOM GOS. UNIVERSITETE, Vol.XXXIV, Series 3-4, 1929, he wrote: "Even in the conditions of nomadic life there is no way to create a strong government without an aggravation of class struggle." About the same time, so it was said, under the influence of the Marxist conception of feudalism as a social formation, Bartol'd came to recognize the social structure of medieval Persia as feudal. (4)

Bartol'd was descended from a well-to-do German family and his original name was Wilhelm; subsequently he substituted for this Vasiliy Vladimirovich. He regarded Russian as his native language and his knowledge of German, at least at the early stage of his career, was not beyond reproach.

During his student days at St. Petersburg University, at the Faculty of Oriental Languages, Central Asia became his main interest and this was to dominate his whole career. In his "Autobiography" he wrote: "It seemed perfectly natural to me that a Russian oriental historian should be attracted to a region which geographically and historically is nearer to Russia than the other eastern countries, and where he has at his disposal sources which are much more inaccessible to western European research workers." (5)

He graduated in 1891, in 1896 began to lecture at his university and in 1901 became professor. In 1912 he was elected member of the Russian Academy, a post which he retained for the rest of his life.

Bartol'd was a scholar in Turkish, Persian and Arabic. Almost every year he travelled to Turkestan to study local records and

antiquities. He also spent much time in the libraries of Istanbul and Cairo, as well as in many European ones. Even the Russian Revolution did not seriously interfere with his work; his fame stood so high that the Turkmen and Kirgiz nationalists asked him to write for them the histories of their peoples.

Bartol'd was a prolific writer whose legacy consists of over 400 books and articles in learned publications. Among the earliest were *THE PROBLEMS OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN TURKESTAN* (1894), *HISTORY OF SEMIRECH'YE* (1898) and *TURKESTAN IN THE PERIOD OF THE MONGOL INVASIONS* (1898-1900). The last won Bartol'd international celebrity and was translated into English in 1928. It brings the history of Central Asia down to the death of Chingiz Khan. The period of the Timurids is dealt with in *ULUG-BEK*, written in 1915 but not published until 1918 (translated into English by V. and T. Minorsky, Vol.II of *FOUR STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL ASIA*, Leiden 1958).

Before the Revolution Bartol'd also made a notable contribution to historical geography by putting forward the theory that in the 13th-16th centuries part of the Amu-Dar'ya waters flowed through the Uzboy to the Caspian Sea (*INFORMATION ON THE ARAL SEA AND THE LOWER REACHES OF THE AMU-DAR'YA FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE 17TH CENTURY*, 1902, and *CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF IRRIGATION IN TURKESTAN*, 1914). Persia was dealt with in the *HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL SURVEY OF IRAN* (1903).

After the Revolution Bartol'd played an important part in organizing historical research in the Central Asian republics. He visited them on scientific missions, gave talks and lectures and played a notable part in setting up the department of oriental history at the Turkestan State University (1920) and in organizing the preservation and plans for studying ancient monuments (1925). The early scientific libraries, archives and museums in the national republics were often associated with his name. He held important posts: chairman of the Board of Orientalists of the Academy of Sciences, director of the Turcological Institute, chairman of the Academy of Material Culture, editor of the periodical *IRAN* and other publications of the Academy of Sciences.

At the same time Bartol'd continued writing and publishing. Some of the best-known of his later works are *ISLAM and MUSLIM CULTURE* (1918), *THE MUSLIM WORLD* (1922), *HISTORY OF TURKESTAN* (1923), *THE TADZHIKS - A HISTORICAL OUTLINE* and *HISTORY OF THE STUDY OF THE EAST IN RUSSIA AND EUROPE* (1925), *HISTORY OF CULTURAL LIFE IN TURKESTAN* and *THE KIRGIZ* (1927), *IRAN and HISTORY OF THE TURKIC AND MONGOL PEOPLES* (1928), and *OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE TURKMEN PEOPLE* (1929).

Some of Bartol'd's works still await publication. A new edition of *TURKESTAN IN THE PERIOD OF THE MONGOL INVASIONS* will contain the notes added by its author to the English edition of 1928 as well as the last, unfinished, chapter which brings the story up to the 1270s. I.I. Umnyakov's annotated bibliography of Bartol'd's works and notes on those still unpublished and deposited in the archives of the Soviet Academy of Sciences will be issued; the majority of them deal with Central Asia. There are also articles and notes on manuscripts, synopses of sources and texts prepared for printing. Thus Bartol'd's impressive legacy is by no means exhausted and it is to be hoped that his hitherto unknown works will eventually be published. The long-overdue task of rehabilitating his reputation was begun by N.A. Smirnov in *AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC STUDIES IN THE USSR* (Moscow, 1954)* and the recent conference has done much to clear his name still further.

Yakubovskiy

Aleksandr Yur'yevich Yakubovskiy (1886-1953) belongs to the first generation of Soviet orientalists, owing to which fact he escaped the ideological difficulties confronting Bartol'd. In 1913 Yakubovskiy graduated from the Faculty of History and Philology of St. Petersburg University and spent some years teaching in the middle school. Only in the Soviet period did he become an orientalist: in 1924 he graduated from the Oriental Faculty of Leningrad University, where Bartol'd was one of his teachers, and in the following year started work at the State Academy of the History of Material Culture (Institute of History of Material Culture since 1937) and at the Hermitage. In 1935 he became professor at Leningrad University and a corresponding member of the Soviet Academy in 1943.

Yakubovskiy specialized in medieval history of the Near East, Caucasus and - first and foremost - Central Asia. He combined the study of written sources with that of antiquities and became a well-known archaeologist. He organized a number of important archaeological expeditions into Central Asia and after 1947 he directed the excavations of Pendzhikent in the Leninabad oblast where remarkable mural paintings of the Sogdian period were discovered. His works are stated to prove that he "keenly responded to the demands of Soviet science". To this category belong his researches on national uprisings in medieval Central Asia, origins of its peoples and periodization of its

* See *CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW*, 1954 No.1, 1955 Nos.1 & 2, and *ISLAM AND RUSSIA*, CARC, London, 1956.

history in the "feudal" period.(6) He also made an important contribution to the ideological side of Central Asian historiography in his critical estimate of Bartol'd's ideas from the point of view of the Marxist theory concerning social evolution ("Problems of Social History in the Works of V.V. Bartol'd", VESTNIK LENINGRADSKOGO GOSUDARSTVENNOGO UNIVERSITETA, No.12, 1947).

The vast majority of Yakubovskiy's works consists of articles in learned publications. His major works were FEUDALISM IN THE EAST (1932), SAMARKAND UNDER TIMUR AND THE TIMURIDS IN THE 14TH-15TH CENTURIES (1933), ORIENTAL CULTURE AND ART IN THE HERMITAGE (1937), THE PROBLEM OF THE ETHNIC ORIGIN OF THE UZBEK PEOPLE (1941) and THE GOLDEN HORDE AND ITS COLLAPSE (1937), the last written in collaboration with B.D. Grekov.

Romodina thus sums up the role of Yakubovskiy and Ivanov in Soviet oriental studies: "These oriental historians have made a large contribution towards accomplishing the very important task of Soviet scholars - they critically examined the estimates and comments on historical facts made in the works of bourgeois authors and in their own researches they applied creatively the principles of historical materialism."(7)

Ivanov

Pavel Petrovich Ivanov (1893-1942) devoted only the last eight years of his life to Central Asian history but in this short time he wrote a large number of articles and major works. He was an authority on the "late feudal" period (16th-19th centuries) and was the first to study thoroughly the social and economic history of the Central Asian peoples.

Ivanov was the son of a worker. Before the Revolution he finished a teachers' training college course and worked in a Russo-native school [presumably in Central Asia]. In 1916 he was called up for military service and after demobilization proceeded to study in the Turkestan Oriental Institute in Tashkent. In 1924 he graduated from its Persian Department, but did not at first work as an orientalist and could devote only his spare time to research. His earliest studies were concerned with Central Asian archaeology. In 1929 he moved to Leningrad where he taught oriental languages and it was not until 1934-35 that he could finally concentrate on historical research.

His choice of subject helped him to achieve success since his predecessors were not interested in Central Asia in the 16th-19th centuries. Ivanov was well equipped for the task since he knew Persian,

Tadzhik and the Turkic languages and could study the sources in the original. He soon made himself known when he published AN OUTLINE OF KARA-KALPAK HISTORY (in MATERIALS ON HISTORY OF THE KARA-KALPAKS, 1935) which was followed by a translated edition in Turkey.

The study of Bukharan and Kokand sources enabled Ivanov to publish a major work on the REBELLION OF THE KITAY-KIPCHAKS IN THE KHANATE OF BUKHARA IN 1821-1825 (TRUDY INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA AKADEMII NAUK, Vol.VII, 1939). The discovery and examination of the archive of the Khivan khans was Ivanov's crowing achievement. In 1940 he published THE ARCHIVES OF THE KHIVAN KHANS IN THE 19TH CENTURY and henceforward he was included among the leading Soviet orientalists. In the winter of 1941-42 during the siege of Leningrad he defended his doctoral thesis on the Khivan archives and soon afterwards he was dead. In 1958 another of his major works, ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL ASIA FROM THE 16TH UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF THE 19TH CENTURY, was published. It had been completed in 1941 but the outbreak of the war prevented publication. This thoroughly documented work is the comprehensive summary of Ivanov's researches and its importance is increased by the fact that Soviet historical literature suffers from an acute shortage of general works on Central Asian history in the "late feudal" period, although there are works on the history of the individual peoples.

Ivanov was the first Soviet scholar to produce an authoritative outline of the various historical processes in the history of the Khanates of Kokand, Khiva and Bukhara from the earliest times until the Russian conquest. He studied it in close connexion with that of the nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples - the Kazakhs, Kirgiz and Turkmens. "A detailed study from the sources of social and economic conditions and creative application of Marxist-Leninist methodology enabled P.P. Ivanov to draw a number of important conclusions and describe some essential aspects of Central Asian feudalism."(8)

Among Ivanov's works which have not yet been published are a history of Afghanistan in the 18th century, a diary of his mission to Eastern Bukhara to inquire into its economic situation (1920-1), and some historical and ethnographical notes compiled in Tashkent and Kirgizia (on the topography of old Tashkent, genealogy of Kirgiz clans and materials relating to the Sart-Kalmyks inhabiting the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul').

Notes

- (1) GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd edition, Vol.4, p.274
- (2) OCHERKI ISTORII IZUCHENIYA ISLAMA V SSSR. N.A. Smirnov. Moscow, 1954, p.120

- (3) UCHENYYE ZAPISKI INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, Vol.XXV. Moscow, 1960, p.32
- (4) Ibid., pp.204-5
- (5) OGONEK, No.40, 1927, p.14
- (6) UCH. ZAPISKI, p.37
- (7) Ibid.
- (8) Ibid., p.41

Town planning in Uzbekistan

Plans for the replanning of Tashkent are now being worked out by the director of the Town Planning Institute of Uzbekistan, A.N. Zotov. The new mining town of Angren was also planned by Zotov.

OGONEK, 6.5.60

Alma-Ata observatory studies satellites

Scholars at the Alma-Ata observatory are studying the courses of man-made satellites. The director of the observatory, V.G. Fesekov, propounded a theory of interplanetary dust which is of great importance in the study of the cosmos, and which has been confirmed by data obtained from the Soviet satellites.

PART. ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, No.6, 1960

Failure of scheme to bring young Kazakhs into Karaganda factory

Under a scheme of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan last year it was decided to select 2,000 young Kazakhs to work in the metallurgical plant in Karaganda. But the selection was not done properly and the leaders of the factory have not helped the Komsomol in its work; they do not want to take young people. So far only 697 people have been chosen and 243 of them have already left the factory because of bad conditions.

PART. ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, No.6, 1960

NEWS DIGEST

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 April - 30 June 1960. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Administrative changes

Administrative changes are recorded in the following appointments only: First and Second Party Secretaries, Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers (Prime Ministers), Chairmen of the State Planning and State Security Committees, and Ministers of Communications.

Turkmenistan

On being elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, B. Ovezov was relieved of the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. TI. 14.6.60

Dzhuma Durdy Karayev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, died on 4 May 1960. P. 5.5.60

Territorial changes

Azerbaydzhan

By decree of 18 April 1960, the town type settlement Imishli has been included in the category of towns of rayon subordination. VVS. 28.4.60

By decree of 18 April 1960:

The settlement round the sovkhos "Azerbaydzhan" has been separated from the Kasym-Ismaïl village soviet and given the status of town type settlement with the name Karayeri.

The settlement Bagramtepe, Imishli rayon has been given the status of town type settlement and renamed Birmay. VVS. 28.4.60

Kirgizia

By decree of 26 May 1960, the settlement of Kara-Su, Kara-Su rayon, Osh oblast has been given the status of town with rayon subordination.

SK. 1.6.60

ARCHAEOLOGY

While excavating the ruins of Ming-Uryuk recently, Uzbek archaeologists located the ancient town of Chash (Shash). Excavations show that the town was situated on the heights above the north bank of the Salar river at the beginning of our era; this is the site of the present Tashkent and confirms the theory of the archaeologist M. Masson which he had based on ancient Chinese and Arab sources. Ming-Uryuk seems to have been the centre of the district of Chash.

Among the ruins excavated were found the ruler's residence of the 5th-6th centuries A.D. Life in Ming-Uryuk ceased at the time of the Mongol conquest.

VOPROSY ISTORII, No.5, 1960

An article in KRATKIYE SOOBShCHENIYA INSTITUTA ISTORII (vyp. 76, 1959), by G.A. Brykina, discusses an engraving of the 8th century found on a Turkish pebble. The pebble was discovered by a Kirgiz archaeological expedition in 1953-4 in the excavated ruins of a Buddhist temple at Ak-Beshim. The temple was built in the 7th century and destroyed by Turkish nomadic tribes in the 8th century. Fireplaces and storage holes found on the site show that the Turks used the ruins as living quarters for a time. The pebble was found in one of these fireplaces; it is 34cm. by 18.5cm. and has cut on it a picture of a hunting dog chasing a mountain goat. The figures are represented by a few outlines incised with a small metal instrument. The style as well as the strata in which the pebble was found (together with iron and bronze objects of Turkish origin of the 8th-9th centuries) indicate that it dates back to the 8th century. The find is unique as nothing similar has been previously discovered in Central Asia.

The technique of outline drawing was used by eastern Turks during the 6th-8th centuries and similar works of this period have been found in the Altay, Mongolia and the Trans-Baykal area. Furthermore, the features of the engraving resemble the style used by the ancient Altay Turks. This confirms the view that the temple was destroyed by the Qarluqs - originating in the Altay - at the time when they invaded northern Kirgizia, and explains how a work characteristic of the Altay Turks could be discovered at Ak-Beshim.

CONFERENCE OF KIRGIZ INTELLIGENTSIA

The first "conference of intelligentsia" in Kirgizia, was held in May 1960. The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Kirgiz Communist Party, I.R. Rezzakov, gave a detailed report on "the tasks of the intelligentsia of the republic for realizing the decisions made at the XXIst Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" which is summarized below.

The XXIst Congress pointed out that in the present period of transition into Communist society the role of the intelligentsia has become more important.

The Kirgiz intelligentsia owes its existence to the Soviet State. There was no intelligentsia before the October Revolution and less than one per cent of the population was literate. Now, however, there are 65,000 specialists with higher or specialized secondary education.

The intelligentsia in Kirgizia includes 50 different nationalities, so in this respect too, it reflects the composition of the Soviet State. They represent and must propagate Marxism-Leninism and Communist internationalism free from narrow-minded local and nationalist interests.

The language of communication between the various nationalities of the Soviet Union is Russian. Since the October Revolution Russian has become the second language of all Soviet peoples. Knowledge of Russian links together the different nationalities as well as giving access to outstanding Russian works of science, technology and culture. More attention must be paid, therefore, to the teaching of Russian in every school of the republic, so that when children leave school they are able to speak Russian fluently and have a good command of the literary language.

The intelligentsia has two main tasks: to take an active part in the construction of the national economy, and to achieve the Communist education of the people.

In every branch of industry the standard of technology must be raised. To achieve this many more specialists are to be trained. Special attention should be paid to training local people as technicians and specialists. In the departments of physics, economics, mathematics and geography at the university there are no students at all from the Alay region, at the agricultural institute there are no students from the Alay, Dzhangi-Dzhol' and Batken rayons.

Another task of the intelligentsia is to explain to the people the importance of new technical methods for achieving the Seven-Year Plan. They must use every means of mass communication in propagating the principles of modern technology as indispensable requisites of progress.

In the period of transition into Communism the first essential of ideological work is to educate the people towards a Communist attitude to work, explain to them the cultural and economic advance of Communism, and the teachings of Marxism-Leninism.

Almost 50,000 people are engaged in propaganda work in Kirgizia. More than 80,000 men and women receive Party propaganda education. Yet there are shortcomings. Not enough attention is paid to the fact that many workers tend to prefer private to public ownership, and exaggerate the advantages of private farms to the detriment of kolkhozes and sovkhoses. There are survivals of capitalism in the morals of some people: drinking, malevolent attitude towards others, envy, etc. Survivals of a "feudal-bay ideology" concerning women are still present in some form or other; there are still instances of girls under age being given in marriage, or sold for bride money, polygamy etc. Women in Kirgizia today take an active part in the construction of Communist society and their role in the national economy becomes more and more important.

These problems as well as the struggle against survivals of religious ideology have been insufficiently dealt with so far.

The Party has been successful in propagating the ideas of socialist internationalism. However, some traces of bourgeois ideology remain - local patriotism, nationalistic views in explaining important events of the past, harping on so-called national characteristics. There are some followers of the reactionary poet Molla Kylych and the bourgeois nationalist ideologist Tynystanov.

In the ideological education of the masses, the press, radio, television and cultural establishments are the most effective means.

Remarkable results have been achieved in book publishing. In 1926, 26 books were published with a total of 65,000 copies. At present 800 books are published yearly with a total of 4m. copies. Soviet literature is of great importance for the Communist education of the people. Pre-Soviet literature was almost entirely confined to poetry. Now, all literary forms are flourishing. Works of Kirgiz authors are translated into other languages spoken in the Soviet Union. For instance, Tugel'bay Sydybekov's **MEN OF OUR TIMES** is very popular all over the

country. Kirgiz drama has also achieved its first successes. Russian and world literary classics as well as plays by Kirgiz playwrights are in the repertoire of Kirgiz theatres.

Concluding his speech I.R. Razzakov emphasized that in the course of further cultural development the multi-national composition of the population must always be borne in mind. Party organizations must cooperate with the intelligentsia and lead it to an active contribution to economic and cultural development. SK. 21.5.60

COMMUNICATIONS

Construction of the Kushka - Herat - Kandahar highway has begun. The road will be 760 km. long. Workers from the Soviet Union engaged on it, include leading members of the Komsomol. TI. 1.5.60

DELEGATIONS

A delegation of Indian women on their way to the International Women's Congress in Copenhagen, stopped at Tashkent. They visited industrial, cultural and medical centres and several institutions for children. PV. 17.4.60

Delegations of educational workers from Cambodia stayed some days in Uzbekistan. They studied the organizations for the political education of children. PV. 4.6.60

A delegation of women of the countries of Asia and Africa visited Tashkent in May. PV. 3.5.60

A delegation of the Japan-USSR Society arrived at Baku for a three-day visit. BR. 31.5.60

At the invitation of the Uzbek Chamber of Commerce, O. Bonsu, president of the Ghana Chamber of Commerce, and Ch. Tettey, general secretary, visited Tashkent. PV. 22.5.60

LITERATURE

The publishing house of the Institute of Linguistics and Literature, AN/Uz.SSR, has brought out a four-volume chrestomathy of Uzbek literature. This chrestomathy covers a thousand years of literary

history. For the preparation of the work research was conducted in the libraries of Istanbul, London, Cambridge and Paris, and several hitherto unknown writers were discovered including Yakini, a contemporary of Navoi.

OGONEK, No.13, 1960

The library of the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography in Stalinabad is one of the richest libraries inside the Soviet Union and abroad. It has acquired nearly all the books of the Russian Orientalist V.V. Barthol'd and has the unique copy of the first edition of VOYAGES AND ADVENTURES OF PHILIP YEFREMOV IN BUKHARA, KHIVA, PERSIA AND INDIA (1786). The library possesses also many manuscripts in Oriental languages.

VOPROSY ISTORII, No.5, 1960

An article in KOMMUNIST, by G. Gusairov discusses shortcomings in planning book publication. In Kazakhstan recently there was not enough paper to print important textbooks such as the HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MARXISM-LENINISM, and PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, but at the same time the Kazakh State Publishing House printed 225,000 copies of A. Dumas' LE VICOMTE DE BRAGELONNE, using more than 400 tons of paper.

KOMMUNIST, No.5, 1960

A new monthly periodical entitled PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' is to be published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. It will appear in Russian and the first issue comes out in July 1960.

Articles in this journal will deal with questions such as Party organization, Party political work, propaganda, activities of the soviets, Komsomol organization etc.

PV. 28.5.60

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

PERSIA

I. THE 1905-11 REVOLUTION

The Social Democrats in the 1905-11 Revolution

The question of the Marxist content of the Persian revolution of 1905-11 has much exercised the minds of Soviet historians, who have closely examined the question of the participation of Russian (Transcaucasian) revolutionaries in the Persian revolution (see CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1956, No.3, pp.288-98, and 1960, No.1, p.76).

Further material on this subject has now been presented by M.S. Ivanov in his article "New Material on the Social-Democratic Group in Tabriz in 1908", in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA No.5 of 1959. Ivanov begins his article by noting that both Persian and Russian sources mention the activity in Persia during the 1905-11 revolution of Social Democrat groups, usually lumped together under the general title of the "Social Democratic Party". Such groups existed in Tabriz, Tehran and Rasht. He asserts, however, that there is no evidence available of the existence of a Party programme, Party regulations, or of any central control or organization. It is known, he says, that Social Democrats played an active role in the democratic-revolutionary Moja-hed Society, but there is insufficient evidence to determine whether this society was in fact the Social Democratic Party (Ejtema'iun-e-amiyun) or whether the Social Democrats merely comprised its hard core.

Ivanov then proceeds to an examination of certain documents from the G.V. Plekhanov Archives which throw light on the Social Democrat movement in Tabriz in 1908. The most important of these documents are (a) a report of a meeting of 30 Tabriz Social Democrats held on 16 October 1908 at which was discussed the question of the organization of a Social Democrat group in Tabriz; (b) a letter dated 3 December 1908 to leaders of the European Social Democrat movement in Geneva signed on behalf of a section of the Tabriz group by Tigran Dervini;

(c) a letter dated 10 December 1908 sent from Tabriz to Plekhanov by A. Chilinkrian.

The arguments for the creation of a Social Democrat group given in the first document were as follows: Persia had entered on the stage of machine industry. A proletariat had been formed. There was a danger that the bourgeoisie would make use of the proletariat to reinforce its position. The people (defined as the elements of society without property) were the most revolutionary section of society. The sooner they achieved class-consciousness the sooner the revolution would succeed. The tasks of the Social Democrats were to organize the proletariat and give it class consciousness. Therefore a purely Social Democrat group should be formed.

These arguments were opposed by a minority who took the line that the time was not yet ripe for the organization and unification of the proletariat, which in fact had not yet been completely formed. To organize the proletariat might drive the radical bourgeoisie into the arms of the reactionaries, while the Persian bourgeois revolution demanded the united activity of all dissatisfied elements. This group, therefore, proposed that the Tabriz Social Democrats should join the Democrats, "purify" them of their reactionary tendencies and act as their most radical element.

The first proposal was carried by a vote of 28 to two.

T. Dervini in the second document wrote that there were few Persian socialists; they were chiefly concentrated in Tabriz, and were in the main members of the intelligentsia who had received an education in Russia. Up to 1908 they had restricted themselves to self-education and propaganda among the intelligentsia, especially the Armenians.

In the third document Chilinkrian similarly wrote to Plekhanov that the Social Democrats in Tabriz were a small group whose aim was to propagate Marxist ideas.

These documents, concludes Ivanov, show that in 1908 the Social Democrat movement in Tabriz was in an initial stage of development. The group was not numerous. The documents give no indication of the existence of any central organization in Persia or of any Party programme or regulations. It is known that in 1909-10 when G.K. Ordzhonikidze was active in Rasht there was only a local Social Democrat group there. There is no documentary evidence of any connexions between this group and any other Social Democrat groups in Persia at this time. The documents show the low ideological level of the Tabriz Social Democrats, but they also allow us to conclude, writes Ivanov, that they were the most active leaders of the Tabriz uprising of 1908.

Early Russian Revolutionaries in Persia

Z.Z. Abdullayev and A.M. Agakhi in "New Facts on the Activity of Russian Revolutionaries in Persia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century", (PROB. VOS., 1959, No.6) write about the influence on the Persian revolution of 1905-11 of Russian revolutionaries who had left Russia during the Russian revolution of 1905-7 and even earlier. Among their number were representatives of ISKRA, mechanics and expelled students.

The authors note that the majority of Soviet students of the 1905-7 revolution remark on the close connexions of the Persian revolutionaries with the Russian revolutionaries of Transcaucasia. They consider, however, that more attention should be paid to their connexions with Turkestan. They quote a letter from the Governor-General of the Trans-Caspian kray to the Ministry of War (23 December 1911) mentioning the presence in the area of passportless fugitives from the Caucasus on their way to Persia, and a letter from the Russian Consul-General in Mashhad, Klemm (2 September 1907), reporting the presence there of "suspicious subjects" from the Trans-Caspian region. The authors cite finally the anjoman (committee) formed by Persian subjects in Ashkhabad to give aid to the Persian revolution (see CAR, 1960, No.1, p.76).

The authors also give on the authority of the contemporary Persian press the names of some Russians who played an active part in the Persian revolution. These were the well-known "Alesha" (killed in Rasht, 1910), a sailor from the battleship "Potemkin", whom the authors have identified as T.A. Goncharov, a peasant's son from Lugansk; the Social Democrat Laso, known in Persia as "Surayya", who was active in Tabriz; Fonarev, a former soldier of the Russian Baku Brigade, who deserted in 1906, joined the Persian revolutionaries and became head of the partisans of the Ardebil "Sattar" Committee; and finally the Caucasian Akhund-zade Mamed Baghir.

II. INDIAN TROOPS IN PERSIA, 1914-20

L.I. Miroshnikov's "Anglo-Indian Troops in Persia, Transcaucasia and Turkestan, 1914-20" (KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, No.XXXV, 1959) is an attempt to show that "the British imperialists used Indian troops for the occupation of Persia, the suppression of the national liberation movement of the Persian people and also for armed intervention in Transcaucasia and Turkestan." The article's secondary aim is to show that such a use of Indian troops "to carry out predatory wars in countries far from India" was not only contrary to the interests of the peoples of these countries but also contrary to the interests of the Indian people, in the person of the Indian soldier.

The article begins with a historical survey of the occasions on which the British made use of Indians in order to oppress other peoples, from the Burmese War of 1824-6 to the First World War. Miroshnikov mentions also occasions on which, as he claims, Indian troops were not "a willing tool of the British colonizers": the Patna mutiny of 1764, the refusal of Bengali troops to fight in Burma in 1852 and the Mutiny of 1857-9. These actions had their counterpart, he alleges, in Persia also when at Enzeli in 1920 "the Indian gunners failed to carry out their officers' orders and refused to open fire on the ships of the Soviet flotilla. . . . The unreliability of the Indian troops served as one of the reasons for the capitulation and retreat of the British. Evidence of revolutionary trends among Indian troops is provided by the fact of the desertion of Indian soldiers to the camp of Kuchik Khan" (the Jangali leader). [There appears to be no truth in this allegation, which is supported only by reference to contemporary Baku Communist newspapers. Ehsanulla Khan, one of Kuchik Khan's lieutenants, in his memoirs published in NOVYY VOSTOK, Nos.23-24 (1928), 26-27 (1929) and 29 (1930) makes no mention of any Indian deserters to the Jangalis. Ed. CAR.]

Miroshnikov does not entirely lose sight of the influence on British policy in Persia of the need to counter Turkish and German military and espionage activity in the area. This does not, however, cause him to modify his basic line, because he considers that one of the main aims of Tsarist Russia, Germany and Britain in the area was "the plunder of Persia". Similarly "British intervention in Southern Persia was connected with military operations. . . . against the Turks in lower Mesopotamia", but the aim of these operations was the "acquisition of Mesopotamia which had been planned before the entry of Turkey into the war. On the presence in 1915 of 12,500 British troops in Khuzestan, which took place "allegedly because of the necessity of defending the oil pipeline" against the Turks, Miroshnikov says that during 1915 the

British forces never met the Turks but on the contrary were used entirely for punitive expeditions against the Arab population. After Townsend's occupation of Amara, when the Turks could no longer threaten the pipeline, part of these troops remained on the Karun river "which can only be regarded as the occupation of the territory of a neutral state".

Of the military operations in Bushire, where the "Anglo-Indian" forces reached 20,000, Miroshnikov writes that up to 1919 they "had to wage a real war against the local population".

Of General Sykes' mission in 1916 Miroshnikov writes that his task was to "create in Southern Persia police forces to bring about there a state of affairs satisfactory to Britain".

With the establishment of the East Persian Cordon and Major Keyes' march from Gwadar to Chahbar, writes Miroshnikov, "Britain. . . with the aid of Indian troops had established control over all the southern provinces of Persia from Khuzestan to Seistan." The Russian Revolution and the evacuation of the Russian troops who had composed the northern part of the East Persian Cordon gave Britain the opportunity of "annexing" the northern provinces and turning them into "an operational base for the invasion of Transcaucasia and Turkestan". A "group of interventionist forces" was formed in Mashhad under General Malleson. "Simultaneously with the intervention in Soviet Turkestan the imperialists were preparing to annex Baku and all Transcaucasia." Although "Dunsterforce" was originally entirely composed of British troops, writes Miroshnikov, here also the authorities later used Indian units.

Meanwhile, while Indian troops were suffering heavy losses in Soviet Turkestan, Indian units were being used to crush the anti-British movement of the Kurds in Khorasan.

The October Revolution, Miroshnikov writes, the national liberation movement in the northern provinces of Persia and the war of the Afghan people against the British had a revolutionary effect on the Indian troops in Persia, and the victories of the Red Army in Turkestan and Transcaucasia caused unrest among them. As a result they disobeyed their officers in Enzeli, and either deserted to Kuchik Khan or were so disaffected that they had to be withdrawn from Enzeli to Rasht and Qazvin "under the guard (pod konvoyem) of British armoured cars". [No authority is given for these statements which have in fact no foundation. Ed. CAR.]

The narrative of which the above is an abbreviation draws heavily on such British sources as Sir P. Sykes HISTORY OF PERSIA, W.E.R.

Dickson's EAST PERSIA, etc. and is liberally sprinkled with detailed references to individual British and Indian units. The general effect is of a massive build-up of troops appropriate to an attempted annexation of Persia, Transcaucasia and Turkestan. It is claimed that British aspirations were foiled by the Red Army not only in the last two cases but in the case of Persia also. Noting that the withdrawal of British forces from Persia began soon after the signing of the Soviet-Persian Agreement of 1921, Miroshnikov gives the peculiar reason that the British Government decided to withdraw because "it considered that the entry of the army of Soviet Russia into Northern Persia would be inevitable if Anglo-Indian troops remained there", although he does not say that the entry of Soviet troops was in fact inevitable in those circumstances.

Miroshnikov concludes that "the participation of Indian soldiers in the First World War called forth their dissatisfaction with the British imperialists, and encouraged the awakening of revolutionary feelings in the ranks of the army and their inevitable transfer to India."

THE BALUCHIS OF PAKISTAN AND PERSIA

What is apparently the first comprehensive Soviet study of the Baluchis of both Persia and Pakistan has now been issued jointly by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR. This is M.G. Pikulin's *BELUDZHI* (IVL AN/SSR, Moscow, 1959, 212pp.). Previous writings by Pikulin and others on the subject of the Baluchis are listed at the end of this article.

Pikulin's work deals with the Baluchis of "the south-west of the Iranian plateau between Kerman on the west and the Indus on the east, along the coast of the Arabian Sea"; he does not discuss the Baluchis of Turkmenistan. He divides the Baluchi area into Western and Eastern Baluchistan; the former term corresponds to Persian Baluchistan, while the latter includes the Baluchistan Agency and the states of Kalat, Makran, Kharan and Las Bela in Pakistan.

The book has three chapters. The first deals with the origins, distribution and mode of life of the Baluchis; the second with the Khanate of Kalat, and Britain's conquest of Eastern Baluchistan; and the third with "The National Liberation Struggle of the Baluchis and their Position in Modern Times". The present article is a summary of the third chapter.

The sources quoted by Pikulin for his information on the Baluchis today are, for the Baluchis of Persia, the Persian daily press and the following Persian works: A. Razmara's *JOGRAFIAYE NEZAMIEYE IRAN* and Amanullah Jahanbani's *AMALIAT-E-QOSHUN DAR BALUCHISTAN*. A.K. Lambton's *LANDLORD AND PEASANT IN PERSIA* is also quoted. For the Baluchis of Pakistan the 1951 census is widely quoted, and also official publications and year-books and the Pakistani daily press. Pikulin's list of sources for the earlier period constitutes a considerable bibliography of works in Persian, Russian, English and French.

Pikulin's book received a favourable review in *PROBLEMY VOSTOKO-VEDENIYA*, 1959, No.6, at the hands of Yu. Gankovskiy. Noting that it was in essence the first monograph on the Baluchis to be published in the Soviet Union, Gankovskiy criticized the book for

omitting the Baluchis' fight for national cultural development, for giving insufficient space to the post-war Baluchi national movement and for omitting the question of the formation of the Baluchi nation. In all these cases Gankovskiy presumably has in mind only the Baluchis of Pakistan.

A comment by Sir Clarmont Skrine, OBE, who knew Pikulin, will be found at the end of the article.

. . .

I. From the End of the 19th Century to 1914 - II. 1914-1957 - III. Comment by Sir Clarmont Skrine.

I. From the End of the 19th Century to 1914

Eastern Baluchistan

The oppressive rule of the British drove the Baluchis to revolt in 1897-8, at the same time as the Pathan risings against the Durand Line demarcation. This rising took place in north-eastern Baluchistan, where colonial exploitation was especially severe and where in 1891-1901 the land tax had been increased from 2 to 2.5 rupees per acre of tilled land. [Noting the migration of Baluchis from Western to Eastern Baluchistan in search of work, Pikulin stresses that it should not be concluded from this that British rule had in fact led to improved living standards. On the contrary, it had brought about an increase in the feudal exploitation and expropriation of the peasants and, by strengthening the positions of the feudal landlords and moneylenders, had hindered the development of capitalist relations in agriculture.]

In 1907 dissatisfaction with the pro-British policy of the Khan of Kalat together with the influence of the Russian revolution of 1905-7 led to disturbances in northern Baluchistan. A punitive expedition composed of British forces acting "on the 'request' of the Khan of Kalat" succeeded in putting down the disorders by 1908.

Western Baluchistan

The whole of this area was ruled by Baluchi sardars (tribal chieftains) whose acceptance of the rule of the Persian government was only nominal. The sardars collected the taxes by a system of tax-farming. Rents and taxes were high, peasants who owned their land paying a tax of up to one-half of their harvest and landless peasants a rent of up



to two-thirds of their harvest. Under this oppressive system peasants left their land and became brigands, robbing villages and caravans. Others went to India in search of work (see above).

In 1897 the Baluchis rose against their Persian rulers in Serhad, Saravan and Bampur under the leadership of the chief of the Narui tribe Hosain Khan. They demanded a reduction of taxes from one-third of the peasant's income to one-tenth. This demand being refused the revolt spread and was only ended in 1910 when Hosain Khan was bought off by being made ruler of a boluk (district) with the right of collecting taxes.

The Russian revolution of 1905-7 had considerable influence on the Persian revolution of 1905-11, which affected western Baluchistan. The Baluchi peasants rose against the Qajars, led by "their [tribal] leaders who were interested in preserving the independence of their khanates from the Persian authorities". In 1907 they rose again under Mir Bahram Khan Baranzai who was the virtual ruler of Persian Baluchistan for several years. He was betrayed, however, by Sa'id Khan who was rewarded with the post of Governor of Baluchistan. Henceforward the position of the Baluchi people deteriorated.

II. 1914-1957

Eastern Baluchistan

The First World War accelerated the approach of the general crisis of capitalism, and in particular of the crisis of the colonial system of imperialism, and thus helped the growth of national consciousness and the development of the national liberation movement of the peoples of India, including the Baluchis. Baluchistan, like the rest of India, became a source of material and reinforcements for the British armies: Baluchis were "recruited into the Anglo-Indian Army and forced to fight for the interests of the British imperialists". In 1917 the finances of Kalat were brought under the control of the British authorities.

The October Revolution induced a revolt among the peoples of India. The events in the Panjab and the North-West Frontier Province, in their turn, had an effect on the Baluchis who were suffering under the double oppression of their own feudal rulers and British colonialism. In 1918 news of British reverses in Mesopotamia had led to disturbances among the Marri tribe and in 1919 the Marri and Bugti tribes supported the Pathan tribes of the Frontier in the Third Afghan War. These movements "showed that the population of Baluchistan was

beginning to be drawn into the common current of the battle of the peoples of India against British imperialism". However the protests of the Baluchi workers against feudalism and colonialism failed because the working-class was few in numbers and lacked organization. Nor were there any peasant organizations, or Baluchi political parties to lead a protest movement. The All-India political parties were not interested in the area.

The development of capitalism which began during this period was deformed by the influence of colonialism. Colonialism preferred feudalism and tribalism which, in their turn, hindered the growth of productive forces. Baluchistan was agricultural and had almost no industry at all. Agricultural methods were primitive. The irrigated area, far from increasing, was not even fully used in spite of peasant land-hunger. The development of capitalism was "assuming those forms which were most alienating for the broad masses, bringing increased exploitation of the immediate producers by the ruling class of khans and the British authorities".

During the century the land rent rose and the income from rent doubled between 1903 and 1930. The tax paid by nomads for the use of pastures was also high and was farmed out to the sardars. These tendencies were observable in Kalat also. In both British Baluchistan and Kalat the peasants were enslaved by moneylenders connected with British banks and firms.

From a consideration of two sets of data on the composition of the agricultural population of eastern Baluchistan it appears that between 1921 and 1931 the impoverishment of the peasantry assumed mass proportions: the number of landless agricultural labourers increased, the number of landowners decreased and women began to work in the fields as hired labourers. "The ruin of the rank-and-file nomad herdsman continued; witness in particular the fact of their intensified transition to simultaneous employment in semi-nomad livestock breeding and tilling the soil." The craftsmen who had previously served the village commune (obshchina) were also driven out of business by the growth of town handicrafts.

During the period 1911-1941 a great migration of population took place from southern to north-eastern Baluchistan, i.e. from the less to the more advanced areas. Such a process, as Lenin has pointed out, is a sign of the development of capitalist relations. In the 1930s the industries of transport and extraction began to develop. Industrial wage-scales, however, were lower than in the rest of India. Baluchi peasants migrated to other parts of India and returning brought democratic ideas with them. In Baluchistan a proletariat and national bourgeoisie began to appear. There were, however, no political

organizations or trade unions: "the workers, living in conditions of colonial and feudal oppression, were deprived of any political rights."

In Kalat British rule provoked unrest. In 1939 serious disturbances broke out, accompanied with demands for a provincial government, the removal of the Political Agents, the lowering of rents and taxes, etc.

The acquisition of independence in 1947 was "a great achievement of the peoples of India and Pakistan", but, owing to the policy of the Government of Pakistan "no noticeable improvement has taken place in the position of the labouring masses, including the population of Baluchistan". Agriculture remains primitive with a very low yield per acre. The irrigated area increases only slowly, while the total tilled area remains almost stable. The land registration carried out by the Pakistani Government in 1950-1 brought about no changes in land tenure in Kalat where the sardars and rulers of principalities continue to be the ultimate landlords. In former British Baluchistan the rent received by landlords from tenants has in general increased, although it varies according to area. In the tribal areas the sardar retains his old position.

[As Pakistani censuses do not give figures on a national basis Pikulin is forced to write not about the Baluchis but about Baluchistan where the Baluchis are in a minority.] Between 1931 and 1951 the number of people engaged in agriculture in Baluchistan increased while the tilled area remained stable; it follows, therefore, that the individual plots of land became smaller. Comparative rural overpopulation can be observed, especially in the north. Few peasants own or rent two acres, the minimum necessary to support a family. Consequently the number of peasants who find seasonal work in industry has grown, reaching 10,000 in 1951. As work in the towns is difficult to find and is ill-paid the worker leaves his family in the village and so preserves his title to his land. Nomads also are forced to eke out their living from other sources, which proves their growing impoverishment.

Its comparative rural overpopulation Baluchistan inherited from the British who had used Baluchistan as an operational base and had discouraged any industrial development which might have absorbed the surplus rural population. Such industries as had appeared (those of extraction, processing and transport) are very weak. Baluchistan's mineral deposits are hardly being exploited. Although oil was discovered in 1873 extraction began only recently. The only modern industrial installations are motor and railway workshops.

Skilled workers in Baluchistan total 18,904 and unskilled

(including seasonal workers who are also peasants) 22,900. There are also numbers of white-collar workers. The Baluchi working-class, national bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, therefore, are growing. However, "in spite of the appearance in Baluchistan of the first detachments of the working-class and bourgeois intelligentsia who are striving for the development of democratic institutions and the provision of democratic rights and freedoms to the population, the Baluchis still retain survivals of tribal organization."

The Baluchi areas of Pakistan formerly consisted of five districts administered by Pakistani District Officers together with the "Baluchi States' Union" (Kalat, Kharan, Makran and Las Bela) under their own feudal rulers and with a Union legislative assembly. In Baluchistan proper a movement had arisen for the unification into a single province of all regions inhabited by Baluchis (including parts of Sind, the Panjab and the North-West Frontier Province), while the Pathans of Loralai and Zhob "demand an autonomous Pashtunistan with the incorporation of these areas in it".

It was in an attempt to crush these and other national and democratic movements that the Pakistani Government in 1955 created the single province of West Pakistan, a move which "ignored the aspirations of the peoples of West Pakistan" and was resisted by the Baluchis. The mass movement against the unified province was led by the Ustaman Gall Party and led to armed clashes with Government troops. This party, as a member of the "National People's Party of Pakistan", has criticized the Government for not carrying out a policy of land reform, industrialization, the creation of linguistic states and withdrawal from military blocs.

In general since 1947 the position of the Baluchi workers has not changed. Agriculture is in a state of decay. The ruin of the peasantry continues while the possibility of migration into the towns is limited by weak industrial development. The standard of living is the lowest in Pakistan: both taxes and prices are rising while wages remain stable; the average wage for a worker in Pakistan is 6-7 rupees per week, while in Baluchistan it is 5 rupees per week. The root cause, as in the rest of Pakistan, is the dominating position in agriculture of feudal landownership.

Nevertheless the popular masses of Baluchistan are occupying an ever greater place in the battle of the workers of Pakistan for improved living conditions.

Western Baluchistan

During the First World War the area was occupied by the British.

Resistance was led by the tribal leaders who were not won over by British bribes. In 1915 the leaders of the resistance were arrested by the British and sent to India, only to escape on the way and return to their people. In 1916 mass anti-British demonstrations took place among the Damani and Baranzai tribes. In spite of defeats the resistance lasted until 1924, when it was put down by joint British and Persian forces.

When in 1925 Reza Khan became Reza Shah Pahlavi of Persia he immediately had to contend with the separatist aspirations of the tribal leaders in the outlying areas of Persia. The Baluchi sardars were informed that they would no longer be treated as independent rulers and that henceforward only Tehran's writ would run in Baluchistan. The natural result was a rising led by Dost Muhammad Khan Baranzai.

The central Government, which was confronted also with risings of the Turkmens and Kurds, entrusted an American in Persian service, Major Hall, with the task of negotiating a settlement with the Baluchis. Major Hall's attempts were successful, and Dost Muhammad Khan was made Governor of Persian Baluchistan.

By 1928 the Kurds and Turkmens had been dealt with and the Government again moved against the Baluchis. Dost Muhammad Khan, faced with artillery and aeroplanes, was defeated and the disarming of the Baluchis began. However, even though disarmed the Baluchis continued to resist. A protest of the Kukhak tribe in 1938 against customs tariffs on livestock was suppressed by armed force with the execution of 74 ringleaders.

The subjection of Baluchistan by the central Government furthered its attraction into the all-Persian market, while the development of money relations put an end to the former economic isolation of Baluchistan and furthered trade both with the other provinces of Persia and with Muscat and India.

At the same time the exploitation of the producers increased. The nomads lost their livestock and took up a settled or semi-settled way of life. A large proportion of the land was owned by the sardars who rented it to peasants on the share-cropping system and at ruinous rates. According to SEVERNAYA PERSIYA: SBORNIK KONSUL'SKIKH DOKLADOV (Moscow, 1933), a nomad oba (a temporary commune or obshchina) made 1,980 tomans per year and expended on livestock taxes, pasture taxes, hire of herdsman, etc. 420.5 tomans. In all, excluding local and feudal taxes, each of the oba's five members received 275 tomans per year.

According to the same data a settled family of three persons with a plot of average size, a vineyard, a working ox and a cow earned in cash from the sale of produce 52 tomans, i.e. 17 tomans each. [Pikulin points out that the settled family earns one-fifth the sum earned by the individual nomad. He does not emphasize the fact that the peasant would presumably sell only what was surplus to his own requirements and that, therefore, his total income is likely to be more than his cash income. Ed. CAR.]

Between 1933 and the Second World War, with "the intensification of the burden of taxes and of feudal exploitation. . . the living conditions of the nomad herdsmen and of the settled farmers in Persia deteriorated considerably". After the war "the position of the broad labouring masses of Persia became even harder".

During and after the Second World War rents and taxes in Persia were high. Peasants who rent khalise (State) lands pay a rent of up to two-thirds of their harvest. Only in oases far from the roads does the peasant retain half his harvest. Those peasants who own small inherited plots of land in the territories of the sardars have to pay the following taxes: the penduk to the State - one-tenth of the harvest; the mulkat-e-zamin to the feudal ruler - one-fifth of the harvest; taxes to maintain the local authorities.

Peasant craftsmen are in a state of serfdom to their feudal lords and pay them a proportion of their earnings.

Although slavery was officially abolished in 1929 it existed until the most recent times: in 1939 the Baluchi sardars of the nomads of the Bent oasis had 2,000 slaves.

Persian Baluchistan, therefore, is still backward. There is no trace of industrial development. The majority of the people till the soil with implements appropriate to the Stone Age. The tribal system is still strong and within the tribes patriarchal relations still exist. The lot of the Baluchi peasants is "cruel exploitation and ignorance".

Pikulin, as is obvious from the title of the chapter, sees the recent history of both Eastern and Western Baluchistan as that of the struggle of a people against the double oppression of their own feudal rulers and foreign domination - from Tehran or Whitehall. In cases where tribal leaders head a movement against the British or the Persian

Government Pikulin normally points out that in doing so they were pursuing their own interests which differed from those of the people. Pikulin follows the well-worn Soviet line also when he denies any civilizing role to British rule. The development of capitalism, which is admitted to have been necessary, was made more "agonizing" than it would otherwise have been by the deforming influence of colonialism. As has been seen, according to Pikulin, the achievement of independence brought no change since the Government of Pakistan simply stepped into the place of the British and carried out the same policy of oppression of the national minorities. Pikulin attributes the political leadership of the Pakistani Baluchis since independence to the Ustaman Gall party within the National Party and the National People's Party of Pakistan. This marks a change from the earlier line according to which "the Baluchis are now taking part in a national democratic movement merging into the national liberation movement of the other peoples of India led by the Communist Party of India," (LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd ed., Vol.IV (1950), article "Baluchis"). It should be noted that while his attitude towards the "national aspirations" of minorities is one of approval, neither Pikulin nor apparently any other Soviet writer has explicitly supported the Baluchi demands for a "Great Baluchistan" composed of all the areas inhabited by Baluchis.

Pikulin's picture of the state of affairs in Western Baluchistan is even gloomier. Here too he is at pains to show that as the rule of the centre became firmer the position of the Baluchi peasant and nomad deteriorated. The combination of feudal and Persian oppression has produced a country with no industry, working-class, national bourgeoisie or intelligentsia, where the people (in the words of the newspaper DEJ, 18 July 1952) "are all illiterate and live in appalling poverty. Their greatest dainty. . . is a maize cake with dates. They drink rainwater. . ." "Persian Baluchistan", Pikulin concludes, "is the most backward area of backward Persia."

III. Comment by Sir Clarmont Skrine

The following comments have been contributed by Sir Clarmont Skrine, OBE, who had intimate experience of the Baluchis both in what is now Pakistan and in Persia. He was Assistant Political Agent Marris and Bugtis 1915-16, Vice-Consul and later Consul in Kerman 1916-19, and Political Agent in Chagai 1921-2. He was Consul in Seistan 1927-29 during the Dost Muhammad Khan's revolt against the Persian Government. He carried out a long tour in the Sarhad in 1931 and was later Political Agent in Kalat 1932-5. It was while he was Consul-General in Mashhad (1942-5) that he became acquainted with Captain Pikulin.

Pikulin came as a captain in the Soviet Army to Mashhad in the summer of 1944 when the Russians began to apply pressure to Persia over the northern oil concession. He played an active part in the pro-Tudeh campaign as director of the Red Army's "cultural" (i.e. publicity and propaganda) organization. This coincided with the appointment of Abramov as Consul-General, Mashhad, and that of Maksimov, a former Consul-General, Mashhad, as Ambassador. Pikulin spoke no English but good Persian and several times tried to pump me about the southern or "British" zone which included the Baluch tribal area of the Sarhad and Persian Baluchistan. He toured about the Russian zone during 1944 and 1945 starting branches of the Tudeh party in outlying townships and tribal areas, and he also paid at least one visit to Zahedan and Khwash, but refrained from political activity there so far as I know. After my departure in July 1945 when the Russians' position in Khorasan became easier he doubtless went south again and may have made contact with anti-British refugees from Kalat, Kharan and Las Bela. These would give him a garbled account of past events and current trends in support of their (probably justified) complaints against their own khans and sardars.

I agree entirely with the editorial comment at the end of the article and would like to add the following observations:

Page 300, Eastern Baluchistan. Under the "Sandeman System" initiated in the 'nineties we did not interfere in the internal affairs of the Khan of Kalat or his sardars except to help them to restore order when necessary. The Jirga system, which Sandeman re-organized and placed under British supervision, gave the people self-government on their own traditional lines.

Pikulin's remarks on the "land-tax" in north-eastern Baluchistan presumably refer to the Quetta-Pishin district, the only area where we collected revenue and which we leased from the Khan of Kalat. That was and still is Pathan country, not Baluch.

Pages 300-1, Western Baluchistan. The account is correct on the whole. At Kerman in 1916-17 I heard a good deal about the province, the sardars of which had been rebellious for at least 30 years under the weak and corrupt rule of the last Qajar Shahs. The nominal revenue payable to the Central Government, 100,000 tomans, appeared every year in the Budget but was never realized.

Page 301, para.4. Both here and on p.305, para.1, Pikulin neglects to mention the fact that in both East and West Baluchistan unrest was fomented by German agents. In Kalat it was suppressed in 1916 by a military expedition which resulted in a tighter control over the State (the Khan of which, Mahmud, was mad) in 1917. In West Baluchistan there were no "mass demonstrations". There were no masses to demonstrate.

Page 301, para.5. Neither the 1905-7 Russian revolution (see p.300, para.5) nor the October Revolution of 1917 had the slightest effect on the Baluch. The sardars kept the tribesmen in ignorance of outside affairs, except perhaps those of the Panjab and Sind. Otherwise the statements in this paragraph are not far from the truth. During World War I there was no question of overthrowing or in any way undermining the authority of the thoroughly "feudal" sardars, except in extreme cases of oppression or misrule. But in peace-time, too, it is true that we preserved the political status quo and discouraged attempts to indoctrinate the people with liberal ideas.

Page 302, paras.2, 3. It is nonsense to say that the British authorities as well as the khans exploited the people. Neither the British nor the Indian government extracted any profit at all from Baluchistan, while the Government of India poured capital into it for public works and paid for the public services enjoyed by the Baluch.

Page 303, para.2. There was some political unrest in Quetta, Pishin and Loralai in the early days of the war, but it was confined to Panjabis, Sindhis and a few educated Pathans.

Page 305, para.2 - page 306. This account is substantially correct, though I am sure that Dost Muhammad Baranzai was never made Governor of Baluchistan. He certainly never paid any revenue. It is true that the standard of living in the province was and probably still is miserably low, but the Persians ought to be given some credit for having brought Baluchistan back into the fold. Baluchistan is of no strategic value to Persia and she cannot be expected to subsidize it as we did British Baluchistan.

Soviet Writing on the Baluchis

The following is a list of recent Soviet writing dealing with the Baluchis:

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| A.M. D'yakov | NATIONAL NYY VOPROS I ANGLIYSKIY IMPERIALIZM V INDII, Moscow, 1948. See CAR, 1957, No.2, p.181. |
| M.G. Pikulin | "The Baluchis of Pakistani Baluchistan", SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, 1958, No.6. |
| Yu. Gankovskiy | "The National Composition of West Pakistan", in PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, Moscow, 1959. See CAR, 1960, No.2, p.205. |
| E.G. Gafferberg | "A Journey to the Baluchis of Turkmenia in 1958", SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, 1960, No.1. |

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO PASHTUNISTAN

In CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, No.3 of 1959, there appeared in summarized form a Soviet account of the Afghan attitude on the Pashtunistan problem. As remarked by Sir Olaf Caroe in his comments to this article (pp.297-300), the Afghan material contains two themes: that a state of Pashtunistan should be carved out of Pakistan embracing only "the Pashtuns beyond the border" and stretching "from the Khyber to Dera Ghazi, from Gilgit and Chitral to the Arabian Sea"; and that when this state had been set up it would through ethnical, linguistic and other affinities naturally join Afghanistan. The argument was: "since there is no difference between us, there is no sense in our being disunited". The first of these demands, since it takes into consideration southern Baluchistan, Chitral and Gilgit, which are non-Pathan in population, can be justified only on historical grounds in that all these areas (except Gilgit) owed a loose allegiance to the Durrani Empire of Ahmad Shah (1747-73). The second claim rests on the premise that the "Pathans" of the former North-West Frontier Province are Afghans who have been torn away from their motherland by the British colonizers.

The purpose of the present article is to determine to what extent Soviet authorities support these Afghan claims (the Soviet article referred to above did not commit itself) and why.

Soviet views on the ethnographical aspect of the problem are clear and unambiguous, even if they are in some respects erroneous: the symposium NARODY PEREDNEY AZII (Moscow, 1957), section "Narody Afganistana", includes under the term "Afghans" not only the western tribes such as the Durranis, but also the Gilzais and such "Pathan" tribes as the Afridis, Wazirs and Mahsuds. The number of Afghans in Afghanistan is given as "over 6m." and it is stated that the Afghans call themselves "Pakhtane". It follows from this that their criterion is linguistic and that for the Soviet authors anyone is an Afghan who speaks Pashtu and calls himself a Pashtun. The same work states that there are 5.5m. Afghans in Pakistan "in Pashtunistan, the area inhabited by the Afghan 'independent tribes'." [In fact the population of the independent tribal areas can be roughly estimated at 2.5m. and the figure of 5.5m. can be applied only to the whole of the former North-West Frontier Province. This error reflects a common Soviet misconception.] A footnote in the same work refers to the Pathans of West

Pakistan as the "5m. Afghan population of Pashtunistan". The Soviet view, therefore, is that there is no distinction between the "Pathans" of the old North-West Frontier Province and elsewhere, what is now West Pakistan, and the "Pathans" of Afghanistan and, furthermore, that within Afghanistan itself there is no distinction between "Pathans" and Afghans. All the Pashtu-speaking peoples of the area from the Indus to Sabzawar and from Kabul to Kandahar are thus regarded as Afghans.

After Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev had returned from Afghanistan in 1955, Marshal Bulganin in a speech before the Supreme Soviet defined Pashtunistan as "a region inhabited by independent Afghan tribes". This led one to suppose (CAR, 1956, No.2, p.192) that in the Soviet view Pashtunistan was now limited to the independent non-administered tribal areas, as opposed to the administered areas. It has since appeared, however, that no such significance was to be read into Marshal Bulganin's use of the word "independent". N.A. Khalfin's "The Pashtunistan Problem" (KRATKIYE SООBSHCENIYA INSTI-TUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, No.XXV, 1959) makes it clear that Soviet authorities do not regard the Pashtunistan problem as referring only to the tribal areas.

Changes in the Soviet attitude

Soviet writers have differed about the extent of the allegiance to Afghanistan of the "Afghan tribes" of the North-West Frontier Province. L. Gordon, for example, in an article entitled "The Battle of Afghanistan against British Aggression at the End of the Nineteenth Century", which, although published in 1951 in OCHERKI PO NOVOY ISTORII STRAN SREDNEGO VOSTOKA, was written in 1947, stresses that the mountain tribes were as unwilling to accept the authority of the Amir Abdurrahman as that of Delhi, and notes that "the trade of the Pathan tribes was closely connected with India, and the British did all in their power to foster the trade of the powindah [seasonal nomads]. So, in spite of close national, cultural, religious and political ties between Afghanistan and the Pathans of the North-West Frontier Province, the latter, even by the end of the nineteenth century, were in an economic respect noticeably gravitating towards India."

In the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd edition, Vol.3 (1950), article "Afghanistan", I.M. Reysner refers to Abdurrahman's preparations prior to the Durand agreement of 1893 to "reunite to Afghanistan the independent Afghan tribes inhabiting the frontier belt between India and Afghanistan" and later writes of "the 5,415,000 Afghans who [in 1849 and 1893] had been torn by the British from Afghanistan".

Later articles, however, avoid giving the impression that the regions divided in 1893 by the Durand Line were not under the effective authority of the Afghan Government. N.A. Khalifin, for example, in a recent article "The Pashtunistan Problem" (KRATKIYE SVOBODSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, Vol.XXXV, 1959) writes that the agreement "cut away from Afghanistan the regions of Waziristan, Swat, Bajaur, etc. inhabited by Afghan tribes", and quotes the Amir Abdurrahman in his AUTOBIOGRAPHY as saying that "England has never missed an opportunity of cutting something away from Afghanistan".

Similarly the Soviet attitude towards Afghan claims regarding the tribes across the frontier has undergone a change. In Reysner's article in the SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA referred to above, there was no sympathy expressed for the Afghan Government's motives in supporting the "foreign Afghans". "In these conditions the Afghan Government, which is landowner-bourgeois and nationalist in character, while denying the right to national self-determination of the non-Afghan peoples within Afghanistan itself, supports the movement for national self-determination of the Afghans in India with the separation of their lands from Pakistan into the independent area (oblast') of Pathanistan. Afghan ruling circles, while emphasizing the national unity of the Afghans on both sides of the frontier, are taking every step to deprive the national movement of the Afghans abroad of its revolutionary, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist character."


In 1955, however, Vol.XXXII, article "Pathanistan", stated simply that the demand for the creation of this state "has found support in Afghanistan".

Yu.V. Gankovskiy in an article entitled "The National Composition of West Pakistan" (PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, Moscow, 1959), sketches the development of the Afghan people (narodnost') up to 1893 when it was split by the Durand Line. Had this not happened, he writes, the Afghan "people" would have developed into the Afghan "nation", and he implies that this "nation" would have included the Pathans of what is now Pakistan. In this he seems to differ from L. Gordon's opinion quoted above that even before the Durand Agreement the border tribes were becoming more closely connected economically to what was then British India than to Afghanistan, for one of the conditions necessary for the development of a nation according to the Marxist definition is a "common economic life".

The question of self-determination

From the above it seems obvious that Soviet writers support the ethnographic argument that the Pathans are in fact Afghans who find

THE PATHANS OF WEST PAKISTAN



(Adapted from map in *Agrarnyye otnosheniya v severo-zapadnoy pogrannichnoy provintsii Indii*, Moscow, 1953)

themselves outside the Afghan state by an accident of history. It is regarded as self-evident that Pakistan should give them the right of national self-determination. The corresponding argument put forward by Reysner in the *ENCYCLOPAEDIA* in 1950 (see above) that the non-Afghan races of Afghanistan deserve the same right has since been dropped. Afghanistan is now regarded as the "champion of the just national rights of a part of the Afghan people torn away by the imperialists" (*NASH SOSED AFGANISTAN*, I.M. Reysner and R.T. Akhramovich, Moscow, 1956), and is absolved of any intention of putting forward a claim to the Pathan lands (*N.A. Khalfin*, op. cit.).

Soviet speakers have stressed that the Pashtunistan problem "cannot be correctly solved without consideration of the interests of the peoples who inhabit Pashtunistan" (speech of Marshal Bulganin in Kabul, 16 December 1955), and that the problem calls for the "application of the principal of self-determination on the basis of the UN Charter" (Joint Soviet-Afghan Communiqué, Kabul, 4 March 1960). The question, therefore, is one of the national self-determination of the "Pashtun people" and it follows from this that only those areas whose population is predominantly Pathan are envisaged as forming part of Pashtunistan. The Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, Dr. M.S. Kapitsa, recently made it clear that Soviet experts did not consider that Pashtunistan should contain any Afghan territory when he said, in answer to the proposal of the Pakistani Foreign Minister Mr. Manzoor Qadir that a referendum should be held among the Pathans of Afghanistan: "Mr. Qadir's statement is a joke. The Pathans being the basic population of Afghanistan the question of a plebiscite on the other side does not arise." (T.14.3.60.) According to *THE TIMES* this statement caused surprise but, as has been shown, it is completely in line with the official and long held Soviet view on the ethnography of the "Afghan people". It does not appear that any Soviet spokesman has supported the wider Afghan claims to Chitral, Gilgit and Southern Baluchistan - non-Pathan areas which owed allegiance in the past to the Durrani Empire of Ahmad Shah.

Western interest

Some indication of one reason why the USSR has changed its attitude towards the Afghan position to one of qualified support can be found in a quotation from Khalfin's article already referred to, "The Pashtunistan Problem": "The problem of Pashtunistan became a weapon with which the imperialists could exert pressure on Afghanistan with the aim of forcing her to take part in the military blocs being knocked together in the Middle East. Before 1954 the USA tried persistently to use Afghan-Pakistani quarrels. . . and under the disguise of mediation strengthen American positions in these countries."

Khalfin gives an account of alleged American attempts to draw Afghanistan into a military alliance, beginning with the visit to Kabul in 1953 of Vice-President Nixon and Senator Knowland. As a result of an Afghan refusal to join the military pact between Pakistan and Turkey in 1954 the USA not only decided to support Pakistan on the Pashtunistan issue, Khalfin writes, but began to exert pressure on Afghanistan through Pakistan. An example of this pressure was Pakistan's decision to found the West Pakistan Administrative Unit and to abolish the North-West Frontier Province.

In 1954-5 British and American military specialists are alleged to have examined in detail the Khyber Pass, "the shortest route to the capital of Afghanistan" and also to have worked out plans for "an army of 100,000 men to combat the liberation movement of the peoples of Asia. In its recruitment an important role was allotted to the Pashtuns." The disorders of the 1 April 1955 in Peshawar are alleged to have been provoked by the British and Americans who "spread fantastic rumours about 'Moscow's intrigues' among the Pashtuns". The United Press correspondent in Karachi is alleged to have received on 13 April an order to fake a communication from Kabul that the USSR had promised military aid to Afghanistan in case of Pakistani or Western aggression aimed at stopping the Afghan demand for a plebiscite among the Pathans.

Khalfin gives a very one-sided account of the Afghan-Pakistani disagreements of 1955, passing on to the Soviet-Afghan Transit Agreement of June ("help was given the Afghan people by its true friend and good neighbour the Soviet Union") and the state visit of Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev during which Afghanistan first received Soviet support on the Pashtunistan issue.

The Soviet attitude to the whole question of Pashtunistan can be summarized as follows: The Soviet Government agrees in principle with the creation of a Pashtunistan which would consist of the Pashtu speaking people now living in both the settled districts and the tribal territory of Pakistan. They do not distinguish ethnically or linguistically between the Pathans living on either side of the Afghan frontier, all of whom they regard as Afghans, but they do not visualize the inclusion in Pashtunistan of any Pathans now living inside the frontiers of Afghanistan. The Russians have never declared themselves either on the subject of the wider Afghan claim to the non-Pathan areas of Chitral, South Baluchistan and Gilgit, or on that of the nature of the association of a future Pashtunistan with Afghanistan. In the past, however, they have on the one hand criticized the Afghan Government's attitude to the non-Afghan peoples inside Afghanistan (i.e. Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens), and on the other have admitted the growing economic orientation towards Pakistan of the Pathans living outside the Afghan frontier. The sum total of overt Soviet support for the Afghan

contention about Pashtunistan thus seems to be very limited. In spite of ceasing to criticize Afghanistan on her handling of her national problems, it seems unlikely that Marxists could hold that linguistic, cultural and historical ties with Afghanistan should outweigh the Pathans' economic connections with Pakistan.

THE ECONOMY OF AFGHANISTAN

I. Water Resources - II. Foreign Trade 1900-45 - III. Afghanistan's "Guided Economy".

A collection of 10 Soviet studies on Afghanistan has recently been issued by the Institute of Oriental Studies (AFGANSKIY SBORNIK - KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, Vol. XXXIII, 1959). Half of these deal with various aspects of the economy of Afghanistan, and are reviewed below; the others include a study by A.A. Polyak on Buristan, and studies on archaeology, literature and linguistics (M.R. Arunova on "Some General Results of Archaeological Excavations in Lashkargah", Z.M. Kalinina on "The Imperative Mood in Modern Literary Pashtu", A.S. Gerasimova on "Conditional Clauses in Modern Literary Pashtu", and L.N. Dorofeyeva on "The Farsi Language of Afghanistan").

I. Water Resources

In an article entitled "The Study of Afghanistan's Water Resources for the Needs of Agriculture" A.D. Davydov makes use not only of Western material on this subject but also of some recent Soviet and Afghan research. Davydov has also contributed an article on "The Development of Geological and Geographical Knowledge in Independent Afghanistan"; this is mainly about Afghan technical education in these fields, but it contains a section on recent developments in the study of Afghanistan's natural resources which is relevant to the question of water resources. A list of Davydov's sources is given in an appendix to this article.

Davydov says that although according to Afghan statistics there are some 2,000 Afghans capable of taking topographical photographs, there are as yet no topographical maps and the task of photographing the whole of Afghanistan would take 50 years. Since without maps no study of the country's resources is possible, the Ministry of Mines and Industry has signed a three-year contract with the American Fairchild Company to compile by means of aerial photography maps of southern and south-western areas to scales of 1:250,000 and 1:50,000. Similar work

is to be carried out in the north with Soviet help.

The meteorological service is also developing, writes Davydov. According to the Five-Year Plan 20 meteorological stations are to be set up: two first-class stations in Kabul (to act also as a coordinating centre) and Kandahar. These centres will send up meteorological balloons with weather forecasting equipment twice daily; second-class stations are to be set up in Jalalabad, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Gardez and Ghazni, and third-class stations in Faizabad, Baglan, Charikar, Kunduz, Obeh, Bala-Murghab, Daulatyar, Chahan Sur, Girishk, Mukur, Paghman, etc.

A summary of Davydov's article follows.

Previous research, 1923-58

Previously the role of glaciers and eternal snows in supplying Afghan rivers had been overestimated. In fact the central Hindu Kush has no snowline, and every variation in precipitation in the mountains is reflected in the foothill valleys: lack of precipitation causes dry rivers and drought; excessive precipitation causes flooded rivers and broken dams and again threatens drought. It is obvious, therefore, that organized and regular meteorological observation and forecasting is necessary for the development of Afghan agriculture. There was, however, no official meteorological service until 1939, while the fullest amateur service was that carried on by G. Iven between 1929 and 1932.

In May 1939 the Afghan Ministry of Public Works invited E. Stenz, a Polish meteorologist, to organize an Afghan meteorological service. Between 1939 and 1948 Stenz set up nine meteorological stations and carried out the first hydrometric studies of Afghan rivers. He became technical director of the Afghan meteorological service, and as a professor of Kabul University trained Afghan meteorologists and hydrologists. His meteorological stations were located at Kabul, Paghman, Jalalabad, Gardez, Ghazni, Kandahar, Girishk, Farah and Herat. A station was begun at Mazar-i-Sharif, but was never completed, so that Stenz's work contains no information on the most important of Afghanistan's arable oases. During 1948-57 difficulties in obtaining personnel and equipment caused many of the provincial stations to close down.

From 1957, with the cooperation and under the guidance of A.S. Likhmachev (USSR), a United Nations specialist, the re-establishment of stations, including that at Mazar-i-Sharif, was begun. At the time of writing meteorological stations are in operation at Jalalabad, Ghazni, Mazar-i-Sharif, Baglan, Kunduz and Herat.

Climatic conditions

Data collected by Stenz and Likhmachev on the quantity of precipitation in the main irrigated oases of Afghanistan, except those in the north, give the following picture: in the foothill deserts and semi-deserts of the south-west (Kandahar, Girishk, Farah) average annual precipitation totals 100-200mm.; in the foothill and inter-mountain valleys open to the west and south-west (Herat) the figure is a little above 200mm.; in the valleys of the centre, east and south-east - 200-300mm. on the average; the average for all the inhabited oases, therefore, is 200-300mm.

The full use of 1mm. of precipitation will yield 4-8 kilos of grain per hectare. Two hundred millimetres, therefore, will yield 800-1,600 kilos per hectare, and areas with less than 200mm. precipitation must be considered as in need of artificial irrigation. In the temperate belt this figure of 200mm. must be increased by 25-30 per cent to account for drainage loss since the crops in fact do not make full use of the available moisture.

In sub-tropical areas the rate of evaporation is very high, considerably exceeding the rate of precipitation (in Girishk - 23 times, Herat - 17 times, Jalalabad - 16 times, Kandahar - 15 times and Gardez and Kabul - 7 times).

Most precipitation occurs in the winter months of December-May under the influence of cyclones from the Atlantic, while June-November are almost entirely without precipitation, the winds being mainly continental. On the rare occasions when the Indian monsoon reaches Afghanistan it causes violent summer storms and catastrophic floods in the south-east and centre of the country. The higher the altitude and the further west the location, the earlier the winter rains occur.

Rivers

The existing meteorological stations give information on either the lower foothill sections of river basins (Jalalabad, Kandahar, Girishk, Herat, Farah) or, at best, their middle sections (Kabul, Paghman, Gardez, Ghazni). Nevertheless the upper areas of the river basins are most important in the study of the conditions of the formation of discharge.

[The article gives a full description of precipitation and its effect on the discharge of Afghan rivers, but as this seems to have been largely compiled from Western sources, it has not been included here. Ed. CAR.]

The needs of agriculture

The calculations of American agronomists of the amount of water needed to irrigate various crops in the Helmand and Argendab valleys show that the rivers are at present unable to meet the need. The demand for water occurs to a considerable extent in the autumn and winter when the water-level of the rivers is low. This demand for water after the high-water season has passed, together with losses caused by evaporation, means that in the second half of the year many Afghan rivers run dry, causing great hardship.

The needs of agriculture call for the following measures:

- (a) The organization in the Hindu Kush of stations to measure the depth of snow and so to forecast the water-level in the rivers and give warning of drought and flood.
- (b) The creation of a network of posts to study water discharge from all sources and to compile a water census so that new lands may be developed.
- (c) The regulation of the discharge of rivers by means of reservoirs to collect excess floodwater for use during the low-water period.
- (d) Improved use of subterranean water by the entrapment of springs and streams in subterranean water galleries (karez), and the wide use of pumps and artesian wells.

The necessity of posts to study water discharge has been obvious for a long time. Few observations have yet been made, but are becoming more possible with the emergence of young Afghan specialists.

E. Stenz set up six instruments for measuring the water-level in the Helmand and Argendab rivers and others. Regular measurements on these rivers have been carried out since 1946 by engineers of the Morison Knudsen Company. During 1956-7 Soviet specialists carried out hydrometric observations on the river Kunduz at Pul-i-Khumri, on the river Panjsher-Kabul at Naglu and Darmta, on the river Jilga at Sarda and on the river Paltu at Paltu.

The value of reservoirs has been shown by results. In the 1920s a reservoir and dam were built in Budkhak and several similar installations were started in central Afghanistan in the 1930s.

After the war the Morison Knudsen Company began building two dams

on the Helmand and Argendab rivers. Although colossal sums have been spent, the dams are not yet finished. The land to be irrigated has been found to be saline, which is due partly to failure to provide a system of drainage to combat the rise of soil-water through excessive irrigation and partly to bad preliminary work. American companies, in any case, "care much more about profit than about the future use by the Afghans of the irrigation installations".

At present six dams and reservoirs are working at Gazi, Siraj, Surkhab, Karga, Argendab and Kajakai with a total capacity of 2,833m. cubic metres and a total irrigated area of 344,600 hectares. The Five-Year Plan provides for dams, reservoirs and hydroelectric stations on the rivers Panjsher-Kabul, Kunduz, Kokch, etc. Some are being built with Soviet financial and technical aid.

II. Foreign Trade 1900-45

The collection of studies on Afghanistan referred to above included an article by N.M. Gurevich on "Afghanistan's Trade during the Second World War". Gurevich had already reviewed Afghan foreign trade during the period 1900-39 in VNESHNAYA TORGOVLYA AFGANISTANA DO VTOROY MIROVOY VOYNY, IVL AN/SSR, Moscow, 1959. The following summary of Gurevich's account of the whole period is based on these two works.

Anglo-Russian trade rivalry in Afghanistan, 1900-17

The Amir Abdurrahman had limited trade with India, which was expensive and had made it difficult for exports from India to compete with those from Russia in the Afghan market. Consequently British imports began to reach Afghanistan through Persia via Quetta-Nushki-Seistan. However, even after the construction of the Quetta-Nushki railway, this route remained prohibitively expensive.

On Abdurrahman's death in 1901 and the accession of Habibullah, Anglo-Afghan relations improved. With the relaxation of trade restrictions the turnover of Indian-Afghan trade increased from 10,620,000 Indian rupees in 1901 to 20,952,000 rupees in 1907.

These relaxations applied also to Russia but to a lesser extent, and Habibullah soon raised import duties on Russian goods and forbade the export of certain goods to Russia. As a result between 1901 and 1907 Russian-Afghan trade turnover increased only from 4,149,000 rubles to 5,139,000 rubles. In 1907, 73 per cent of all Afghan trade passed over the Indian border, only 23 per cent over the Russian.

By the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 Russia officially recognized Afghanistan as outside her sphere of influence and Britain agreed to Anglo-Russian equality in the Afghan market. Habibullah, however, refused to accept this and import duties on the Indian border remained lower than on the Russian.

In 1913 on the completion of the Bukhara-Termez railway Russia again demanded equality with Britain in Afghan trade. Faced with the German threat Britain was willing to make concessions, but negotiations were first held up by disagreement on the status of Herat and were then stopped by the outbreak of war.

At this time Britain monopolized the Afghan market to the south of the Hindu Kush and Russia to the north. Neither country allowed the transit of foreign goods across its territory into Afghanistan. Trade in both directions across the Russian border increased from 4,245,000 Indian rupees during 1896-1900 to 18,200,000 Indian rupees during 1911-15, and the percentage of the total Afghan trade passing over this border increased over the same period from an average of 28 to one of 38. Trade over the Indian frontier increased over the same period from 10,682,000 Indian rupees to 29,181,000, and the average percentage decreased from 72 to 62.

In 1915 the Tsarist Government again demanded special rights in Afghanistan. The British Government, alarmed by the talks which were taking place between Habibullah and the Germans, seemed about to make concessions. The October Revolution, however, broke off "the deal between the two rapacious imperial powers".

The development of Soviet-Afghan trade, 1917-39

"The October Revolution of 1917. . . put an end to the policy of plunder both within Russia and in relation to other countries. In the first days of its existence the Soviet Republic proclaimed and began to put into effect the principle of the equality of rights of all countries and peoples, large and small. Proceeding from this the USSR has always given and continues to give all possible assistance to colonial and dependent countries in their battle for political independence and economic self-sufficiency, and both now and in the past has come out against the exploitation of these countries by the imperialists. Therefore the policy of the Soviet Union. . . has been . . . directed at 'cooperation in developing the economy of these neighbouring countries, the raising of their culture and the development of their own industry' (A.S. Mikoyan, "The Monopoly of the Foreign Trade and Import of the USSR", ENTSIKLOPEDIYA SOVETSKOGO IMPORTA, Vol.I, Moscow, 1929). This was and has remained the policy of the Soviet

Union in relation to Afghanistan also, to whom our country has constantly given much political and economic aid."

During 1917-19 trade between Afghanistan and Russia ceased: northern Afghanistan suffered acute shortages of manufactured consumer goods and amassed reserves of such exports as cotton, wool, karakul and carpets which could not be exported to India because of the expense. This expense and the fact that northern Afghanistan was near the Central Asian railway system and that the Soviet Union was a more reliable and stable market than the capitalist countries made it possible to renew and develop Soviet-Afghan trade in the 1920s in spite of the break during the Civil War.

During the period 1920-5 Soviet-Afghan trade remained inconsiderable: whereas the pre-war turnover had been 12,245,000 rubles, in 1925 it was 2,122,000 rubles, mostly Afghan exports.

Between 1925 and 1929, however, the Soviet Government abolished import licences and abolished or reduced import duties on Afghan goods, and Soviet-Afghan trade revived. By 1927-8 the pre-war level had been reached and the USSR for the first time had a credit trade balance with Afghanistan. The development of trade, however, was hampered by the lack of good roads in northern Afghanistan and the high customs duties which the Amir Amanullah continued to set upon Soviet goods. Negotiations on a Soviet-Afghan trade agreement were at last making progress when Amanullah was killed.

During 1929-33 the Bachha-i-Saqao episode and the slump curtailed trade with the West and brought about a further expansion of Soviet-Afghan trade. During the late 1930s Afghan national trading capital was concentrated and centralized in sherkats (lit. companies), a move which was met with hostility by Britain but with encouragement by the USSR. Soviet trading organizations, in their dealings with the sherkats, followed the principle of supporting them and making their future activity possible.

During 1936-9, with the re-establishment of the net-balance system which had been dropped during the slump, world trading prices changed again in Afghanistan's favour. The Afghan sherkats, strengthened by the presence at their back of a guaranteed Soviet market and supply of Soviet goods, began to make agreements direct with the trading agents of European countries, by-passing Indian middlemen. The Soviet share of Afghan foreign trade grew from 7 per cent in 1924-5 to 17 per cent in 1933-4 and 24 per cent in 1938-9.

Soviet-Afghan trade, 1939-45

During the Second World War the USSR ceased to import Afghan wool and cotton and to export her cotton cloth and sugar to Afghanistan. During this period also the following rise took place in export and import prices:

	<u>39-40</u>	<u>40-1</u>	<u>41-2</u>	<u>42-3</u>	<u>43-4</u>	<u>44-5</u>
General export index:	100	118	120	275	265	201
General import index:	100	99	176	374	432	368

Thus while between the wars export prices grew faster than import prices, owing to the favourable influence of trade with the USSR, during the war this trend was reversed.

During the second half of the war the price of Afghanistan's imports was more than twice that of India's. India was able to use her position as a monopoly exporter to Afghanistan to put obstacles in the way of her foreign trade. This would not have been possible had not Afghanistan's trade relations with other countries, especially with the USSR, been broken.

The structure of Afghan foreign trade, 1900-1945

(a) Imports: Cotton cloth: Up to 1939 this was Afghanistan's most important import. At the beginning of the 20th century cotton cloth began to be imported from Russia, which thus broke the monopoly hitherto held by cotton coming across the Indian border. Imports from Russia increased from 134 tons in 1899-1900 to 1,750 tons in 1913-14, half the import from India in that year. As a result of the First World War imports from Russia decreased slightly, while those from India increased.

With the Revolution imports over the Russian border came to a temporary stop. At the same time the cost of cotton imports from India increased and their amount fell from 3,607 tons in 1914 to 1,473 in 1921-2. With the price collapse which followed the crisis of 1921, however, cotton imports from India rose (3,302 tons in 1924-5). Imports from the USSR, reached their pre-war level only in 1931-2 and by 1936 were up to 2,892 tons.

Although the slump decreased the amount of imports from India her place was taken by Japan and the USSR lost ground to the capitalist powers in Afghan cotton cloth imports: in 1937-8 the USSR's share of the market was 41 per cent, and in 1938-9 was 36 per cent.

During the period 1914-39, although cotton prices fell, imports into Afghanistan increased only slightly because (a) the domestic weaving and spinning industries continued to develop, (b) the Afghan Government controlled the import of cotton cloth, and (c) imports of woollen, silk and synthetic textiles increased.

The German invasion of the USSR and the war against Japan left India as Afghanistan's sole supplier of cotton cloth. Exports from India, however, were controlled and, although Afghan imports from Persia grew, total imports fell from 69.5m. metres in 1939 to 40.6m. metres in 1945.

Oil products: Before the 1920s Afghanistan imported only kerosene for lighting purposes. Only when roads and motor vehicles appeared did the import of petrol begin. In 1937-8, 1,569,000 gallons of petrol were imported, 1,120,000 of them from capitalist countries (Burma and Persia).

With the war imports from Burma stopped, while those from Persia increased until after 1942 all Afghanistan's petrol imports were coming from Persia through India. In that year export controls in India caused Afghanistan's imports to fall. There was a sharp shortage of petrol in Afghanistan; prices rose by 24 per cent and were prevented from rising further only by the development of Persian production and the contraction of its market.

Sugar: Before the 20th century all Afghanistan's sugar was imported from India and was very expensive. From the end of the 19th century, however, imports from Russia caused the price of sugar in Afghanistan to fall, which in its turn caused an increase in imports from India and from Russia. Imports from Russia, which totalled 1,610 tons in 1913-14 and fell to 14 tons in 1924-5, reached equality with imports over the Indian border in 1937-8 (9,900 tons) and remained at approximately the same level during the next year, although imports over the Indian border fell to 3,884 tons. By the end of the 1930s the bulk of the sugar imported over the Indian border came from Java.

In 1941 supplies ceased both from the Soviet Union and from Java, and India became Afghanistan's only source of sugar. The introduction of the quota system and, more important, the rise in sugar prices and the development of an Afghan sugar industry with a mill at Baglan, caused imports to drop to 892 tons in 1942-3 (12,270 in 1941-2).

Equipment and motor vehicles: Equipment and machinery were rarely imported before the 1930s. Purchases subsequently increased and became comparatively regular. Most machinery was imported from the

capitalist countries, mainly from Germany (69 per cent). The USSR equipped one cotton-cleaning mill at Kunduz.

Motor vehicles first appeared in Afghanistan in the early years of the century, but were not imported in any appreciable numbers until 1925. Between 1932 and 1939 the number of cars in Afghanistan increased from 400 to 3,100. The majority of Afghanistan's motor vehicles were supplied by Britain (48 per cent) and America (39 per cent). During the war imports of both equipment and motor vehicles dropped sharply and became irregular.

Tea: Before the 19th century most of Afghanistan's tea had come from China and was very expensive. During the late 19th and 20th centuries, however, the cheaper Indian tea began to make inroads on the Chinese monopoly. Imports grew with falling prices and increased demand. Of the 1,497 tons imported in 1939, 50 per cent was Chinese, 30 per cent Japanese and 20 per cent Indian.

In 1941 India became Afghanistan's sole supplier of tea. Afghan imports rose as did Indian prices; the latter reached 117 per cent of the 1939 figure in 1944 but fell to 80 per cent of this figure in 1945. In Afghanistan, however, over the period 1939-45 prices rose by 142 per cent.

(b) Exports: Karakul: During the first half of the 19th century Afghan karakul (Persian lamb) had been exported to Europe mainly via Persia. Later, however, Bukhara became the main market through which it reached Europe. The Amir Abdurrahman, in an attempt to free himself from Russian middlemen, declared the export of karakul his own monopoly and tried to deal direct with London. This attempt failed, however, because of the low quality of Afghan karakul. By the end of the 19th century approximately 80,000 fleeces annually were exported to Russia. This figure increased at the beginning of the 20th century, with Russian trade expansion in Afghanistan and an increase in world karakul prices, to 150,000 fleeces, with smuggling accounting for another 150,000.

The First World War caused a drop in Russian exports of karakul and consequently a drop in Afghan exports to Russia. Afghan karakul, however, continued to reach Europe via Mashhad, although in reduced quantities.

The Russian Revolution and Civil War caused exports to Bukhara to stop altogether. However, the Afghan karakul industry gained by the acquisition of 300-400,000 head of pure-bred karakul sheep which were driven into Afghanistan by defeated Central Asian tribal leaders. These sheep improved the quality of Afghan karakul and the skill of their

owners improved Afghan breeding and preparation techniques. Afghanistan resumed export of karakul in the second half of the 1920s.

Although Afghanistan was the largest single supplier of karakul the influence of British and American middlemen caused her to receive less than the market price for her produce. Only in 1928 did Afghanistan open a trade agency in London. Large-scale exports to the USSR began under the influence of the revolts of 1928-30, the closing of the Kabul-Peshawar railway and the slump. By 1928-9 exports to the USSR had reached the pre-war level and continued to grow. Exports to India, Europe and America began to increase again in 1931.

In 1934 the monopoly of the export of Afghan karakul was given to the Afghan National Bank and its sherkats: the right to export was restricted to Afghan citizens.

As a result of the expulsion of foreign capital from the export of karakul, the presence of an assured market in the USSR and the rise of karakul prices in the capitalist world brought about an increase in karakul production. Exports rose from 906,500 fleeces in 1932-3 to 2,280,300 in 1939-40. Exports were limited by bad natural conditions in Afghanistan, which caused high mortality rates among karakul sheep, and by inexpert skinning and preparation of the fleeces.

With the outbreak of sea warfare in 1940 London lost its place as the world's chief fur-market. Afghan karakul already in London was sent on to New York, which from 1940 became its only market. In spite of the decrease in the demand for Afghan karakul wholesale prices rose from \$6 per fleece in 1939 to \$11.70 in 1945, a sharper rise than that shown by the general index of wholesale prices in America.

Fruit and nuts: Export of Afghan fruit and nuts began (to India) in the second half of the 19th century. These exports grew with the advance of the railway to Peshawar and Quetta. Exports to Russia began at the beginning of the 20th century, and before the First World War accounted for 2,000 of the average annual export of 9,000 tons.

After the war exports to Russia stopped, while those to India remained stable. Fruit and nuts were two of the few Afghan exports whose value increased to keep pace with the rising cost of imports, and their export consequently increased. The introduction on Indian railways of refrigerated wagons made the export of fresh fruit on a large scale possible for the first time.

In 1934 a semi-monopoly on the export of fruit and nuts from Kandahar province was given to the "Pashtun" sherkat, which sold its

fruit and nuts through a trade representative in Chaman. This system resulted in higher prices and was extended to other Indian cities. By 1939 exports reached 46,512 tons.

In 1938, however, Indian traders in retaliation for the exclusion of Indian middlemen from the export of Afghan fruit and nuts declared a boycott on these goods, and by 1940 prices were only 50 per cent of their 1937 level. The "Meva" sherkat was ruined and the "Pashtun" sherkat stopped paying dividends. This damaged the interests not only of the Afghan bourgeoisie but also of the Afghan peasant.

The war stopped exports to all countries except India (exports to Germany had been growing). Attempts to export dried fruit to America were unsuccessful. Prices in India increased, but transport difficulties caused a slight drop in exports, which most affected the northern provinces: Herat sherkats tried to export to Persia.

During the Second World War Afghanistan established a kind of monopoly on the export of fruit and nuts by coordinating the activity of exporters and making them all sell their goods through the Afghan trade delegation in Peshawar.

Wool: The growth of the British wool industry led to a great increase in Afghan wool exports through India. Exports to Russia also began at the end of the 19th century. Rising prices and demand on the eve of the First World War caused exports of wool to these countries to reach dimensions never surpassed: in 1915-16 exports to Russia totalled 4,400 tons, to India 9,200 tons.

After the war the inability of wool prices to keep pace with the rising cost of imports and the curtailment of trade with Russia led to a drop in wool exports. Prices rose, however, in 1925-9 and exports to Russia reached their 1915 level, where they remained stable until 1939, although exports to India fell again. Consequently before the Second World War the USSR was the main importer of Afghan wool, paying higher prices than India and giving in exchange high quality manufactured goods. Other countries imported only a small quantity of Kandahar wool, which was sufficiently valuable to make its export to India and abroad profitable.

During the war exports to the USSR ceased and average exports to the capitalist world rose to 5,000 tons annually. However, prices in India, already lower than in the USSR, failed even to keep pace with world prices.

Cotton: Afghanistan began to export cotton to Russia at the end of the 19th century, importing cotton manufactured goods in

exchange. In 1915 exports to Russia reached 4,539 tons. When the Civil War stopped export to Russia hardly any cotton was exported as export to India was too expensive to be profitable. As a result the domestic spinning and weaving trades developed to meet Afghanistan's need for cotton textiles. Exports of cotton to, and of cotton textiles from, the USSR reached pre-war levels only in 1931-2.

Meanwhile the Afghan Government, with the help of the USSR, was taking steps to improve the quality of Afghan cotton and in particular to develop the cultivation of long-staple cotton, and it achieved such success that in 1939 cotton was exported to Germany, as well as to India and Japan.

In 1939 export to Europe by sea stopped. Afghan cotton, however, continued to reach the USSR and, through the USSR, Germany. After 1941 and the failure of trade talks with Japan, India remained Afghanistan's sole market.

Afghan exports to India rose from approximately 6,000 tons in 1939 to 7,000 tons in 1941. Transport difficulties and shortage of petrol, however, caused exports to fall to 2,500 tons in 1942 and 3,000 tons in 1945. The area under cotton in Afghanistan contracted until it was just able to meet the growing Afghan demand. Consequently Afghanistan did not accumulate large reserves of unsold cotton.

III. Afghanistan's "Guided Economy"

Two other articles in the AFGANSKIY SBORNIK refer to economic questions. N.I. Chernyakhovskaya in "The Economic Policy of the Afghan Government, 1953-7" notes with disapproval that the Afghan Government has begun to attract foreign capital investment in mining, public works, agriculture and transport, and considers that such foreign capital investment, even when as strictly controlled as it is in Afghanistan, is "pregnant with dangers of imperialist enslavement". She also emphasizes the alleged superiority of Socialist aid as being "more serious" and as forcing the capitalist countries to offer more favourable terms than they otherwise would.

As foreign capital is acting, she writes, more and more as State-monopoly capital the Afghan Government is forced to interfere in the country's economy to protect Afghan national capital which is still weak. This new course of State capitalism was revealed most clearly with Muhammad Daud's appointment to the post of Prime Minister in 1953 and his support in 1954 of a "guided economy".

The aim of Afghanistan's guided economy, writes Chernyakhovskaya, is "to secure the national capital's profits, development and entrenchment with the help of the State". She notes that the State has entered the field of banking with the Dy Afghanistan Bank, which has taken over the dominating position previously occupied by the Afghan National Bank. A number of specialized semi-State banks have appeared, 51 per cent or more of whose capital belongs to the Dy Afghanistan Bank. Foreign trade also is monopolized by State institutions and Government-controlled large companies.

Yu.M. Golovin, also, in "Some Features of the Development of Industry in Afghanistan" notes the growth of State capitalism in Afghanistan, especially after Muhammad Daud's election in 1953, and accounts for it in the same way. In his conclusion, however, he writes that the Afghan State has been protecting national capital for 40 years, and points out that Afghanistan up to 1956 had allowed no foreign capital investment in Afghan industry, and that modern factory-type industry in Afghanistan had been built mainly with Government funds because of the weakness of the Afghan national bourgeoisie. Even when the government began to sell State undertakings to private capital it retained its hold on the extraction industries and established control over the sherkats.

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A.D. DAVYDOV'S SOURCES

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S I N K I A N G

The Collectivization of Agriculture

A recent study by G. Bakhamov, "The Collectivization of Agriculture in the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Rayon of the Chinese People's Republic" (TRUDY AN/KAZ. SSR, SEKTOR VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, Vol.I. Alma-Ata, 1959), affords an example of the Soviet attitude towards developments in Sinkiang under the Communist regime. The attitude is one of uniform approval, but mistakes made by the Communist authorities, and their rectification, are duly noted.

Bakhamov begins with a survey of land tenure in Sinkiang before the province's "liberation" by the Communist forces. In a country, he writes, where 88 per cent of the population is engaged in agriculture on the average 50 per cent of the land was in the hands of 5-6 per cent of the population. In the farming, as opposed to the livestock-breeding areas, eight per cent of the population owned 80 per cent of the land.

Consequently, he writes, the first problem was to redistribute the land. Landowners and kulaks were deprived of all land except that which they worked themselves and of all working animals, implements, living accommodation and grain surplus to their own needs. This land reform, which did not affect the livestock-breeding areas, was completed by 1952.

Meanwhile the process of collectivization had begun in 1950 with the formation of "Labour Mutual Aid Brigades", the members of which owned the means of production privately but agreed to share them. During the formation of these brigades, Bakhamov writes, "left-wing mistakes" were made. Some organizers recruited the brigades by force, others tried to create brigades in which land, tools, etc. were owned in common and wages were paid according to labour, and yet others, against the Party's instructions, formed brigades according to class or national criteria. These tendencies were checked in 1953.

In 1953 the peasants of Sinkiang began to demand that their brigades should be made into collectives. The Government published regulations governing the conversion, and the change began. In 1955,

however, Mao Tse-tung criticized right-wing views which were slowing down collectivization and called for the completion of collectivization within the next few years. This appeal was followed by the voluntary transformation into collectives of the majority of brigades, both within Sinkiang and elsewhere, and by the spread of the collectivization movement to peasants who were not members of brigades. During this stage the official attitude towards the kulaks changed from one of "preservation" to one of "limitation and gradual liquidation".

During 1957 the transformation was completed from collectives of lower type (where a limited degree of private property in the means of production was allowed) to those of higher type (where all the means of production were communal property and wages were distributed according to labour). By October of that year 95.49 per cent of all peasant households were members of collectives of the higher type.

Meanwhile in the livestock breeding areas the creation of "Labour Mutual Aid Brigades" had begun in 1955. During 1956 a mass campaign for collectivization was carried out and, according to Bakhamov, made use only of propaganda methods. The formation of collectives of the lower type was completed by autumn of 1958.

The campaign for collectivization was helped by the example of its advantages given by the State collectives, including some manned by units of the Chinese Army, and by the State loans which are given first of all to peasants who are members of collectives. The "fraternal help" of the Soviet Union to the peoples of Sinkiang was "invaluable" and between 1950 and 1956 totalled 1,066 tractors, 140 combines, and 4,000 tractor-ploughs, seed-drills, cultivators, etc. Soviet specialists helped in the construction of irrigation installations and gave instructions in the use of new machines and in new agricultural techniques. "Finally the successes of the collectivization movement are explained by the fact of. . . the unprecedented revolutionary activity of the peasant masses themselves."

Collectivization, Bakhamov claims, has increased productivity several times. Between 1955 and 1956 the number of livestock in Sinkiang grew by 7.26 per cent.

THE BORDERLANDS IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on the Borderlands countries appearing in Soviet newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 April - 30 June 1960. The Editors regret that owing to the large amount of material it has been found impracticable to continue the coverage of Soviet reports on India.

THE U-2 INCIDENT

In its Note of 10 May to the US Government the Soviet Government stated that the route of the US reconnaissance aircraft shot down by Soviet rocket forces near Sverdlovsk had been Peshawar - Aral Sea - Sverdlovsk. Subsequent Soviet comment on the incident assumed that the aircraft had violated Afghan territory. Y. Korovin ("Aerial Espionage and International Law", INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No.6 of 1960) said that "in sending an American plane on an intelligence mission to the USSR via Afghanistan, without the knowledge and consent of the Soviet and Afghan Governments, the United States deliberately violated the sovereignty of two UN member states."

Afghan reactions to the incident were promptly ascertained. In answer to questions by a Tass correspondent (PRAVDA 12.5.60) the Afghan Foreign Minister Muhammad Naim said that the USA's "aggressive activities" could lead to war, that a state which offered its territory for such aggressive acts was an accomplice in aggression, and that the Afghan Government intended to protest to both the US and the Pakistan Governments. PRAVDA reported on 19 May that the protests in question had been made. Afghan press comment denouncing the American "aggression against Afghanistan" was reported in the Soviet press.

PRAVDA published the texts of the Soviet Notes to Pakistan of 14 May and 22 June, which accused the Pakistan Government of "complicity" in the flight of the US reconnaissance aircraft over Soviet territory. The first of these Notes declared that the Soviet Union had the means to "render harmless military bases used for the commission of aggressive acts against the Soviet Union"; the second Note said that in the event of further "provocative flights" the Soviet Government, to protect the security of the Soviet people, would "be compelled to take appropriate measures not excluding strikes at the bases used to carry out such flight

An article in the Pakistani JANG condemning the U-2 incident was quoted in KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA of 4 June. JANG said that Marshal Malinovskiy's strictures on this violation of Soviet air space were fully justified, and that the dispatch of further "espionage aircraft" over Soviet territory by the USA or its allies would be "the gravest crime".

AFGHANISTAN

The Afghan Premier Muhammad Daud, accompanied by his wife, arrived in the Soviet Union from Vienna on 15 April for a holiday and to continue medical treatment. In addition to formal meetings with Soviet leaders in Moscow, he was entertained by Khrushchev at his dacha at Gagra on the Black Sea coast. He left for Kabul on 21 May.

Afghanistan's National Day, 27 May, was marked by festive meetings in Moscow and Tashkent devoted to Soviet-Afghan friendship. In special articles on the 42nd anniversary of Afghan independence PRAVDA, PRAVDA VOSTOKA and BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY reviewed Afghanistan's friendly relations with the USSR during this period, emphasized the part being played by the USSR in building up the Afghan economy, and, in particular, praised Afghanistan's foreign policy. Yermolayev, in PRAVDA, said that the Afghans themselves called their policy one of neutrality, but in fact it was very different from "the passive contemplation of international events"; it was a policy of "active participation in the fight for peace and for the liquidation of colonialism and the imperialist plundering of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America".

Under the heading "Pashtunistan Wants to be Free" TRUD of 3 June published a report of a tribal jirga held "in one of the regions of Pashtunistan", at which tribal representatives declared their resolve to continue the struggle for the freedom of Pashtunistan, and expressed their gratitude to the Afghan Government and people for its aid. IZVESTIYA of 7 June published an account of a speech by the Afghan Premier condemning references to the Pashtunistan issue made in a speech by Mr. Macmillan in the House of Commons. Mr. Macmillan, said Muhammad Daud, had spoken in defence of the Durand line; but the Afghan Government considered that this line, "imposed by force", was not the line of demarcation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it would never concede that Pashtunistan was part of the territory of Pakistan, as Mr. Macmillan had declared it was.

NEPAL

The results of the Sino-Nepalese discussions in Peking, which led to an agreement on frontier questions and an agreement on Chinese economic aid to Nepal, were acclaimed in the Soviet press (CAR, 1960, No.2, p.229). NEW TIMES (No.14 of 1960) observed: "Judging by Western press comment, successful completion of the Sino-Nepalese negotiations has come as a disappointment to those who want to incite enmity between countries with differing systems. But everyone who favours international peace, friendship and détente will welcome these agreements as one more step towards these goals." The subsequent visit of Chou En-lai to Nepal, during which a Sino-Nepalese "treaty of peace and friendship" was signed, was fully reported in the Soviet press.

According to a Tass dispatch of 10 May (KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA 12.5.60) a group of Soviet specialists had completed a preliminary reconnaissance in various regions of Nepal and had decided on the sites for the erection of a hydroelectric station, a sugar factory and a tobacco factory, under the Soviet-Nepalese economic aid agreement. Work on the projects would begin towards the end of this year. Meanwhile, according to the HINDUSTAN TIMES, Soviet-Nepalese trade was increasing; a first consignment of Soviet goods was expected in Nepal in June, including motor-cars, bicycles, clocks and watches and electrical equipment.

PERSIA

PRAVDA of 15 May published the Soviet Note warning Persia of the consequences of possible violation of Soviet air-space, in connexion with the CENTO military and air force manoeuvres of 14-18 May. The Note said that the US Government had "proclaimed as its state policy the infringement of the sovereignty and inviolability of the frontiers of other states, as well as espionage and diversion", and therefore to allow such a state to make use of the air-space of countries bordering the USSR could only be considered as a hostile act against the USSR and a contravention of Soviet-Persian treaties, and in particular the Soviet-Persian treaty of 26 February 1921.

The death sentences passed on five "Azarbaijani democrats" on 4 May, and the sentences of life imprisonment passed on 17 others, were the occasion for long articles in Soviet newspapers denouncing the Shah's regime (IZVESTIYA 12.5.60; PRAVDA 1.6.60; TRUD 3.6.60). Those sentenced, it was noted, had been accused of preparing a "Communist plot", and of having links with foreign states; but in fact their only crime was to defend the national independence of their country. There

was not a single year of the present Shah's reign that had not been marked by savage reprisals against the population, beginning with the brutal reprisals against Azarbaijani and Kurdish democrats in the first years of his reign.

Soviet comments on the military coup in Turkey suggested that the next convulsion might well take place in Persia. A. Leonidov, in NEW TIMES, No.22 of 1960, made a virulent attack on the Shah and the Persian ruling class ("an utterly corrupt court clique"). Greed for oil profits and "fear of the awakening people", said Leonidov, had "made these high-placed adventurers agree to turn Persia into a doomed outpost of the CENTO war bloc"; but the people of Persia were silent no longer, and "only the blind and the deaf can fail to perceive the portents of a storm".

THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
OF
KAZAKHSTAN, KIRGIZIA, TADZHIKISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN AND AZERBAIDZHAN

100 0 100 200 300 km.



- Borders of the U.S.S.R.
- Limits of Union Republics.
- Capitals of Union Republics.
- Railways.
- Canals.
- Canals under construction or projected.
- Sands.
- Main arterial road with pass.

Also published by Central Asian Research Centre

THE TURKIC LANGUAGES OF CENTRAL ASIA: Problems of Planned Culture Contact. A translation of an article entitled "The Turkic Peoples of the USSR: the Development of their Languages and Writing" by Professor N.A. Baskakov, with comments by Dr. Stefan Wurm. 52pp. large post quarto. Price: Six Shillings. (Reprinting)

TURKIC PEOPLES OF THE USSR: Their historical background, their languages and the development of Soviet linguistic policy, by Dr. Stefan Wurm. 51 pp. large post quarto. Price: Ten Shillings.

SOME FEATURES OF THE MORPHOLOGY OF THE OIROT (GORNO-ALTAI) LANGUAGE by C.G. Simpson, Reader in Turkish at the University of Durham. 68 pp. large post quarto. Price: Seven Shillings and Sixpence.

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A summary of the grammar of the current literary language of Soviet Azerbaijan together with passages of contemporary literature and extracts from the press.

TURKESTAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A Brief History of the Khanates of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva, by Mary Holdsworth. 81 pp. large post quarto. Map. Price: Fifteen Shillings.

Based largely on Russian sources, both Tsarist and Soviet, this monograph describes the state of the Khanates before, during and after the coming of the Russians.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TURKMEN LANGUAGE by G.K. Dulling. 50 pp. large post quarto. Map. Price: Fifteen Shillings.

Turkmen, while related to modern Turkish and Azeri in the south-western group of Turkic languages, differs from them in several important points of phonetics, morphology and syntax. This book describes these differences and also contains some notes on the unwritten Turkmen dialects spoken outside the Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan in Persia and Afghanistan.

RUSSIAN WORKS ON AFGHANISTAN. 12 pp. large post quarto. Price: Five Shillings.

A bibliography compiled for the most part from bibliographies and references found in Russian publications in the course of the Centre's study on Afghanistan (CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol. IV, No. 2). It does not claim to be exhaustive, but is believed to be the only one of its kind in existence.

RECENT SOVIET SOURCE MATERIAL ON SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA AND THE BORDERLANDS (including the Middle East): Issued as a biannual supplement to CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW. Approx. 50 pp. large post quarto. Price: Five Shillings.

This bibliography is limited to certain specific periodicals, about 50 in number, and to new books. Highly technical source material is not included.

MAP OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA & KAZAKHSTAN: In the form of four folded Sheets in booklet cover with Introduction, Gazetteer and Glossary. Price complete: Forty-two Shillings post free.

The Map is based on a Russian map on scale 1:5M in the ATLAS MIRA of 1954. It has been brought up to date (1958) as far as possible. Scale: 1:3,750,000. It is printed in six colours; heights, depths and contour values are given in metres.

THE MIZAN NEWSLETTER: A monthly review of Soviet writing on the Middle East (first issue January 1959), comprising articles on Soviet opinion about Middle East affairs, relations between the USSR and Middle East countries, and Soviet newspapers' presentation of Middle East developments. From July 1960 the scope of the Newsletter has been extended to include Soviet writing on Africa. Subscription rate: Four Pounds per year, post free; single copies: Seven Shillings and Sixpence.



The above map shows the area covered by *Central Asian Review* in relation to the rest of the world. The total area of the six Muslim republics is $1\frac{1}{2}$ million square miles, that is, about 23.5 per cent of the total area of Soviet Asia.

The total population of the Muslim Republics is 26,676,000 (1959 Census) or about 41.7 per cent of the total population of Soviet Asia now estimated at about 64 million. The figure of 26,676,000 includes 15,000,000 Muslims, 7,923,000 Russian, Ukrainian and Belo-russian settlers and a number of smaller non-Muslim communities such as Armenians, Koreans, Dungans and Jews amounting to a total of 832,000.

The total indigenous population of Soviet Asia is estimated at 25 million. Thus, whilst the six republics together occupy only one-fifth of the total area of the region, their indigenous (i.e. Asian) population amounts to about 66.5 per cent of the indigenous population of the whole of Soviet Asia.